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The flags of the 28 NATO member countries flap in the wind in front of headquarters in Brussels.

NATO in Context

Geopolitics and the Problem of Russian Power

BY ROBERT E. HUNTER

Since the end of the Cold War, the question “Whither NATO—and why?” has come up regularly, especially in the United States. This is not an idle question nor one that can simply be dismissed. If anything, it is remarkable that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization still exists a quarter-century after the key reason for its creation—the widely shared perception of a political, strategic, and military threat from the Soviet Union—ceased to exist. To be sure, there is now renewed challenge from the Soviet Union’s principal successor state, the Russian Federation. From the beginning of the 1990s, however, until the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014, a span of nearly 25 years, the argument could have been made that there was no need for continuing the Western alliance that did so much to contain Soviet power and the Warsaw Pact and that played a significant role in the dissolution of both. Many people did argue just this point, both in the United States and elsewhere, but they were never in the majority (or at least they never prevailed in public and parliamentary debate). The reasons for NATO’s continued existence are important to understand, including to provide a basis for considering its future and, more precisely, the tasks it should be asked to perform and its very character as an alliance of sovereign states spanning the two sides of the Atlantic.¹

Power in Europe: Until the End of the Cold War

NATO has been only one of the many instruments and political-security efforts designed to deal with problems of power in Europe. The modern history of this subject can be said to have begun

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with the end of the Napoleonic wars, when the Congress of Vienna fashioned a set of understandings that, based on the overarching concept of the balance of power, largely kept the peace on the continent until 1914, when it fell with a crash that led to the most cataclysmic war (to that time) in European history. The collapse that led to the Great War had many causes, but perhaps none so important—and certainly none so consequential for the aftermath—as the problem of German power. This had emerged with full force upon the completion of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s project to forge a more or less united Germany, with the final phase in the period between 1867 and 1871. From that time until 1945 (with a hiatus from 1918 until the late 1930s, or the “phony peace”), dealing with the “German problem” was central to forging arrangements that could bring some reasonable predictability and a method of preventing a radical imbalance of power (and hence the risk of a major European war). These efforts, too, failed and cataclysmically so. After the Second World War, one of the central problems on the continent was how to deal with the future of German power.

One key objective, shared by all the nations of Europe and extending into the time of the division of Europe between East and West, was to keep Germany from again being a principal source of instability and potential conflict in Europe—in other words, to “keep Germany down,” in the oft-quoted phrase attributed to Lord Ismay, NATO’s First Secretary General.² Furthermore, once the lines of division in Europe solidified, with Germany divided between the American, British, and French occupation zones on one side and the Soviet zone (later becoming the separate nations of West Germany and East Germany)

on the other, there was tacit East-West agreement to keep the country divided—one of the few things on which all could agree.

But concern about growing German power from 1867 onward was not the only problem plaguing Europe. Beginning in the mid-1940s, there was awareness of Soviet power in the heart of the continent—awareness that had been building for some time, certainly from the solidification of Bolshevik control in Russia and the formal creation of the Soviet Union in 1924—that embraced the old Russian empire at close to its furthest historical dimensions. The Second World War and the defeat of Nazi Germany—and especially the central role of Soviet forces in bringing about that defeat—brought Soviet military power and then progressively developing communist control to the middle of Germany, as well as north and south along a line that stretched, as Winston Churchill put it, “[f]rom Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic[.]”³ Thus, the problem of Soviet power overlapped with that of German power from the late 1940s until the end of the Cold War, when further basic transformations took place. First, by the beginning of the 1990s, it became evident that the German “problem” had been “solved,” in large measure because of developments within German society—a truly remarkable event in European history. This “problem” had to of course remain “solved.” Second, the contemporaneous collapse of the Soviet internal and external empires appeared (erroneously) to many observers to be at least a partial solution to the problem of Soviet power in Europe and, more broadly, elsewhere in the world. Indeed, the collapse of these two Soviet empires was the most profound retreat of any major nation’s or empire’s power, without war, in all of recorded peacetime history.

At that time, views regarding Germany's future coalesced. As Soviet military forces and the resultant political influence were withdrawn from both East Germany and elsewhere in Central Europe, leaders in Moscow swallowed hard and accepted not only that the two halves of Germany could be unified, but also that it could be a member of NATO, subject to some transitional arrangements contained in the so-called Two-Plus-Four Agreement (the two Germanies and the four post-World War II occupying powers).⁴ In effect, the Soviet Union/Russia had decided (or accepted) to rely on the United States to keep watch over united Germany, in part through embedding it in a Western institution that had its own practices for organizing security relationships and behavior-expectations among allied countries. This embedding was also facilitated by the membership of a united Germany in what is now the European Union.

Even so, added insurance was useful. This was especially important for Germany, as it sought to forestall the reawakening of fears among some Central European peoples and governments. Therefore, when NATO and then the European Community took in new members—most important in the first tranche were Poland and the Czech Republic, which “surrounded” Germany with these two institutions—it helped to ensure that the future economic success of—and perhaps even dominance by—a united Germany would not be perceived as “here comes Germany again,” but rather as “here are NATO and the European Union.” The same logic applied to the creation of the euro: the German economy would still be uppermost (and it continues to be so in Europe), but a visible instrument of that predominance would not be the *deutschmark*. Notably, the leading architect of these

particular insurance policies was Helmut Kohl, who served as Chancellor of both West Germany (1982-1990) and of a reunified Germany (1990-1998).

The United States as a European Power

This analysis is important background to the entry of the United States as a European power, first episodically (1917-1919 and 1943-1946) and then continually from the late 1940s onward. The third U.S. engagement was derived in part from memories of what had happened after the United States left Europe following the First World War; it was also stimulated by emerging concerns that the rapid withdrawal of the overwhelming bulk of U.S. forces from the continent after the end of World War II could lead to exploitation by the Soviet Union. Of course, that conclusion was not immediately obvious and did not reflect a consensus at the time. Indeed, there is still some debate about whether there had to be a division of Europe and a Cold War with the Soviet Union. That point is raised here because it is relevant to current circumstances. Is it possible for leaders (and nations) to live with an anomalous situation in terms of relations involving powerful states—a powerful Soviet Union in the late 1940s and today's resurgent Russia—or is the cliché “nature abhors a vacuum” (of power) too psychologically compelling? Is this the case even in circumstances where solidifying lines of division and requiring certainty in calculations about relationships could be antithetical to the securing of national interests? It is no accident that many of those in both the United States and, presumably, Russia who talk about a “new Cold War” come from the ranks of those who fought the first Cold War. These individuals were then reassured by the confidence and predictability

conferred by the existence of a stable, more or less rigid, and overarching paradigm of East-West confrontation, as opposed to the anomalous and psychologically unsettling situation of a “paradigm gap”⁵ in U.S. foreign policy following the disappearance of the Soviet Union.

Viewed in retrospect, U.S. grand strategy toward the European continent from April 1917 onward can be summarized as preventing the domination of Europe by a hostile hegemon or, at a minimum, by any country or empire that would seek to deny to the United States the prosecution of its own national interests, especially defined in economic terms.⁶ (This resistance to a “hostile hegemon” also has a major “values” dimension: the advance of liberal democracy, the twin, historically, to pursuit of national interests as prime movers of American engagement in the outside world). This definition fit the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II (with the Austro-Hungarian Empire in its wake), Nazi Germany (and, until September 1943, fascist Italy), and then the Soviet Union with its European satellites. By contrast, the United States supported the rise of a “friendly” hegemon—what is now the European Union because, beginning with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European Economic Community and its successors helped provide coherence and capability in dealing with the problems of German and Soviet power, while at the same time advancing the Kantian proposition that democracies are more pacific than authoritarian or totalitarian societies. Even this American acceptance of a role for the EU has its limits, however, as the U.S. does from time to time still try to play EU members off one another⁷ and it still has not fully accepted a major role, in potential

competition with NATO, of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).⁸

In the late 1940s, the United States came to believe that, without a reassertion of American power on the continent on a lasting, rather than an episodic, basis, Soviet power (both geopolitical and ideological-economic) was likely to prevail across Europe, to the detriment of U.S. interests and values, as well as those of the European liberal democracies.⁹ It is important to note that the establishment of American power in Europe did not happen overnight but was progressive¹⁰, and that it also involved both public and private sector elements.¹¹ Revival of democratic politics (and opposition to communist politics, especially in France and Italy) went hand in hand with economic revival.

It was only near the end of the decade that these political and economic efforts appeared to be insufficient as Soviet power and influence were being consolidated farther east. There was a growing belief that the United States had to make a strategic commitment to the continent to promote confidence on the part of what were becoming known as West European countries. As such, in signing the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the United States for the first time committed itself permanently to the defense of other countries.¹² Even so, the North Atlantic Treaty contains no automatic commitment by any ally to come to the defense of another signatory against “armed aggression.” Rather, in the words of Article 5, each of the Allies is obligated to take “such action as it deems necessary.”¹³ At U.S. insistence, sovereignty was and continues to be fully preserved. (It is not for nothing that the North Atlantic Council takes all decisions by consensus, which in itself conveys strength, not weakness. When the Council has taken a

decision, including for the use of military force, no allied country has ever gone against that decision, even though no NATO operation has ever included all of the Allies. NATO has always operated militarily as a “coalition of the willing,” though not in terms of the political commitment to stand together).

Even so, the U.S. commitment to the security of its initial 11 Allies was political—a strategic commitment without any tangible manifestation at first. However, critically important despite that limitation—especially as measured against the historic reluctance of the United States and the American people to make such a commitment—was the fact that it received bipartisan support in the U.S. Senate.¹⁴ It was only after the start of the Korean War in June 1950, which seemed to show that the Soviet Union was prepared to use military force to advance its geopolitical ambitions, that NATO was militarized. Indeed, Allied Command Europe only came into being almost two years to the day (April 2, 1951) after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.

This review is important because it presages so much of what happened at the end of the Cold War, as well as what is happening now.¹⁵ The process in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was remarkably similar to what had happened in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and consisted of an amalgam of politics, economics, strategic commitment, and military forces and institutions. It is this process and its relevance to the problem of dealing with Russian power in Europe today that is the focus of the balance of this article. Further, given the centrality of the problem of Russian power, the article will not explore other key aspects of the development of NATO, including the so-called “out of area” issues, extending beyond Europe and into the Middle East

and North Africa, or critical security issues on the continent, including the influx of refugees and other migrants that is posing the most severe crisis for the EU in decades.

NATO’s First Break-Point: When the Music Changed

The most remarkable thing about NATO in the post-Cold War period was that it continued on, something that historically does not happen to alliances when the war is over. Equally remarkable was that the United States did not leave Europe, either by taking out all of its military forces¹⁶ or—more importantly, in fact—by in any way slackening its strategic commitment to the continent.

There were a number of reasons for both phenomena. Perhaps most important was inertia, an all-important quality in international relations or indeed in any big organization; there was no impetus to dismantle NATO, especially with its elaboration of processes and products that had made it truly the most successful (political-) military alliance in history. That included the historically unique integrated military command structure, the layering of committees and processes to take decisions across national lines, the standardization of many weapons and procedures, and the fact that, for most of the European Allies (plus Canada, though not the United States), military affairs and activities had been effectively “denationalized.” Each nation retained its sovereignty and maintained its own way of conducting its national security, but all of these non-American Allies focused in the first instance on responsibilities that were denominated by their membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.¹⁷

Why the United States sustained such a strong European commitment is more

complex. The United States was then and continues to be, in NATO jargon, the “800-pound gorilla.” Without going into the full history of what transpired, there was the memory of what had happened at earlier moments when the United States had withdrawn strategically and militarily from the continent. More significantly, Europe continued to be important to the United States, although following the end of the Cold War this was denominated more in economic and other non-military terms than militarily. There was also strategic security business to be done, both to ensure that the great challenge to European security, the Soviet Union, was indeed fractured beyond repair, as at the same time its forces were being withdrawn, and to help restructure relations among countries that were emerging or reemerging from decades of suppression under Soviet power and tutelage.¹⁸ While it cannot be

quantified, the United States has learned over the years that its strategic commitment to European security, however that may be defined in any period, buys it a lot of political and economic influence. In short, it gets cut a lot of slack by Allies simply because it can be relied upon to be ready and willing to help if there are security-related troubles. Indeed, testing whether that proposition continues to be true and, if so, to what degree and in what forms, is one of the key conundrums facing the Alliance at the moment and is likely to be so for the foreseeable future. The United States at the end of the Cold War confirmed itself as a European power; the extent to which it will continue playing that role lies at the heart of many of the challenges that face the West, including the future and value of NATO.

The reconstruction of European security and other developments made possible by the



Leaders from Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine gathered to sign the documents dissolving the Soviet Union and creating the Commonwealth of Independent States on December 8, 1991.

end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the internal and external Russian empires, and the withdrawal of most of Russian military and strategic capacity from Central Europe all have many fathers and mothers, as is true of most great historical developments.¹⁹ One such “father,” as noted earlier, was certainly Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. But perhaps the most important was U.S. President George H.W. Bush, who argued in Mainz, Germany, as early as May 1989 (six months before the opening of the Berlin Wall), for a “Europe whole and free,” later supplemented with the words “and at peace.”²⁰ It may be that President Bush did not himself at the time understand the full import of what he was proposing. These few words constituted a basic grand strategy for the United States and the West in Europe and set forth an ambition that has never been realized in European history.

Pursuing a Europe Whole and Free and at Peace

In the first years after the end of the Cold War, the United States provided most of the leadership in transforming NATO so that it could attempt to accomplish this basic strategic vision.²¹ This included several elements, each of which was designed to meet a particular strategic problem and, more importantly, was dependent on all of the other elements. The most important were as follows:

- Retaining the United States as a European power, in whatever terms and dimensions are necessary to make this convincing to all, as well as both to foster strategic confidence in Europe and to advance America’s own national goals on the continent;
- Preserving the “best of the past,” notably the structure and practices of the NATO

Alliance, with the integrated military command structure being most important, along with continued efforts to forestall the “rena-tionalizing” of NATO military forces;

- Keeping the German problem solved;
- Taking the Central European countries off the European geopolitical chess board where they had been proximate causes of the 20th century’s two world wars and, to a significant degree, the Cold War. This includes inhibiting the reemergence of old national quarrels or at least doing as much as possible to suppress them. (Of course, what the European Union has done is also important and arguably more so than what NATO has done to achieve this purpose);

- Preventing, if at all possible, an impetus in Russia—following the Soviet Union’s geopolitical, political, and economic collapse—for revanchism, as had happened in Germany after the First World War and the “unequal peace” imposed on it in the series of treaties that came out of the Versailles and other post-war conferences;²²

- Ensuring that Ukraine, newly independent and the most important country bordering on European Russia, would not fall under Moscow’s sway but would also not, at least at first, be formally and fully integrated into key Western institutions, including NATO, even though Western “aspirations” would be honored;

- Downsizing and repositioning NATO military forces, in effect reorienting them about 120 degrees from the old inner-German border toward southeast Europe (for example, the nations of the former Yugoslavia and possibly beyond), with the U.S. Air Force notably being largely moved from its principal locus at Ramstein, Germany, to Aviano, Italy. At the same time,

the U.S. proposed, and the Alliance accepted, the creation of Combined Joint Task Forces, which would provide the NATO military with greater flexibility; and

■ Beginning to break down walls between NATO and the European Union, operating on the principle that “security” in Europe would be as much as, if not more than, about economic and political developments—that is, democracy—as about military matters.²³ The EU would thus necessarily play an instrumental role in economics and politics that had proved so successful in Western Europe during the previous four decades. The Western ambition at the start of the 1990s was to extend this principle and practice into countries suddenly coming out from under Soviet influence and control. There were even hopes that this could happen in Russia.

The principal reason for listing these core parts of the new grand strategy is to denote that each element related to a fundamental objective of European security, including America’s interest in it. They show the intersection and interaction of political, economic, and security (military) factors, in a symbiotic relationship, as had been true from the onset of the Cold War. Of course, the private sector also has had a major role to play. Indeed, one reason for the continuing strength of transatlantic ties is that economic relations between the United States and the EU countries, in both public and private sectors, are closer to balance both in terms of trade and balance of payments, as well as in cross-border investments and ownership, than is true, in particular, with China, and as was true at the time of U.S. concerns with Japanese economic competition.

President George H.W. Bush’s vision, as elaborated both during the balance of his administration and in much of the Clinton administration, was also to try achieving something even more fundamental in terms of relations among states, especially given Europe’s often painful and tragic history: to try to move beyond two historic practices, namely the balance of power and spheres of influence. This was a tall order and, in fact, this transformation has so far proved to be unattainable, though at first there did seem to be some promise of doing so and it remains a goal worth pursuing.

Key to achieving the strategic elements of the overarching grand strategy was and still is dealing effectively with the great problem of power on the continent that remained after the end of the Cold War: the future of Russia. Clearly, making it possible to avoid a reintroduction of spheres of influence and balance of power politics, as well as the risks of renewed challenges to European security writ large, would require incorporating Russia into a larger framework. More than any other, it is this problem that has not been solved, nor is there currently much prospect of achieving that goal, if it can be at all, at least for the foreseeable future. Indeed, from the time “Europe whole and free and at peace” was proposed as an organizing principle for Europe, three criteria regarding Russia had to be fulfilled: 1) there would not be an onset of serious revanchism in Russia; 2) Russia would have to abstain from trying to establish suzerainty over countries in its neighborhood;²⁴ and 3) any new arrangements in European security could not be at the expense of the security or other legitimate interests of any European country (including Russia and every other European nation) or of the continued operation of the

NATO Alliance²⁵, including the critical continued engagement of the United States.

Part of the problem has been the way in which the different elements of the grand strategy, as unpacked here, have been pursued.²⁶ The most critical efforts have had to deal with the triple issues of: 1) taking Central European states off the geopolitical chessboard; 2) making a place for Ukraine, without either its falling under the sway of Russia or its premature, formal incorporation in Western institutions such that Russia would have legitimate (not “neo-imperial”) cause for concern; and 3) not isolating Russia, but rather trying to draw it productively into the outside world, and more particularly the West, without its either threatening or being threatened by others.

NATO’s most important effort to try squaring these various circles was to create the Partnership for Peace (PFP).²⁷ Given the differing interests found within the West, in particular on the part of national institutions (for example, the military), PFP coalesced around three basic purposes: 1) to help transform and “socialize” the militaries of non-NATO member countries that joined PFP and, building on the inculcation of Western standards and practices, to have a positive impact on broader society; 2) to help aspirant countries prepare themselves for possible NATO membership so they could be “producers and not just consumers of security;”²⁸ and 3) to help countries that would never (or not soon) join NATO as full Allies to advance their security capabilities, work with NATO, and, in the process, fall within the “penumbra” of NATO engagement, though without the benefit of the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 security guarantees.²⁹ Further, it was decided that any countries that belonged to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could join PFP

and also NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and thus presumably have a chance for Alliance membership.³⁰ That definition included all of the so-called neutral and non-aligned countries, all components of the former Yugoslavia, and all components of the former Soviet Union—thus defining as “European” countries as far afield as Kyrgyzstan!

Two major problems intruded. First, it was difficult to get the Russians to join PFP, as something fashioned by NATO, though the Yeltsin administration eventually did so. Second, for many of the Central European states, PFP was clearly not enough, despite the working relationships with NATO that it afforded. For them, coming out of decades of domination and with no confidence in their future security in the absence of something more tangible, only NATO membership would suffice (even EU membership would not be enough, given that it would not include security guarantees backed by the United States). This desire, strongly backed for some countries by the German government (for reasons discussed earlier), was responsible for the beginning of NATO’s enlargement into Central Europe. However, moving in this direction raised two major problems with regard to the basic issues of dealing with Russian power in Europe, present or future. The first was how to reassure Russia that including Central European states in the NATO Alliance would not be a first step toward either “confronting” Russia, “excluding” it from Europe, or “surrounding” it with Western power, at least on the European side. The second problem was that, if there were to be some effort to reassure Russia on these points, what needed to be done about Ukraine so that it would not feel itself to be consigned to a Russian sphere of

influence, either hard or soft? The Ukraine piece of the puzzle had to be pursued in a way that would not consign it to a no-man's land or that would set aside the additional principle that countries should have the right to decide their own future orientation and associations. (Of course, that has never meant that any country wishing to join NATO can automatically do so). This is a tricky balance to strike and has often led to misunderstandings and disappointed expectations.³¹

The Interlocking Steps of 1997—And Russia's Later Reactions

Key developments took place in 1997 in a series of interlocking steps. NATO decided to take in three new members (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic);³² it negotiated with Moscow a NATO-Russia Founding Act which, among other things, created a Permanent Joint Council at NATO Headquarters and the ambition to work together in 19 areas;³³ and it negotiated a NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership and created a NATO-Ukraine Council at NATO Headquarters.³⁴

For many officials and commentators in the West and, in particular, in the United States, these arrangements, taken together with other steps, constituted a new set of understandings about the future of power in Europe and a way to avoid reversion to the kind of difficulties that had led to the two great wars of the 20th century and the Cold War.

Unfortunately, Russia has never accepted this analysis, nor is it obvious that there was any formulation that Russia would have been willing to accept, either then or since, short of the dissolution of NATO and maybe not even that. Perhaps nothing the West could have proposed would have made possible a workable similarity of interests and practices between

NATO and Russia, even if Vladimir Putin had not come to power but rather the Kremlin had continued with leaders such as Boris Yeltsin or Dmitry Medvedev, who was Russian president from 2008 to 2012, between the two Putin presidencies. Indeed, there is a popular Western view that what Putin has done is more or less in Russia's DNA and thus inevitable.³⁵

But whether what has transpired could have been different does have bearing on what might be possible in the future. In particular, is there anything the West, especially the United States, can do to deal with Russian power in Europe, while fully preserving Western interests, without simply accepting the need to confront the Putin administration for as long as is necessary, presumably until there is some change within the Russian government, economy, and society analogous to the developments that led the Soviet Union to dissolve?

This article will prescribe a number of steps for the United States, NATO, and other Western countries and institutions to take now or in the near future to ameliorate the current problem of Russian power in Europe.³⁶ First, however, it is necessary to examine things that have been done over the last several years that contributed to the current imbroglio. They can at least be instructive as illustrative "thou shalt nots" for the future, on both sides.

With his seizure of Crimea in February 2014 and the extension of Russian military activities (both direct and indirect) into other parts of Ukraine, President Putin's Russia is clearly violating agreements that bind the country, notably the Helsinki Final Act of 1975³⁷ and the Budapest memorandum of 1994.³⁸ Moscow has also not fulfilled its commitments regarding Ukraine under the so-called Minsk II Agreement.³⁹ Russia's direct

military actions within Ukraine have been supplemented by activities in other spheres and in other places in Central Europe, notably cyber attacks, manipulation of energy markets, economic penetration, and either direct or indirect propaganda and efforts to subvert democratic practices and institutions. These efforts also supplement what Putin and others have done to reduce the chances for development of liberal democratic politics and society in Russia—a subject that is indicative of parallel attitudes toward matters of Russia’s projection of power beyond its borders.

Yet while fully recognizing Russia’s primary responsibility for current challenges to European security, we in the West still need to try devising a set of strategies that can offer a

means for dealing effectively with the problem of Russian power in Europe in order to avoid being condemned to another open-ended, potentially dangerous, and certainly costly confrontation. One step in this process is to understand that the West and especially the United States also played a considerable part in bringing us to the current situation.⁴⁰

This understanding needs to start with recognition that it is incorrect to argue that Russia has been violating agreed norms of the post-Cold War world in Europe and a new order (other than violation of particular treaty commitments). Since Russia has not in fact been involved in creation of such norms and order, it cannot be said to be in violation. This is a key point that is generally ignored by critics of



A group of unmarked soldiers conduct a routine patrol at the Simferopol Airport in Crimea. These “little green men,” as they were referred to by the media, were later identified as members of the Russian armed forces.

Putin's behavior who stigmatize what he has been doing. We do not like it, and we can and do oppose it, but he has not gone against some agreed-upon understandings, since such understandings could not exist in the absence of serious Russian participation in framing them. This is a basic principle of statecraft and a lesson for the future.

Following the period when the United States and other Western countries believed that an effective system of security relationships had been put in place for Europe, several Western and especially U.S. actions, particularly under President George W. Bush, could reasonably have been viewed by Moscow, under any leadership, as pushing it aside or at least as not taking its legitimate interests into account. In effect, from the latter part of the Clinton administration through the next two U.S. administrations, President George H.W. Bush's ambition to try including Russia fully in development of European security was largely ignored. Russia (the Soviet Union) had lost the Cold War, so the reasoning went, and it could be marginalized or at least accorded minor status in deliberations about the future of Europe. The first part of this statement is true (the Soviets lost the Cold War); the second (Russia could be ignored) helped to sow the wind. Ukraine, more than any other country, has reaped the resultant whirlwind.

Notably, in June 2002, the U.S. unilaterally abrogated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.⁴¹ Following the Cold War and the effective end of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation, the treaty arguably was no longer important strategically; symbolically, however, it showed that Russia was still "at the top table" along with the United States. Abrogation was a gratuitous act, a demonstration that the U.S. could do whatever it wanted, as it also did

when it led NATO in attacking Serbia in 1999 (over Kosovo), without a UN Security Council Resolution, and in invading Iraq in 2003⁴²—a country not close to Russia, but also not in a part of the world of no interest to it.⁴³

Then, in 2004, NATO took in seven more members in addition to the first three.⁴⁴ Russia had moderated its criticism of the first enlargement because, as noted above, including the Poles and the Czechs "surrounded" Germany with NATO, thus helping to insure against any risk of German revanchism. For NATO to invite the three Baltic countries to join could be cited as a "special case," though the Russians didn't like it, since the West had never accepted their incorporation into the Soviet Union under the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. But Romania and Bulgaria, along with Slovakia and Slovenia? And later Croatia, Albania, and now, in 2016, Montenegro? Including Romania and Bulgaria especially fed Russian fears, realistic or not, that NATO was bent on determining the future of European security on its own, particularly in Central Europe.⁴⁵

Two other Western steps played into Russian suspicions. The first was the U.S. decision, eventually blessed by NATO, to deploy anti-ballistic missile sites in Central Europe. These are designed to defend against North Korean missiles and those that Iran might develop at some point in the distant future—the latter rationale being advanced on security grounds but in fact essentially reflecting U.S. domestic politics. The U.S. has argued that these missile defenses would in no way impact Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal—that is, eroding mutually assured destruction. In fact, the U.S. is correct in its reasoning, and Russian analysts know it. But that is not the point. As viewed from Moscow, the United States was

showing it could act militarily at will in Central Europe, regardless of what the Russians might say, and, in the process, go against the spirit (though not the letter⁴⁶) of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.

More important, however, was NATO's declaration at its April 2008 Bucharest summit that "[Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."⁴⁷ This was designed as a face-saving device for U.S. President George W. Bush when several European members were not prepared to give these two countries even a non-committal Membership Action Plan, pointing toward potential NATO membership at some unspecified point in the future, but without any guarantee that it would in fact occur. Unfortunately, the wording of the summit declaration could only be read—however unwittingly it was drafted—as the actual formal commitment by the Allies ("they will become members") to the security of these two countries against external aggression under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili read NATO's declaration that way and tested the proposition in South Ossetia. Vladimir Putin also obviously read the NATO declaration the same way and slapped Georgia down in a short conflict. Given that no NATO ally came to Georgia's military defense, the Bucharest declaration proved to be worse than useless, not just by showing that no ally truly saw Georgia as a future NATO member, but also by implicitly calling into question the worth of Article 5.

Matters may have rested there, but competition over Ukraine began to increase. Russia sought to draw Ukraine closer to its orbit, while the U.S. worked gradually to draw Ukraine fully into the West. Thus both sides acted to erode the tacit understanding about

Ukraine's future relationships, both with Russia and with NATO, before there was a serious exploration into whether to include Russia in the future of European security arrangements and, if so, how. In 2008, then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev sent NATO a number of proposals on a broader framework, but they fell well short of what the West could accept and were thus not given serious consideration.⁴⁸

The West also did not fully explore the economic track. Russia was admitted to the World Trade Organization only in 2012, after 18 years of negotiations, whereas in order to demonstrate to Russia the West's desire to include it in global institutions that step should have been taken immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Further, the U.S. Congress only then repealed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974⁴⁹, which had limited trade with the Soviet Union in order to punish it for restricting Jewish emigration, even though the rationale for the amendment had collapsed some 21 years previously. Finally, no U.S. public officials of any stature attended Putin's showcase Winter Olympics in Sochi in early 2014, a clear and obviously intended departure from past practice and a rebuke to Russian human rights abuses as viewed in the United States. (Despite American actions, only Putin knows whether or not they had any instrumental impact.)

A Way Forward in Dealing with the Problem of Russian Power

With this brief analysis of "how we all got here from there" and without trying to be comprehensive, a few general principles are in order regarding Western policies that could, among other things, help to deal with the continuing problem of Russian power in Europe:

The United States In. The United States needs to remain deeply engaged as a European power. This is so in part because the basic U.S. grand strategy toward Europe, from April 1917 onward, is essentially unchanged. Clearly, the potential challenge from Russia to the continent as a whole is not what it was during the Cold War. Nevertheless, most of the states on Russia's western periphery, not just Ukraine, are deeply concerned, and they would be even more so if none of them had become members of NATO. Of course, this statement begs the question whether, without NATO enlargement and other Western steps that ignored legitimate Russian interests, Putin would have taken the steps he did against Ukraine and also, less directly, against a number of other Central European states. But "better safe than sorry" is a good principle when history cannot be undone or "tested" in a controlled experiment.

Further, there is a common understanding in Europe that no matter how much military capacity any European country has, none, even in combination, would be able to deal with a Russia determined to have its way in this area, for example, against one or more Baltic States. The United States remains indispensable. Indeed, even after the Cold War, the European Allies have worked assiduously to keep the United States engaged strategically on the continent—with "strategically" defined more in terms of political commitment than in actual deployment of military forces (though interest in the return to Europe of some U.S. forces has risen since the beginning of Russian actions against Ukraine). Insuring continued U.S. strategic commitment to Europe was a major reason that the Allies responded so promptly and strongly after the U.S. was attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001, which led, the next day, to NATO's only ever invocation of Article

5 (without a request from the United States to do so). Further, when the United States sought European (and other) support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, every single NATO Ally, as well as a number of PFP partners, sent military forces and other security personnel. Arguably, almost all of them did so not because they felt threatened at home by Taliban-instigated terrorism, but rather to help ensure that the United States would come to their aid if need be—and the "need be" has meant, more than anything else, a potential threat from Russia. Thus it is natural that the Allies, whether those directly in the potential line of fire from Russia or others more remote within Europe, want the U.S. to be prepared to redeem this implicit bargain.

Remember Europe. The United States must show that it has not reduced its interest in Europe. It does not take much imagination or insight to realize that the attention paid by the U.S. Government to Europe generally has been slackening over the years, especially after the completion of NATO's restructuring during the 1990s, followed by the U.S.-led military actions in Bosnia and over Kosovo.⁵⁰ Though some reordering of U.S. global priorities between the time of operations in Kosovo (1999) and Russia's seizure of Crimea (2014) was clearly merited, this did become a matter of concern to Europeans when the U.S. announced that it would undertake a "rebalancing" to Asia. This was a natural development that derived from shifts in global economics and, thus, in some degree geopolitics. The United States has long been a power in both the Pacific and the Atlantic, and did not isolate itself from the Western Pacific in the 1920s and 1930s to the degree it did from Europe. The United States thus correctly

believes itself able to “walk and chew gum at the same time.” Nevertheless, concern developed in Europe about an excessive shift in U.S. attention and thus possibly reduced readiness to respond to perceptions of insecurity regarding Russian power in Europe.

This sense that the United States might not be as willing to engage in Europe or that it may not be making intelligent judgments was compounded by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which provoked the worst crisis ever within the NATO Alliance and which has presented major problems for the West ever since.⁵¹ There has also been concern expressed about the manner in which the military campaign against Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya was conducted⁵², as a problem more of perception (U.S. “leading from behind”) than of reality, considering the critical role of American airpower in that conflict. Furthermore, there has been a common belief in recent years (at least up until events in Crimea and even to a significant extent afterward) that Washington has been less interested in exercising leadership in Europe than in the past. Given the many uncertainties regarding Russian intentions, this is not a good message for United States to send to its Allies.

The military response. Some of the Western response to Putin’s actions thus far, as well as to the uncertainties regarding what he might do next, does require a military response of an appropriate and useful nature and needs to involve the United States. It must at least be clear that the United States does take—and will continue to take—seriously European security matters. This is necessary in order to reassure Allied states, especially the three Baltic nations, that NATO is committed to their security. NATO took several steps at its 2014 summit in Wales.⁵³ These steps included,

“continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance...developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats...[and] a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a new Allied joint force that will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise.”⁵⁴ It is also important, however, to recognize that NATO is unlikely to prevail against Russian conventional forces if Putin were to take further direct military action⁵⁵, as opposed to steps in areas such as cyber or energy, or stirring trouble among Russian populations in any of these states. The political and, hence, strategic commitment is of the essence, beyond some “demonstration effects,” and it applies in particular to perceptions of U.S. engagement, not just militarily or even in NATO terms, but in terms of overall commitment to Europe⁵⁶

Striking a balance. It is also important to differentiate between Western efforts to reassure Central European countries and actions that would contribute little to actually affecting Putin’s calculations, but which, by contrast, he can represent to the Russian people as further evidence that Russia is being “surrounded” by the West or is being “disrespected” and denied its “proper place in the sun.” As argued above, the West, and particularly the United States, has been derelict in this regard, although it is not possible to prove whether the series of U.S. errors has been instrumental in helping to determine Putin’s projections of Russian military power against Ukraine and indirectly elsewhere in Central Europe. The NATO Allies need to be mindful of the spirit as well as the letter of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, as well as its original purposes, in deciding what to do militarily in

terms of deployments and bases. Balances need to be struck. To be sure, Russia is in default on treaty commitments, but the circumstances of perception are not symmetrical. Putin uses what the West does in his domestic propaganda, which is all the more psychologically compelling given that it must be clear to all attentive Russians that their country is indeed inferior in most of the constituent elements of national power and influence. Something similar relates to the imposition of sanctions on the Russian economy, in hopes that domestic political pressures will cause Putin to change course. Maybe they will, but Western calculations reflect at least in part the tendency to see in economic sanctions greater capacity to change behavior than is borne out by historical experience, except on rare occasions. Furthermore, if a nation's leadership considers that something truly important is at stake, sanctions almost always fail. The West does have to calculate that, at least in the short-term, sanctions that affect the average Russian can be used by Putin for anti-Western domestic propaganda. Indeed, imposing sanctions is classically more of a "feel good" option when others are not attractive than a serious effort to achieve goals.

Remember first principles. In seeking to deal with the problem of Russian power in Europe, both now and later, it is important to revert to first principles of the 1940s: that military instruments are only one element in the overall mix for mobilization of Western power and influence, both absolute and countervailing. Politics (including support for democracy) in Central European states is a critical factor, as is economics—in both the public and private sectors. Indeed, the "hollowing out" of the Soviet Union was accomplished less by Western military power (which proved to be

the shield) than by economic power and political example (the sword). Something similar might also prove to be true regarding Russia's future. (This is the case for sanctions). The roles of political and economic factors are even more applicable to Ukraine, where entrenched corruption helps to facilitate Russia's intervention, notably because of the impact of corruption on Ukraine's economic and political failures. The failure of Ukrainian liberal democratic politics goes along with lagging Western investment in the country, as well as Kyiv's unwillingness to consider arrangements that will grant significant autonomy to Russian-ethnic and Russian-speaking regions. In short, dealing with the problem of Russian power overall requires a package of instruments, approaches, and attitudes that emphasize inherent Western strengths⁵⁷ and needs to include steps by Ukraine that focus on its future success as a nation. The same is true in other Central European states that are lagging behind in economic and democratic development.

Rethinking NATO Enlargement. Even if there were to emerge further credible threats from the Russian Federation toward its Western neighbors, the Alliance needs to consider carefully the pace and extent of further membership enlargement under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Allies have already accepted that they will cope with the added administrative, political, and even military integration challenges posed by having many more members than before. But calculations also need to be made about what added security is truly to be gained, especially by countries in Central Europe that are not "in the line of fire" from Russia, so to speak. Every country within Europe proper that could have legitimate concerns about the need for Article

5 strategic-military guarantees against potential aggression is already a member of the Alliance.⁵⁸ It can, in fact, be argued that there has already been too much NATO enlargement, at least prior to further attempts to see whether Russia could be included in a mutually advantageous and mutual security-producing way in a “Europe whole and free.” Of course, most Central European states remain under the illusion that they can truly be full members of the West and attractive to Western investment only by being members of NATO. This is not the case; rather, they must undertake necessary internal economic, political, and social reforms.⁵⁹ PFP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (along with steps by the EU) put countries in the Western “family”; increasing NATO membership at this point is likely on balance to be counterproductive in

terms of overall security and other requirements, especially in dealing with the problem of Russian power and Putin’s domestic exploitation of NATO’s expansion. Of course, this also means that Finland and Sweden should continue their current non-membership relationships with NATO, rather than seeking to join. That would serve no useful purpose either for them or for the Alliance.

Ukraine’s case remains most important. Given the value of not bringing Ukraine formally into either NATO or the EU, at least until efforts were exhausted to create some overarching security arrangements in Europe that would include Russia—the original tacit “bargain” of 1997—there is merit in considering a status for Ukraine for the foreseeable future similar to that adopted by some of the Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) countries



A pro-European protest held in Kyiv in 2013 embodied the willing nature of the Ukrainian democratic movement, however as of yet Ukraine has been unable to translate this into a successful and stable regime.

during the Cold War. Most instructive were the position, politics, and practices of Finland. While firmly within the Western family of nations (and implicitly to be assisted if it were attacked by the Soviet Union), it also maintained relations with Moscow that were non-threatening. This relationship was called “Finlandization” and, while some U.S. observers found it morally unacceptable in terms of “friends versus enemies,” it proved to be effective. Something similar could be a useful transitional device for Ukraine.⁶⁰

Instruments of Western power and influence: integration and balance. The requirements of dealing intelligently and effectively with the problem of Russian power in Europe has now demonstrated beyond argument the critical requirement that NATO and the European Union finally break down remaining barriers to their cooperation with one another, and not just those that involve the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. The problems facing Europe and the United States do not arrange themselves according to neat institutional lines, but rather will require broad understanding of interconnections and the need for coordinated responses. It is nonsense that three countries—Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—have been able to stymie developments in NATO-EU cooperation that should have been achieved two decades ago. Further, it is now necessary to have a method—a political-level process—that will foster integrated Western analysis and action across the full range of political, economic, and strategic (including military) matters. This needs to include analysis of the best uses of scarce resources. NATO has developed a goal of two percent of GDP spending on defense by each Ally, a goal that few Allies are able to meet. In fact, as argued above, the role of NATO

conventional military forces would be limited in dealing with a projection of Russian military power in Europe if Moscow were to do more than it already is doing.⁶¹ More relevant (and thus likely to be more efficacious for the West over time) is to provide substantial resources to help build up economies (especially that of Ukraine) that are vulnerable to Russian inroads. It is therefore far better for the NATO nations to set a standard for contributions to *security* overall rather than *military* spending, perhaps even a higher level of effort than two percent of GDP. Indeed, even if all of the NATO Allies met the goal of two percent of GDP in military spending, it would likely be of marginal value in deterring or countering any further hostile Russian intentions in Central Europe.⁶² A commitment to a broader definition of security, however, focusing especially on the economic realm, could have a significant impact.

At the same time, increased military and related activities designed to dissuade Russia from further adventures against Ukraine and other parts of Central Europe must not, in the West’s overall interests, lead it to drift into a permanent confrontation with Russia as a byproduct of taking those actions that are necessary, unless Russia makes such a permanent confrontation unavoidable which, at this juncture, seems unlikely. Indeed, the original idea of Partnership for Peace (and EU analogues)—that participation by every “European” country is possible and even desirable—needs to apply here as well. This is not to be naïve or to expect that Russia will want to participate in institutions and processes that it has had no role in designing anytime soon. It is also possible that Putin has already decided that maximizing Russian advantages, whatever the penalties, is the best course to pursue. Clearly, he has to

decide the balance of risks and benefits, especially regarding the potential long-term isolation of the Russian Federation from deep engagement in the outside world, where poor choices made by the Soviet Union ultimately led to its self-defeat and fall from the ranks of great powers. In the meantime, however, the West needs to make its own calculations regarding whether it might, in time, be possible to develop with all the countries of Europe a workable approach to the problem of Russian power that is also supportive of Western interests. This goal should be kept in mind in designing and implementing efforts for existing, reformed, and possibly new institutions.

In general, there needs to be balance between acting where necessary against unacceptable assertions of Russian power and seeking opportunities to engage Russia productively, if at some point it will be prepared to do so, rather than the West's concluding now that Moscow will continue to choose the ultimately self-defeating path of single-country aggrandizement. A major risk in the alternative to such a search for possible cooperation, of course, is the development of a rigid approach, the over-militarization of responses, and the playing into Putin's hands (for as long as the Russian leadership pursues current policies and approaches in Central Europe) with regard to his using Western actions to convince the Russian public that their country is being denigrated and treated with far less respect than Russians believe it merits as a (putative) great power.

Moving onward? Finally, in judging approaches for a long-term strategy regarding the problem of Russian power in Europe, it is important not to lose sight of an "off ramp" from what Putin has been doing. That includes

not exaggerating Russian capabilities, military and otherwise, and not forgetting lessons from retrospective analysis of Cold War developments, including, perhaps most critically, that viewing military capabilities as a good predictor of political intentions can be self-defeating and even dangerous. Furthermore, it is perhaps most important that current debates not lead to a solidification of views in the West, especially in the United States, that Russian behavior is irremediable or that it must be confronted for the indefinite future, perhaps in a new Cold War. The risks of self-fulfilling prophecy are all too real, especially when viewed in terms of the tendency of human nature to desire sharp lines of division and even, as so often appears in U.S. debate, a division between "good guys" and "bad guys." Currently, Putin is quite willing to play his part as the villain, and he may see his stature in Russia rising as a result. But it would be a profound mistake for the West to take this as an invitation to create a new line of division within Europe and to condemn ourselves to another lengthy period of self-defeating confrontation or worse.

Attitudes in the West will be critical and must include self-confidence and a willingness to engage Russia where that can be both advantageous to the West and also mutually attractive and beneficial.⁶³ This does not mean neglecting what Putin has done so far; that cannot—and must not—be ignored. But it is also important to be intelligent in judging what is to be done rather than ceding the initiative to Putin. A good place to begin looking for potential opportunities is in the 19 areas of potential NATO-Russian cooperation contained in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.⁶⁴ These areas of potential cooperation should include the NATO-Russia Council if

Russia is prepared to engage seriously to mutual benefit—a testing ground of its intentions. At some point, there could be consideration of supplementary security arrangements.

In sum, the overall objective in dealing with the problem of Russian power on the European continent should be that first advanced by President George H.W. Bush: to build a “Europe whole and free and at peace.” Above all, for the West to seize and retain the initiative, it must be clear and unemotional in its analysis, thoughtful in strategic planning, resistant to both overreaction and underreaction, and confident of the West’s inherent strengths, which are vastly superior to those of Russia. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Because of NATO’s current central concerns with Russia, this article will focus primarily on NATO’s role in continental Europe: in particular, its collective defense function, less so its crisis management and cooperative security functions. See: “Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012,” <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

² “Lord Ismay Quotes,” *Goodreads*, <https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/4322359.Lord_Ismay>.

³ See: “Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech,” <<http://www.westminster-mo.edu/explore/history-traditions/IronCurtainSpeech.html>>.

⁴ “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany,” September 12, 1990, <<http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm>>

⁵ The author coined this term in about 1992.

⁶ The United States was in effect adopting the view propounded by Professor Halford J. Mackinder of the London School of Economics, often paraphrased that whoever controls the heartland of Europe controls the world. See: “The Geographical Pivot of History,” *The Geographical Journal* 23, no. 4 (April 1904), <<http://www.thinkorbebeaten.com/Library/M/MacKinder's%20Heartland%20Theory.pdf>>.

⁷ This is particularly evident in negotiations on trade deals, even though the Treaty of Rome invests this authority in the European Commission (Article 113). The United States will seek advantages from one or another European country, a common practice in diplomacy.

⁸ Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1463/MR1463.fore.pdf>.

⁹ Notably, the United Kingdom played a major role in seeking the engagement of U.S. power permanently in Europe. The British Labour government helped to inspire what became the Marshall Plan and took the lead in creating, through the March 1948 Brussels Treaty, the Western Union (which later evolved into the Western European Union and, today, CSDP), which was instrumental in fostering America’s

lead in developing the North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty of Washington) of April 1949.

¹⁰ Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill's now historic speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, proclaiming the onset of an "Iron Curtain," was widely criticized in the United States and it can be argued even now that he was premature. It is also interesting to note that Churchill had previously apparently tried to cut a deal with Joseph Stalin on the future of the Continent. See: Winston S. Churchill, "Sinews of Peace" (speech, Westminster College, Fulton, MO, March 5, 1946), National Churchill Museum, <<https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/sinews-of-peace-iron-curtain-speech.html>>. On U.S. responses to the speech, as reported to the Foreign Office in London by the British Embassy in Washington, see: Paul Halsell, "Winston S. Churchill's 'Iron Curtain Speech' March 5 1946, Joseph Stalin's response, and British Foreign Office assessment of speech impact," *The Internet Modern History Sourcebook*, 1997, <http://nebraskastudies.org/0900/media/0901_0102iron.pdf>. On Churchill's diplomacy with Stalin, in which he purportedly tried to work out Anglo-Soviet arrangements for Europe, without the United States, before he turned to pursuing the engagement of the United States, see: Fraser J. Harbutt, *Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹¹ Many of the architects of this role for U.S. power and presence in Europe were major private sector figures. See: Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

¹² "Treaty of Alliance with France," February 6, 1778, <<https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=008/llsl008.db&recNum=19>>.

¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty: Article 5*, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>.

¹⁴ See: *Vandenberg Resolution*, S Res. 239, 80th Congress, 2nd session, (June 11, 1948), <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad040.asp>

¹⁵ The intervening period is far less interesting or instructive for the future and will not be dwelt on here.

¹⁶ Though in the summer and fall of 1990, most of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe departed for the Persian Gulf after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, never to return. See: John R. Galvin, *Fighting*

the Cold War (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2015): 404-413.

¹⁷ Of course, there were exceptions. Greece and Turkey still have special preoccupations with one another. And some allied countries with interests beyond Europe, notably France in francophone Africa, have continued to look in that direction as well as, and often in distinction to, engagements with allies in Europe or across the Atlantic.

¹⁸ For East Germans, the history of suppression that ended in 1989-1990 began in 1933 under the Nazis, for the Baltic States in 1940, for other parts of the Former Soviet Union from many years earlier, and for most of Central Europe from the end of World War II or later in the 1940s.

¹⁹ Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, must be considered to be one of those "fathers." Yuri Arbatov, Director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies—the semiofficial Soviet liaison to Western research institutions during the Cold War—commented laconically that, "We are going to do something terrible to you... You will no longer have an enemy." Of course, it can be argued that Vladimir Putin has reversed the process by again giving the West an enemy. See: "Georgi Arbatov," *The Telegraph*, November 14, 2010, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/8132697/Georgi-Arbatov.html>>.

²⁰ George H. W. Bush, "A Europe Whole and Free" (speech, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989), <<http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm>>.

²¹ Notably, Germany took the lead on NATO enlargement and on what became the NATO-Russia Founding Act, although the NATO draft of that Act was written mostly in Washington.

²² Notable in this regard was article 231 of the Versailles Treaty: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." Ironically, it was written by two young Americans at the conference, John Foster Dulles and Norman Davis, the former of whom was later secretary of state, the latter president of the Council on Foreign Relations. See: Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2003).

²³ Early in the author's tenure as U.S. ambassador to NATO (1993-98), he characterized this as, "NATO and the European Union are two institutions living in the same city on different planets."

²⁴ See: Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy*, (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

²⁵ That would also have to include operations of the European Union.

²⁶ Many of the steps taken will not be discussed here, notably the structure of NATO forces, levels of funding and defense investment, burden-sharing among allies, and practical relations between NATO and the EU, because they are less central to the basic problem of power on which this article is focusing.

²⁷ This is only shorthand. See: *Partnership for Peace Programme*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

²⁸ This author's formulation.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ See, for example: Warren Christopher, "A New Atlantic Community for the 21st Century," address at the State Theater in Stuttgart, Germany, September 6, 1996, <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1996/html/Dispatchv7no37.html>>.

³¹ One matter has always been the "criteria" for being accepted as a member of NATO. Many ideas have been advanced and many hoops designed for aspirants to jump through. In fact, however, there is only one criterion for NATO membership: whether all the existing members of the alliance are prepared to extend an Article 5 security commitment. The rest is procedural fluff.

³² The details of these decisions, formally taken at NATO's Madrid Summit, need not be discussed for the purposes of this analysis. See "NATO Summit" (Madrid, Spain: July 8-9, 1997), <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/home.htm>>.

³³ *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation* (Paris, France: May 27, 1997), <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm>.

³⁴ *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine*, July 9, 1997, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm>.

³⁵ See, for example: Stephen Kotkin, "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2016.

³⁶ Given the limitations of the subject and other articles in this edition of *PRISM*, this article will also

not deal with the possible results of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation or on the complexities regarding Russia's engagement in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East, including the idea that it is trying to "buy itself out of Ukraine sanctions" by being helpful to the United States or, at least in partial contrast, by showing that it can "play in the West's backyard" in another region, as well.

³⁷ *Helsinki Final Act*, August 1, 1975, <<http://www.osce.org/mc/39501>>.

³⁸ "Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances 1994, December 5, 1994, <<http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484>>.

³⁹ "Full text of the Minsk agreement," *Financial Times*, February 12, 2015, <<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de.html#axzz49ogRGcIT>>.

⁴⁰ The author is avoiding the term "Cold War," which he defines as a circumstance in which two states or coalitions in confrontation are unable to distinguish between issues on which they can engage in potentially productive negotiations and issues where they cannot do so—when virtually everything is "non-negotiable." That was true during a significant part of the traditional "Cold War." It is not true now in Western relations with Russia; and thus the concept will be avoided as not likely to contribute to useful analysis and debate and of emotive rather than practical value.

⁴¹ See: *Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems*, Signed Moscow May 26, 1972, <<http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html>>.

⁴² Putin also criticized the West for military actions against Libya in 2011: "When the so-called civilized community, with all its might, pounces on a small country, and ruins infrastructure that has been built over generations—well, I don't know, is this good or bad?" Mr. Putin said. "I do not like it." Ellen Barry, "Putin Criticizes West for Libya Incursion," *The New York Times*, April 26, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/europe/27putin.html?_r=0>.

⁴³ For its part, in 2007, Russia decided to suspend its observance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. See: Andrew Kramer and Thom Shanker, "Russia Suspends Arms Agreement Over U.S. Shield," *The New York Times*, July 15, 2007, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/world/europe/15russia.htm>>. In 2015, it withdrew from the

Joint Consultative Group on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. See: Kathrin Hille and Neil Buckley, "Russia quits arms pact as estrangement with Nato grows," *Financial Times*, March 10, 2015, <<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f6c814a6-c750-11e4-9e34-00144feab7de.html#axzz49ogRGciT>>.

⁴⁴ The added member nations were Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

⁴⁵ NATO did adopt a working principal that no country, referring indirectly to Russia, would be permitted a veto on any decisions that NATO would make about security, including membership decisions.

⁴⁶ "NATO reiterates that in the *current and foreseeable security environment*, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by *additional permanent* stationing of *substantial* combat forces [emphasis added]. *Founding Act*, Op.cit.

⁴⁷ *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, issued by the Heads of State and governments participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest, April 3, 2008, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm>.

⁴⁸ *The draft of the European Security Treaty*, June 2, 2008, <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6152>>.

⁴⁹ Doug Palmer, "Obama signs trade, human rights bill that angers Moscow," *Reuters*, December 4, 2012, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-obama-idUSBRE8BD12620121214>>.

⁵⁰ NATO's air campaigns in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), followed by the deployment of peacekeeping forces (the Implementation Force and Stabilization Force in Bosnia, and Kosovo Force), were only indirectly related to issues of Russian power in the continent or threats to European security more broadly. They had to be undertaken in response to the most extensive conflicts and human suffering on the European continent since World War II, not just for moral reasons, but also to show that the Western alliance was relevant to real situations, thus to validate all of the efforts to adapt NATO for the future. Had NATO stood aloof from the fighting and dying in Bosnia, it would have lost both political and moral legitimacy. Further, at the time everyone involved in European security agreed that there would be no wider war emanating from events in either Bosnia or Kosovo. Also, in both cases, in the end

Russia cooperated with Western countries in helping both conflicts to end and, regarding the NATO-led Bosnia peacekeeping forces, Russian troops played an active role, under U.S. command, for the first such cooperation since U.S. and Soviet forces met on the Elbe River in 1945. By contrast, NATO's intervention in Kosovo, without a UN Security Council Resolution—which Russia would likely have vetoed, along with China—was one of the elements in Russian calculations that it was not being treated as an "equal" in deliberations concerning European security.

⁵¹ As noted, this discussion will not attempt to assess the relationship between Russia's engagement in Syria and what is happening with regard to Ukraine.

⁵² For President Obama's comments on this issue, see: Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. president talks through his hardest decisions about America's role in the world," *The Atlantic*, April 2016, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>>.

⁵³ See: *Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales*, September 5, 2014, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm>. Note: this article was completed before the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016. It is slated to build upon the decisions taken at Wales and other NATO military steps since then in Central Europe.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ For example, see: David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, "Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics," RAND (2016), <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html>.

⁵⁶ To be effective, NATO and the United States would have to rely primarily on horizontal as opposed to vertical escalation—that is, to make clear to Russia that it would pay a heavy ("disproportionate") price elsewhere in the world for unacceptable actions in Central Europe. What that price would be needs to be thought through carefully and relate to the extent possible to Russia's own calculations of cost and benefit. It is for this reason—a "disproportionate" price—that it is hard to conceive of Putin attacking any NATO member state with military force, or even to seek to occupy major areas of Ukraine, as opposed to lesser "threats"—what NATO now calls "hybrid warfare," and probably not even that.

⁵⁷ Thus, surely, comments by the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that Russia poses an “existential threat” to the United States are not only nonsensical and potentially dangerous, they play into paranoia on both sides and reduce the opportunities for either side to move beyond the current imbroglio, even if both sides wanted to do so. See: “If you want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential threat to the United States, I’d have to point to Russia,” Dunford said. ‘If you look at their behavior, it’s nothing short of alarming.’ See: Dan Lamothe, “Russia is greatest threat to the U.S.,” says Joint Chiefs chairman nominee Gen. Joseph Dunford,” *The Washington Post*, July 9, 2015, available at <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/07/09/russia-is-greatest-threat-to-the-u-s-says-joint-chiefs-chairman-nominee-gen-joseph-dunford/>>.

⁵⁸ This definition does not include Georgia and, of course, Moldova and Belarus. But the Allies have already demonstrated by their refusal to support Georgia during its conflict with Russia in 2008 that there will not be a consensus to admit it to NATO.

⁵⁹ The political and foreign policy backsliding of the current Hungarian government shows the risks of adding countries to the NATO alliance without at the same time imposing continued requirements for democratic development. In 1998, U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-Tex.) proposed a mechanism whereby new NATO members, which experienced internal political developments, such as now in Hungary and Poland, could formally be counseled by existing Allies in matters of democracy and governance. The U.S. administration rejected her suggestion, unfortunately as it has transpired.

⁶⁰ For one perspective on this idea, see: René Nyberg, “Finland’s Lesson for Ukraine,” *The New York Times*, September 2, 2014, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/opinion/finlands-lesson-for-ukraine.html>>. While Ambassador Nyberg seeks to refute arguments for “Finlandizing” Ukraine, he also cites the conditions whereby it can be effective. For example, “Finlandization isn’t a synonym for capitulation; it’s the key to managing an asymmetric power relationship.... [During the Cold War,] Finland was far from a vassal to the Soviet Union. It maintained its democracy, a low-profile military defense and above all its Western orientation.”

⁶¹ This article will not attempt to deal with the complexities of questions relating to nuclear weapons in Europe, including in the strategies of NATO and

the Russian Federation. It is an area for potential arms control negotiations, however.

⁶² This judgment leaves aside the value of the defense spending goal in convincing the U.S. Congress that the European allies are “pulling their weight,” an issue that has gained added saliency now that NATO has proclaimed the 2 percent goal; it also leaves aside the potential role that increased European defense spending could play in regard to potential military actions “outside of area,” e.g., in the Middle East, if that were to transpire. Ironically, the 2 percent goal actually betokens weakness rather than strength since, as of the writing of this article, only 5 of the alliance’s 29 members meets the goal.

⁶³ Thus Western (including U.S.) cooperation with Russia in the Arctic continues virtually unabated, as being in everyone’s self-interest. This region has been “fenced off” from U.S. restrictions on dealing with Russia, and that position is supported by most federal agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard. Common perceptions of the threats posed to everyone by climate change may help to explain this cooperation.

⁶⁴ In May 2002, the NATO Rome Summit agreed with Russia on a new NATO-Russia Council to replace the Permanent Joint Council set up under the 1997 Founding Act. Most important, arrangements would no longer have all the NATO Allies on “one side of the table” and the Russian Federation on the other; henceforth, all members of the NRC would be treated as equals, with veto power over decisions. The 19 areas of potential NATO-Russia cooperation remained the same. See: *NATO-Russia Council, 2002 Rome Summit*, May 28, 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf>>. Note: Arms control might be particularly attractive, both for its own value and as according Russia equal status in perceptions as well as in fact.

Photos

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NATO



More than 2,500 troops from 9 NATO countries participated in exercise Iron Sword in Pabrade, Lithuania in November 2014.

NATO's Land Forces

Strength and Speed Matter

BY JOHN W. NICHOLSON

NATO's strength and speed—both military and political—generate political options short of war. Both of these elements are necessary to counter the limited tactical advantages of Russian Federation forces and prevent further conflict.

The risk of war—of either a land war or a nuclear escalation—is not zero, but with its strength and speed, NATO is generating the necessary options to prevent conflict. If deterrence fails, NATO will prevail.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the most—if not the most—successful military alliances in history, having helped to ensure nearly 70 years of peace in Europe. It was central to ending the Cold War, an event which brought freedom to tens of millions of people in Eastern Europe. The Alliance contributed to preventing further conflict in the Balkans and led a 50-nation coalition in Afghanistan that helped stabilize the country for over a decade. NATO accomplished this by adapting its enormous strengths to the circumstances of each crisis.

As NATO's campaign in Afghanistan came to an end and its Heads of State discussed the future security environment at their summit meetings in 2010 and 2012, they envisaged a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation (RF).¹ However, in early 2014, after the Winter Olympics in Sochi, the RF's aggressive actions in Crimea and Ukraine revealed a disturbing new evolution in its behavior and narrative.²

As a result of Russia's actions, NATO Heads of State at the Wales Summit established the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), including the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF), to adapt NATO forces to deal with the threat posed by Russian aggression.³ This action included the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).

General John Nicholson, U.S. Army, is the Commander of Resolute Support and United States Forces-Afghanistan. During his 33-year career, he has served with NATO in Afghanistan and in Europe, including in the Balkans, and most recently as Commander of NATO's Allied Land Command.

"Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security, so if you want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential threat to the United States, I'd have to point to Russia."

-General Joseph Dunford, during his confirmation hearing to become United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 9, 2015

"Russia continues to try to rewrite the international rules and principles that have formed the foundation of stability in Europe for decades, using all the elements of its national power including the military to coerce and influence States in its nearer broad."

-General Phillip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the NATO Chiefs of Defense Meeting, May 21, 2015

"We have seen a more assertive Russia. A Russia which is destabilizing the European security order."

-Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, Munich Security Conference, February 13, 2016

The RAP is composed of two main elements: assurance measures and adaptation measures. The assurance measures include, on a rotational basis, "continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance," while adaptation measures are designed to increase the capability and capacity of the Alliance to meet security challenges.⁴ Since adopting the RAP, NATO has maintained a continuous presence in eastern member states by conducting exercises and training among Allied forces. Adaptation measures include increasing the size and capability of the NRF and the establishment of NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs). Six NFIUs have been established in eastern NATO states and are designed to facilitate the planning and deployment of the NRF and additional NATO forces. NATO has raised the size and readiness of Multinational Corps North-East in Szczecin, Poland, in order to maintain constant

oversight of the northeastern border. It has also established the Multinational Division Southeast, which is tasked with maintaining constant oversight of the southeastern region of NATO's border nations. In addition, NATO is prepositioning military equipment for training in the territory of eastern Alliance members; improving its ability to reinforce eastern Allies through the improvement of infrastructure throughout the Alliance; and improving its defense plans through the introduction of the Graduated Response Plans. Each of these adaptation measures was designed to ensure that NATO has "the right forces, in the right place and with the right equipment," and that "they are ready to move at very short notice to defend any Ally against any threat."⁵

The resulting "adaptation" of NATO's land forces over the last year has resulted in strong, fast land forces that can generate options short of war. Should deterrence fail, these same measures will enable NATO to prevail decisively.

Strength Matters: NATO Enjoys a Significant Strategic Correlation of Force Advantage Over Russia Which, If Applied, Will Be Decisive


Military planners analyze the correlation of forces (COF) at the strategic and tactical levels to determine relative strengths between potential adversaries. At the strategic level, this calculation evaluates factors such as the size of a country's armed forces and its composition, military budgets, population, gross domestic product (GDP), and political legitimacy. A comparison of these strategic factors is illustrative of NATO's strategic strength.

The strategic advantages of the Alliance vis-à-vis Russia are telling: armed forces that are more than four times larger, a combined population more than six times greater, defense budgets that are 18 times larger, and a combined GDP that is 20 times greater.

Furthermore, Russia's downward demographic and economic trends suggest that these ratios will remain for the foreseeable future, irrespective of the current planned modernization of the RF's armed forces, which does not appear sustainable.⁶

The one area of strategic parity is in nuclear weapons, which poses an existential threat to Alliance members. The mere possession of these weapons, however, does not translate into strategic leverage unless one believes there is a possibility they might be used. As Henry Kissinger recently observed:

The relatively stable order of the Cold War will be superseded by an international order in which projection by a state possessing nuclear weapons of an image of a willingness to take apocalyptic decisions may offer it a perverse advantage over rivals.⁸



Russian Nuclear Rhetoric

We were ready to do it."

-Russian President Vladimir Putin when asked in a documentary if he had been ready to put Russia's nuclear forces on alert to ensure Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, March 15, 2015

"I don't think that Danes fully understand the consequence if Denmark joins the American-led missile defense shield. If they do, then Danish warships will be targets for Russian nuclear missiles."

-Mikhail Vanin, the Russian ambassador to Denmark, March 21, 2015

"Asymmetric mega-weapons could appear in Russia by 2020 – 2025. They will rule out any threat of a large-scale war against Russia, even under the conditions of absolute superiority of the adversary in terms of traditional military systems."

-Dr. Konstantin Sivkov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Studies, explaining how a Russian mega-weapon could be used to create a tsunami off the coast of America or cause the Yellowstone super-volcano to erupt, March 25, 2015

"If they like being targets because of the American weapons systems, this is their choice. The deployment of elements of the BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense], the launch sites that are effectively aimed at our strategic nuclear forces—this is a problem for them. They automatically become our targets".

-Deputy Secretary of Russia's Security Council, Evgeniy Lukyanov, discussing Poland and Romania's deployment of BMD systems, June 24, 2015

"Given the powerful NATO air defense system on the European TOA [Theater of Operations], and the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in terms of fighter aviation, our airplanes do not have many chances of penetrating and reaching their targets. That is why the deployment of systems . . . with nuclear payload considerably increase the deterrent role of the Russian tactical nuclear weapons."

-Dr. Konstantin Sivkov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Studies, June 24, 2015

"Over the past three years, companies of the military-industrial complex have created and successfully tested a number of prospective weapons systems that are capable of performing combat missions in a layered missile defense system."

-President Putin during a meeting discussing weapons designed to pierce a BMD shield, November 10, 2015

"Indeed, certain secret data was caught by the cameras, and that is why they were later deleted. We hope that this will not repeat in the future"

-Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov acknowledging the development of unmanned submersible drones capable of carrying nuclear payload, November 11, 2015

The Russian Federation would appear to be such a state. Dr. Kissinger's theory might explain the disturbing nuclear rhetoric emanating from Moscow—an attempt to translate their one area of strategic parity into leverage and a means to fracture Alliance cohesion.

While a detailed discussion of nuclear policy is beyond the scope of this article, a willingness to leverage these capabilities as a form of escalation dominance is relevant to the discussion of how best to prevent conflict. Regardless of whether Russian leaders are bluffing, as some may believe, Alliance military leaders must assess their capabilities and stated intent at face value when planning how to deter and prevent conflict. Based on these statements and more, the risk of the Russians escalating a land war to the use of nuclear weapons is not zero. And if the risk is not zero, it becomes even more critical that we deter conventional conflict as a means to prevent escalation to nuclear conflict. While hybrid operations with ambiguous aggression and plausible deniability are the most likely form of conflict, it is also important for us to deter

or deal with the threat or actuality of a conventional attack.

Why Political and Military Speed Matter: Analysis of Tactical Correlation of Forces

In order to determine how best to deter conventional conflict, we must examine the tactical correlation of forces, which is limited in time, scale, and scope. While an adversary may be inferior at the strategic level, as Russia is, they may still be able to generate a positive tactical correlation of forces at a specific place and time for a limited duration.⁹

Military science uses historical norms to determine what force ratios are required for successful tactical military operations. The chart on the following page comes from U.S. doctrine; however, similar ratios are found in the military doctrine of most nations, including the Russian Federation.

The force ratios depicted here are the minimums necessary to predict success, although they can be improved in one's favor through

"Moscow's nuclear saber-rattling raises questions about Russia's leaders' commitment to strategic stability, their respect for norms against the use of nuclear weapons, and whether they respect the profound caution nuclear-age leaders showed with regard to the brandishing of nuclear weapons."

-U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Remarks on "Strategic and Operational Innovation at a Time of Transition and Turbulence" at Reagan Defense Forum, November 7, 2015

"Russia's rhetoric, posture, and exercises of its nuclear forces are aimed at intimidating its neighbors, undermining trust and stability in Europe."

-Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, Munich Security Conference, February 13, 2016

Correlation of Forces is a tool used to approximate the level of force required for a chosen mission. For example, the U.S. Army uses the following table to determine the force ratios for specific types of engagements

Historical minimum planning ratios		
<i>Friendly Mission</i>	<i>Friendly : Enemy</i>	<i>Position</i>
Delay	1 : 6	
Defend	1 : 3	Prepared or fortified
Defend	1 : 2.5	Hasty
Attack	3 : 1	Prepared or fortified
Attack	2.5 : 1	Hasty
Counterattack	1 : 1	Flank

In a prepared defense, you need at least one-third of the forces of your attacker; a hasty defense requires a ratio of at least 1 : 2.5. To successfully attack, you need at least 3 times the force of an adversary in a prepared defense or 2.5 times the force of the adversary in a hasty (rapidly created) defense.



the use of joint support, including air, naval, special operations, space, and cyber. If contemplating an attack with less than a 3:1 ratio, a prudent military planner cannot guarantee success. Hence the desirability of NATO's capability to deliver to any eastern ally a robust defensive force that achieves a 1:3 ratio against potential Russian aggression. Additionally, such a defensive force would not be escalatory in that it does not have favorable force ratios for offensive action.

Along NATO's northeastern border with Russia, under the existing set of conditions, the Russians enjoy certain advantages that enable them to generate a favorable force ratio for offensive action. If they were to successfully exploit a temporary tactical advantage to secure a gain, and then threaten nuclear escalation to check an Alliance response, they could parlay an area of strategic parity—nuclear weapons—and a limited tactical advantage into an enduring strategic outcome: the fracturing of Alliance cohesion.

What Are The Areas Of Tactical Advantage That The Russians Can Generate?

Interior Lines. In the analysis of tactical correlation of forces, we first look at the interior lines¹⁰ of the Russian Federation that enhance the ability of the RF to mass troops faster than the Alliance at certain points on its borders with NATO countries, i.e. the Baltics, Poland. The Russians have three armies positioned in the Western Military District that can deploy 13-16 battle groups, totaling approximately 35,000 troops, within 48 hours to the border of the Alliance, and another 90,000 troops within 30 days.

Speed of Decisionmaking. While the outcomes of RF decisionmaking are often criticized as illegitimate for not respecting existing

international norms, the Russian Federation's unitary chain of command enables expeditious action across the whole of government.¹¹ Conversely, while NATO's decisions possess the legitimacy of 28 nations acting in unison, they require consensus among all 28 sovereign member states, which inevitably takes time.

Tanks in Europe. The Russian Federation's armed forces, although four times smaller than the combined armed forces of NATO, contain sufficient quantities of armor, air defense, long-range fires, and conscript soldiers to generate numerical advantage at certain points along our common borders before a large-scale NATO response could be launched.¹²


A comparison of RF and Alliance armor forces is instructive. While the Alliance has reduced its tank forces since the end of the Cold War, Russia has kept much of its force in storage and modernized parts of its active force. Because of improved relations with the RF, the U.S. removed all of its armored forces from Europe by 2013. Therefore, even though the Alliance possesses more active armor forces than the Russians, these tanks are dispersed among the Alliance member states, meaning the Russians can generate a local advantage in armor, in certain areas, for a finite period of time. If they chose (and could afford) to do so, the Russians could restore significant quantities of older model tanks, which could approach parity or even a numerical advantage against Allied forces.

Snap Exercises. Through the use of "snap exercises" and ambiguity, the Russian Federation repeatedly desensitizes and tests for weaknesses along NATO's boundaries. In concert with their annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine, the RF has reduced transparency with NATO by exploiting provisions within the 2011 Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna Document on security and confidence-building measures (see box). Allowing observers at large-scale exercises has been one of the principal ways in which nations have reduced the potential for mistakes or miscalculations that in the past have often led to wars. By classifying their exercises as snap exercises, the Russians invoke an exception within the Vienna document that does not require prior notification of OSCE member states.¹³ This exception is being used to increase the scale and frequency of these exercises beyond those allowed in the agreement, as well as to limit any observation. In fact, one such snap exercise was used to mask the invasion of Crimea in March 2014, while another was used to rehearse portions of their deployment to Syria.¹⁴ These exercises enable the Russians to

learn and to improve their ability to conduct large-scale mobilizations and operational maneuvers to generate a tactical correlation of force advantage at key points. In addition, the exercises use scenarios that specifically target NATO, such as their snap exercise in December 2014 in which RF troops deployed into Kaliningrad and moved toward the Lithuanian border.

Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)¹⁵. This military doctrinal term describes how RF forces seek to deny Allied access and freedom of action in key areas bordering the NATO-Russian interface, such as the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Far North, and now the eastern Mediterranean, through the establishment of integrated air defense and missile zones.¹⁶ Among the most dense of such zones in the world, these bastions include long-range



Russian Federation and NATO Alliance Armor Forces

surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and anti-ship missile systems. If activated, these networks would extend over sovereign Alliance land, sea, and air space that could potentially set conditions for an invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. If such a situation were to occur, neutralization of these networks would require significant Allied land, air, maritime, and special operations forces.¹⁷

As one can see by the range rings of RF systems in these bastions, the RF is attempting to recreate the defensive depth they lost with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In so doing, however, they are increasing the potential for mistakes or miscalculations that could escalate into armed attack against Alliance member states. The SS-26 Iskander surface-to-surface missile has a maximum range of 500 kilometers. If fired from the Kaliningrad Oblast, it can reach five NATO national capitals (Riga, Vilnius, Warsaw, Copenhagen, and

Berlin) and most airports and seaports within the Baltics with conventional or nuclear warheads. The SA-21 Growler surface-to-air missile has a maximum range of 400 kilometers and extends over the sovereign airspace of half of Poland, the entirety of Lithuania, and more than half of Latvia. The SSC-5 Bastion coastal defense missile system has an effective range of 600 kilometers and is currently deployed in Crimea and Murmansk. From its firing point on the Crimean peninsula, it can target any ship in the Black Sea.

NATO Military Focus and Capabilities must Evolve and are Evolving

Despite their overall strategic inferiority to NATO, given the Russian Federation's capability to generate local advantage in terms of the tactical correlation of forces and to leverage its nuclear capabilities in a form of escalation



2011 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna Document

Para.41. Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved are exceptions to the requirement for prior notification to be made 42 days in advance.

Para.67.1. No participating State will carry out within three calendar years more than one military activity subject to prior notification, involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks or 2,000 ACVs or 900 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple-rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above).

"The reality is that the rule-book of European security is out of date. We need to modernize it to reflect today's reality and re-engage Russia. We need snap inspections of snap exercises. We need lower thresholds for notification of exercises. We need measures to put more transparency on military activities and postures in Europe. And we need common standards to manage possible accidents and incidents at sea and in the air.

NATO is abiding by the rules and will continue to do so. At the same time it is clear that we need a modernized regime negotiated within the OSCE framework. Unless we create a more intrusive and up-to-date transparency regime designed for this new reality, the danger of miscalculation, accidents and stumbling into a military confrontation is real and it is increasing."

-Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, "Modernizing the rule-book of European security," November 26, 2015

dominance, how should Alliance military forces contribute to deterrence?

Deterrence is ultimately a political outcome achieved in the mind of a potential adversary by convincing them that the costs of an action outweigh the benefits. The military supports the ability of political leadership to deter in multiple ways. The assurance measures in place contribute to deterrence through the presence of small Alliance forces conducting training and exercises with our eastern Allies. Their presence demonstrates Alliance resolve and commitment to collective defense. In the event of an armed attack, an adversary would be attacking multiple Allied forces, thus potentially bringing to bear the full weight of the

Alliance in response. The downside of this "tripwire" approach is that these forces are not of sufficient strength to defend against a short-notice Russian offensive, therefore necessitating a campaign to retake Alliance territory after it has been seized. The costs of such an offensive campaign in terms of lives, materiel, time, and money would greatly exceed the costs of defending that ally and preventing the loss of territory in the first place.

An alternative to tripwire deterrence is deterrence through a forward defense. Positioning strong forces to achieve a favorable tactical correlation of forces for defense (1:3) would raise serious doubts in the mind of the Russian leadership that they can achieve their

objectives. Reducing the chances of an armed conventional attack reduces the potential that such a confrontation could escalate to the nuclear level, a desirable outcome given that the risk of nuclear escalation by the RF is not zero. Although militarily effective in deterring aggression, this course of action would potentially violate the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and invite escalation by the Russians. For these reasons, and given the additional costs associated with forward defense, Alliance members have shown little appetite for this option.

This leads us to a hybrid option in which we sustain tripwire deterrence while simultaneously improving our ability to rapidly reinforce and establish an effective defensive posture as conditions warrant. Deterrence can be achieved in this option by demonstrating the Alliance's ability to quickly move strong forces to defend any threatened state within the Alliance. In short, we deter through a combination of strength and speed.

NATO possesses the forces and capabilities to deter in a hybrid manner, but they must be used in different ways than they have been since the end of the Cold War. What are the

adjustments the Alliance must make—and is making—to deter conflict in this manner?

First, we must start with an understanding of collective defense within the Alliance. The operative portion of the Washington Treaty, which established collective defense within NATO, is detailed in Article 5.

Indicators and Warnings (I&W). First and foremost, the Alliance's intelligence enterprise must provide adequate indicators and warnings of possible aggression that would result in the potential for an "armed attack" as per Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.¹⁸ These are essential to achieving the speed necessary to prevent war by enabling political-military dialogue regarding timely deployments of the NATO Response Force and the high readiness forces of the Alliance. I&W are not solely a covert intelligence function. They also involve the use of both open source and diplomatic assessments. Without adequate I&W to initiate timely decisions, it is possible that there could be no options other than war. A NATO Response Force that arrives early may still be able to deter, but one that arrives late, after an armed attack has occurred, will surely have to fight.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. [Emphasis added]

- The North Atlantic Treaty (1949): Article 5 para. 1.

High Readiness Forces (HRF). Next we must address the gap in current NATO Rapid Response timetables. The NRF, described above, can respond to a unanimous resolution of the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance's principal political decisionmaking body, by commencing the deployment of the Spearhead Force, the VJTF of 8,000 troops, within 5-7 days. The remainder of the NRF would begin to move in 30-45 days. The main bodies of NATO militaries would follow afterward. There is thus a window of vulnerability in the early days and weeks of a crisis. This gap can be filled with other NATO forces.

In addition to the NATO Response Force, most nations of the Alliance maintain national high readiness forces. These forces are retained as national reserves and are not offered to NATO on a standing basis, but could be offered in the case of a potential Article 5 scenario. Additionally, they could deploy based on determination by a member nation that an Article 5 obligation has occurred. In either case, these HRF can deploy in a matter of days or weeks. Combined, the NRF and HRF of the Alliance are equivalent to up to four divisions, consisting of approximately 50,000 troops, primarily the professional airborne and marine infantry forces of each nation. The rapid deployment of these forces to threatened areas would achieve the correlation of forces required to defend (1:3) within days or weeks and thus counter any RF tactical advantage. The speed with which these forces can deploy enables the Alliance to counter, in part, RF interior lines and their streamlined political decisionmaking system.

These are also "forcible entry capable" units in the event certain airports or seaports are unavailable. This rapid reinforcement capability was exercised in August 2015 when the

NRF and HRF of nine Alliance nations conducted exercise Swift Response 15. After assembling at a base in Germany, they conducted numerous special forces and airborne operations in a simulated reinforcement of threatened Allies. This forcible entry capability enables the Alliance to respond to multiple threats simultaneously, such as the RF attempting horizontal escalation across multiple areas (the High North, the Black Sea, and the Baltics, for example). Given that these HRF are light forces, they do not constitute an offensive threat to the RF and are therefore non-escalatory; they are effective in defensive operations when they enjoy local air superiority. However, at the upcoming Warsaw Summit, NATO Allies could consider a mechanism to make these forces available in extremis as an adjunct to the NRF capability, thereby closing the aforementioned window of vulnerability.

This capability was most recently demonstrated on November 4, 2015, during exercise Trident Juncture when the U.S. Army's 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division was alerted and deployed directly from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and jumped into San Gregorio, Spain, just 7.5 hours later. As a further demonstration of Alliance capability, the brigade was preceded by U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers deploying directly from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.

Pre-Positioned Forces and Equipment. While the Alliance can move light forces quickly, heavier forces have a greater defensive capability against heavy Russian Federation forces. Their longer deployment times (30-90 days), especially from the continental United States, lessens their deterrent effect early in a crisis. However, by pre-positioning tanks and other armored forces, the Alliance can counter RF interior lines, more rapidly deploy heavy

deterrent forces to threatened Allies in Europe, and buy time for diplomatic resolution of a crisis. The decision to pre-position a U.S. set of heavy equipment in Europe significantly enhances the deterrent capability of Alliance land forces by enabling a more rapid reinforcement of early-arriving light forces with heavy combat capability.

Neutralizing A2/AD. To retain freedom of action within Alliance territory and the surrounding air and sea space, the Alliance must develop effective counters to evolving Russian A2/AD capabilities. While the RF may contend that these are defensive capabilities designed to protect them from NATO intrusion on their borders, they must also understand with certainty that any lethal use of these systems over Alliance territory would constitute an armed attack, which would invoke Article 5. Neutralization of these systems would be accomplished by Alliance joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and joint fires.¹⁹ These Allied capabilities exist but have not yet been arrayed against the RF A2/AD sites. Continued RF expansion and the deepening of these systems require that the Alliance develop plans should it become necessary to defend ourselves. For example, the recent establishment of SA21 radars and missile infrastructure in eastern Syria extends Russia's air defense coverage over sovereign Turkish (NATO) airspace, including Incirlik Air Base, from which U.S. aircraft operate against terrorists in Syria.

Fill Specific Gaps and Equipment Shortfalls. The end of the Cold War and the conduct of a ten-year campaign in Afghanistan understandably led to the optimization of Alliance armies for the prosecution of counterinsurgency operations, not for inter-state, high-intensity conflict against a symmetrical opponent. As a

result, despite NATO's overall strategic advantage in the size of armed forces and defense budgets, there are certain gaps and shortfalls that exist in some Alliance conventional capabilities. These need to be considered in the context of the latest Alliance defensive planning, the Graduated Response Plans. To enable rapid reinforcement and deterrence, these capabilities include: strategic lift, anti-armor systems for light forces, armor, air defense, long-range artillery, ISR, and electronic warfare, among others. The Secretary General's encouragement of the 2 percent spending goal, if met, would go a long way toward filling these gaps and shortfalls.

Training and Doctrine. Shifting focus from a decade of counterinsurgency to readiness for a high-intensity collective defense against a symmetrical opponent necessitates an ongoing re-examination of existing doctrine and training. For example, hybrid warfare is the subject of intense study on how military forces best support the responses of Alliance governments to hybrid threats²⁰; it encompasses border control, law enforcement, intelligence, and strategic communications challenges, to name a few. These considerations are being integrated into NATO exercises at all levels.

For the rapid deployment of light forces to successfully deter against hybrid threats, the creation of reconnaissance and security zones in support of national home defense forces is key. If those light forces must deter against an armored threat, they must transition to a light anti-armor defense with local air superiority, which necessitates neutralization of any A2/AD threat and sufficient fires and anti-armor capability within the light force. Additionally, to ensure they are able to integrate with heavy forces deployed to conduct a forward defense of alliance territory, those forces must be

trained in combined arms defensive operations. The unique requirements of this defense must also be included in training: fighting within sovereign Alliance member states, and protecting civilians and infrastructure to the maximum extent possible.

The Baltic Scenario

One hypothetical scenario that combines Russian use of a tactical COF advantage with escalation dominance is the defense of the Baltic States. Some argue that such a scenario has a low probability of occurring, but it is unquestionably of very high risk for the Alliance. Such an occurrence would involve a rapid mobilization in the Russian Federation's Western Military District to seize all or parts of the Baltic States, ostensibly to protect ethnic Russians.²¹ (There were approximately 30 million Russians outside of Russian Federation borders when the Soviet Union disbanded.²²) In reality, such a seizure would recreate strategic depth lost by Russia with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Using the tactical COF advantage generated by a rapid mobilization of the 6th and 20th Combined Arms Army and the 1st Tank Army, the RF could hypothetically seize parts or all of the three Baltic States and northern Poland. Such an attack would include activation of their dense A2/AD network to isolate the area, prevent the introduction of reinforcements, and then threaten nuclear escalation to "freeze" the conflict. This would confront the Alliance with the dilemma of responding to a clear violation of Article 5 in which the Russians would threaten nuclear escalation—a prospect the Russians hope would fracture Alliance cohesion and change the global security architecture in their favor.

The NATO military response to this prospect mandates detailed plans for the

maintenance of freedom of action in Alliance and international air, sea, land, and space by countering RF A2/AD zones and by meeting their tactical forces with sufficient strength to defend against an armed attack of an Alliance member. We must then rehearse these plans in a transparent manner to clearly convey Alliance capabilities.²³

In this scenario, the speed of Alliance response in the first critical days and weeks would be vital to deterrence and conflict prevention. The chart on the following page highlights the necessity of using rapidly deployable, high readiness forces to achieve the correlation of forces necessary to adequately defend and, therefore, deter any Russian attack. The introduction of high readiness forces early in a crisis enables the Alliance to achieve a 1:3 COF within two weeks and a 1:2.5 COF ratio soon thereafter. RF forces would thus be incapable of achieving a *fait accompli*. This is critical to preserving the time and space needed to resolve any crisis through diplomatic means.

In addition to military speed, we must also consider the speed of political decision-making. Political speed is required to preserve options short of war. A decision not to immediately act is a decision to forfeit certain military options, such as deterrence or defense, and might leave NATO with no other option than a costly campaign to retake Alliance territory.

Expeditious political decisions therefore help preserve political options at a smaller military cost. Military leaders can contribute to expeditious political decisionmaking through detailed military planning in advance of a crisis. Detailed planning informs the dialogue between military and civilian leadership regarding options, and enables interoperability


between military forces, which likewise creates options for political leaders. Thus, NATO's strength and speed generate political options short of war. If deterrence fails, however, strength and speed enable us to prevail in conflict.

The cohesion and competence of NATO's land forces have never been higher. Our armies are composed mainly of volunteer professionals who have served alongside one another for ten years in Afghanistan. This high level of professionalism and combat experience is unprecedented and far exceeds that of any other alliance or individual army on the planet, to include the RF. Our soldiers are led by exceptional leaders who are intensely studying the emerging challenges we face and preparing their forces to meet those challenges. Alliance members should take heart from the

quality of their armies. Despite over a decade of combat, they are not tired—they are ready.

Managing Uncertainty, Creating Options, Avoiding Mistakes or Miscalculations

We must be alert in order to reduce the potential for mistakes or miscalculations that could lead to a military confrontation, which could then escalate. These are reduced through increased transparency and communication with the Russian Federation's political and military establishments. Transparency existed during the Cold War²⁴ but due to recent Russian actions, it has been greatly reduced. There have been numerous calls to reestablish transparency through the proper notification and observations of exercises as recommended by Secretary General Stoltenberg and through reinvigorated maritime talks, air talks, ground



exercise observers, and other means to enable de-escalation in a crisis.²⁵

Conclusion

NATO's first goal is conflict prevention. Military forces contribute to this by deterring conventional conflict. Conflict prevention is ultimately a political or diplomatic endeavor that is supported by the military's readiness to defend our vital interests. We deter through our strength and our speed, which are delivered through readiness. Military readiness costs money, but the costs of readiness pale in comparison to the human and material costs of war.

Ultimately, we hope for a time when we can work together with the Russians in our areas of common interest.²⁶ Until that time comes, we in NATO's military structure must contribute to the prevention of a conflict by increasing our strength and speed in order to provide options short of war. If deterrence fails, the strategic advantages that NATO enjoys mean that we would prevail, but our mandate is to first and foremost prevent any conflict that threatens the ability of Alliance member states to live "whole, free and at peace."²⁷

PRISM

Notes

¹ NATO, "Lisbon Summit Declaration," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, November 20, 2010, para. 23, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm>; NATO, "Chicago Summit Declaration," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, May 20, 2012, para. 36-38, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm>.

² Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference" (Speech, Munich, Germany, February 13, 2016), *NATO*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_128047.htm>.

³ NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, September 5, 2014, para. 5-9, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm>; Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Back to the future? Russia's hybrid warfare, revolutions in military affairs, and Cold War comparisons," *NATO Defense College*, no. 120 (October 2015): 11-12; Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, "Defence Ministers agree to strengthen NATO's defences, establish Spearhead Force" (Speech, Brussels, Belgium, February 5, 2016) *NATO*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_117188.htm>.

⁴ NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, September 5, 2014, para. 9, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm>.

⁵ NATO, "NATO's Readiness Action Plan – Fact Sheet, North Atlantic Treaty Organization," *NATO*, May 2015, <http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_05/20150508_1505-Factsheet-RAP-en.pdf>; Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, "Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the ceremony inaugurating the headquarters of the NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) in Lithuania" (Speech, Vilnius, Lithuania, September 03, 2015), *NATO*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_122325.htm?selectedLocale=en>; Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, "Press statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the inauguration of the headquarters of the NATO Forces Integration Unit Romania (NFIU)" (Speech, Bucharest, Romania, July 02, 2015) *NATO*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_121545.htm?selectedLocale=en>; Alexander Vershbow, "NATO and the New Arc of Crisis" (Speech, Fundación Botín, Madrid, October 28, 2015) *NATO*, <<http://www.realinstitutoelcano>>.

org/wps/portal/web/riecano_en/event?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/calendar/activities/conferencia-nato-new-arc-crisis>.

⁶ Matthew Bodner and Anna Dolgov, "Putin Warns Russian Defense Industry Not to Fall Behind," *The Moscow Times*, July 19, 2015, <<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/putin-warns-russian-defense-industry-not-to-fall-behind/525853.html>>.

⁷ All graphs and data in this article are based on unclassified information from NATO Allied Land Command (LANDCOM).

⁸ Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Books, 2015): 338.

⁹ Keith A. Dunn and Stephen J. Flanagan, *NATO in the Fifth Decade* (Philadelphia, PA: Diane Publishing Company, May 1990): 242.

¹⁰ The U.S. Army defines "interior lines" as lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point. Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012): glossary 4.

¹¹ Andrew Roth, "Vladimir Putin's massive, triple-decker war room revealed," *The Washington Post*, November 21, 2015, <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/21/vladimir-putins-massive-triple-decker-war-room-revealed/>>.

¹² Fires are defined as: "The use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target." See: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Fire Support," Joint Publication 3-09 (December 12, 2014): GL-7, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_09.pdf>.

¹³ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Vienna Document 2011 On Confidence – And Security – Building Measures," 2011, Ch. V Prov. 41, Chap. VI Prov. 58, <<http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597?download=true>>; Damien Sharkov, "Russian Snap Military Drill 'Could Turn Into Assault on Baltic Capital,'" *Newsweek*, February 23, 2015, <<http://europe.newsweek.com/russian-snap-military-drill-could-turn-quick-assault-baltic-capital-308752>>; Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, "Adapting to a changed security environment," (Speech, Washington, D.C., May 27, 2015) NATO, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_120166.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

¹⁴ Johan Norberg, "The Use of Russia's Military in the Crimean Crisis," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 13, 2014, <<http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/13/use-of-russia-s-military-in-crimean-crisis/>>; Newsmax Wires, "U.S.

Intelligence Lapse on Russian 'Surprise' Moves in Syria Probed," *Newsmax*, October 8, 2015, <<http://www.newsmax.com/TheWire/us-intelligence-russia-syria/2015/10/08/id/695210/>>.

¹⁵ Anti-access: Those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. Area-denial: Those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area. Definitions found in: Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 2012): 6.

¹⁶ "By the early 1990s the Russian air defense paradigm was mature and well-studied, both by the Russians and their former opponents in the West. Several basic principles were implicit and well implemented in Russian designs, especially in the later generation of radars and missile systems:

1. Diversity in SAM [surface-to-air missiles] systems and search/acquisition radars.
2. Geographically overlapping coverage by search/acquisition and engagement radars.
3. Networking of SAM systems and acquisition radars, using fixed lines and wireless radio links.
4. Increasingly, the deployment of highly mobile SAM batteries and radars.
5. Integration of passive Emitter Locating Systems (ELS).
6. Layered coverage with long range area defense SAMs and short range point defense SAMs and AAA [Anti-Aircraft Artillery].
7. The wide use of emitting decoys to seduce anti-radiation missiles.
8. A hierarchical C3 [Communications, Command, and Control] system based primarily on mobile command posts at battery, district and regional levels.

Systems built around these eight ideas are now in production and being actively exported by Russian industry on the global stage. Therefore any IADS [Integrated Air Defense System] which a Western air force must defeat post 2010 may be constructed in part, or wholly, around the fusion of the Soviet era and post-Soviet era IADS concepts.

Since 1991, Russia's industry and research institutes have invested much intellectual capital and effort to overcome remaining weaknesses in the inherited Soviet model. These are reflected in a range of increasingly frequent design characteristics and deployment techniques in more recent Russian designs:

1. Mobility has improved, to the extent that many systems can “shoot and scoot” inside 5 minutes, to make lethal suppression extremely difficult.
2. Search/acquisition and SAM system engagement radars are to be actively defended against missile attacks by the use of point defence missiles, or AAA, the former independent or integrated into the area defence SAM battery.
3. Surveillance and acquisition radars are shifting to the L-band, UHF-band and VHF-bands, reversing the trend to shorter wavelengths, and making stealth design increasingly difficult.
4. SAM batteries are increasingly designed for autonomous operation, decoupling them from the rigid hierarchical command model of the Soviet era.
5. Wireless radio networking of SAM batteries, search/acquisition radars, and command posts, is now almost universal.
6. Most contemporary Russian radars are fully digital, frequency agile, and increasingly, advanced processing techniques such as Space Time Adaptive Processing (STAP) are employed.
7. Most new Russian radars are solid state designs, and electronically steered phased arrays are preferred due to their agile beam steering and shaping capabilities, and high jam resistance.
8. Radar range against conventional aircraft and missile kinematic range have virtually doubled since the early 1980s, in order to deny the use of support jamming aircraft.”

Dr. Karlo Kopp, “Assessing Joint Strike Fighter Defence Penetration Capabilities,” *Air Power Australia*, January 07, 2009, <<http://ausairpower.net/APA-2009-01.html#mozTocId927290>>.

¹⁷ J.Hawk (translator), “What You Need to Know About the Russia’s Air/Space Defense System Concept,” *Southfront*, September 8, 2015, <<http://southfront.org/russia-airspace-defense-system-concept/>>. Article, which is by Andrei Mikhailov, originally appeared in Russian on <vko.ru>; Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “Adapting to a changed security environment,” (Speech, Washington, D.C., May 27, 2015) *NATO*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_120166.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

¹⁸ The North Atlantic Treaty Article 5, April 4, 1949, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>.

¹⁹ “Joint fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in

support of a common objective.” See: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Fire Support,” Joint Publication 3-09 (December 12, 2014): I-3, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_09.pdf>.

²⁰ The U.S. Army defines a “Hybrid threat” as the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects. Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012): 1-3.

²¹ Timothy M. Bonds, Michael Johnson, and Paul S. Steiberg, *Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015): 7, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1320.html>; Christopher S. Chivvis, “The Baltic Balance – How to Reduce the Chances of War in Europe,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 2015, <<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/baltics/2015-07-01/baltic-balance>>; Terrence Kelly, “Stop Putin’s Next Invasion Before it Starts,” *US News & World Report*, March 20, 2015, <<http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/03/20/stop-putins-aggression-with-us-forces-in-eastern-europe>>.

²² On October 24, 2015 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov published a detailed article in the official “Russian Gazette” titled “The Russian World on the Path of Consolidation,” in which he stated that “providing overall support to the Russian World is an unconditional foreign policy priority for Russia, which is embedded in the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Concept.” He concluded by expressing confidence that the Congress will “successfully solve the task that lies ahead of us in the interest of unveiling further the colossal potential of the Russian World.” In it he discussed Russia’s plans of using its diasporas, numbering approximately 30 million according to Lavrov, to support their efforts to expand Russian influence and to further Russian goals internationally. The original article in Russian can be found here: <<http://www.rg.ru/2015/11/02/lavrov.html>>.

²³ Carmen Romero, “Statement by NATO Deputy Spokesperson Carmen Romero on NATO military exercises,” (Speech, Brussels, Belgium, August 12, 2015) *NATO* <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_122048.htm>; Drew Brooks, “Russians keep eye on European training: Swift Response underway with hundreds of Bragg soldiers,” *Fayobserver.com*, August 27, 2015, <<http://www.fayobserver.com/military/russians-keep-eye-on-european-training-swift-response-underway-with/>>

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²⁴ Examples of Cold War procedures which provided transparency include: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (1976), the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (1988), the Conventional Forces in Europe (1990), the Confidence and Security Building Measures (Vienna Document) (1990), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (1991), the Open Sky Treaty (1992), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), and the OTAN RUSSIE (2002). Examples were cited from: Allan Krass, *The United States and Arms Control: The Challenge of Leadership* (Wesport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997): 29-67.

²⁵ Agence France-Presse, "NATO To Russia: Be Transparent on Military Drills," *DefenseNews*, May 19, 2015, <<http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/05/19/nato-urges-russia-transparent-military-exercises/27606343/>>; Fydoor Lukyanov, "U.S. and Russia Back to Cold War Diplomacy," *The Moscow Times*, May 26, 2015, <<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/opinion/article/us-and-russia-back-to-cold-war-diplomacy/522383.html>>.

²⁶ NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, September 5, 2014, para. 21-23 <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm>; NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, interview by Alexey Venediktov and Lesya Ryabtseva, November 29, 2014, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_115877.htm?selectedLocale=en>; Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, "Adapting to a changed security environment," (Speech, Washington, D.C., May 27, 2015) *NATO*, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_120166.htm?selectedLocale=en>; Peter Zwack, "It's High Time for U.S., Russian Militaries to Start Meeting Again," *Defense One*, November 19, 2015, <<http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/11/us-russia-must-agree-disagree-wake-paris-attacks/123885/>>.

²⁷ NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, September 5, 2014, para. 1, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm>.



Norwegian vessels patrol with a Dutch submarine in Arctic waters

NATO and the North Atlantic

Revitalizing Collective Defense and the Maritime Domain

BY INE ERIKSEN SØREIDE

The military-strategic environment in the North Atlantic is changing. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) safeguards a region of stability, cooperation, and respect for international law, but it needs to address Russia's new strategic capabilities and increased military activity in the maritime domain. This article examines current defense and security challenges in the North Atlantic with emphasis on what NATO should do to secure the transatlantic sea lines of communication.

The North Atlantic is Norway's key strategic area. Fisheries, maritime transport, tourism, and the extraction of oil, natural gas, and minerals are all important economic drivers for prioritizing this region. Our long coastline creates an enormous expanse of territorial waters and economic zones, and more than 80 percent of the ocean areas over which we have jurisdiction are located north of the Arctic Circle. Thus, Norwegian territorial rights cover parts of the North Atlantic, the Barents Sea, and the Arctic Ocean. Norway, with a population of just five million people, has jurisdiction over more than 2.2 million square kilometers of sea, an area which is seven times larger than our mainland territory. With great resources comes great responsibility.

Compared to most quarters of the world, the Arctic is a region of stability, respect for international law, and well-functioning multilateral institutions. It is most often associated with environmental concerns and commercial endeavors. Climatic changes are causing reductions in ice coverage and ice volumes, and large areas are becoming more accessible. At times, expectations have been high for the economic potential, be it shipping, exploitation of oil and gas reserves, fishing, or tourism. Such activities add to the inherent strategic importance of the region. However, although there is a potential for increased economic activity, development is slow, especially in today's oil and gas market as prices do not cover the required investment costs. Additionally, climate conditions are also tough, with extreme cold and much wind and fog.

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One might ask why I draw the reader's attention to the North at a time when other regions make international headlines. Indeed, we are experiencing an unprecedented complexity in the European security environment. New and old hybrid, conventional, and asymmetric threats are combined and interwoven, presenting us with an unpredictable and multifaceted security landscape. The Ukraine crisis demonstrated that conflict in Europe is not a phenomenon of the past. Once again, conflict has been waged with overt and covert military means on European soil. Terrorism has struck the heart of Europe several times in recent years, and geographic distance to areas of conflict is no security guarantee. We are seeing unbelievable human suffering, disregard of human rights, disrespect of international law, climate hazards, economic constraints, and social despair. Europe is facing new realities in the east and in the south. Our commitment to universal values is being tested; we must work hard to uphold Western unity and cooperation.

There are also challenges from within. European politics are not in good shape. The combination of migration, economic turmoil, and social difficulties is a fundamental challenge, and we are witnessing radicalization and extremism, combined with the use of violence, to try to achieve the objectives of certain actors. The legitimacy and role of international political institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and NATO, are being questioned and spurring disagreements in and between countries. Radical movements—from both the political left and right—are gaining a foothold, with anti-establishment and anti-modernity sentiments a common feature. At the same time, the refugee crisis is testing the functioning of our

cooperative mechanisms. Political polarization within and between countries is a challenge to our ability to make good decisions, including within the realm of security policy. Political institutions, and our common international security architecture are needed now more than ever. Regional and global unpredictability, emerging threats, and domestic struggles must be met with cooperation and unity.

We experience the changes in our security landscape in different ways. This is only natural. In times like these, however, it is more important than ever that we stand together. "Every man for himself" is no solution. Solidarity is NATO's center of gravity. A threat to one is a threat to all. The Alliance needs to be able to deal with the new and unprecedented complexity in our security environment, and it must acknowledge and address threats and challenges from diverse actors and from all directions. We call this the 360-degree approach.¹ In line with this reasoning, Norway has a special responsibility in the North. Our attention to this region is therefore one of our most important contributions to Allied security.

Part of this new security landscape is a more self-assertive Russia. Russian armed forces are training more and their exercises are of an increasingly complex nature. The scale, scope, and intensity of recent Russian "snap exercises" occurring without advance notification are considerable. In the current tense situation, snap exercises create uncertainty and increase the risk of unintended escalations. This corresponds to a higher level of activity across NATO's area of responsibility. Russia's pattern of military exercises, particularly in the Baltic Sea region, and its violation of the airspace of NATO members and partners, are perceived as threatening by our allies. While

Norway does not consider Russia a military threat today, we cannot discount that its military capabilities could pose a challenge to transatlantic security in the future.

New Military-Strategic Developments in the North

Our greatest concern is Moscow's new strategic capabilities. Russia's development of new high-end military capabilities, including submarines, aircraft, and long-range, high-precision missiles that collectively can target all of Europe, as well as vital transatlantic lines of communication, has the potential for far-reaching and long-term consequences. In addition, Russia has built new garrisons and support facilities along its northern coast and on Arctic islands such as Novaya Zemlya, Franz Josef Land, and the New Siberian Islands. Russian authorities use the upgraded and expanded infrastructure for daily policing, but it can also be used for military operations.

Established to defend the Russian homeland and today Russia's only ice-free port in the north, Murmansk remains the base for nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles that are capable of inflicting damage on both the United States and Allied territory. The North Atlantic also remains the patrol area of Russian submarines. In 2014, Russia established a new Arctic command in Severomorsk under the commander of the Northern Fleet, with responsibility for the entire Arctic area. The strategic Russian military capabilities based in the North, and the need to protect them, remain the primary reasons for the geostrategic value Moscow places on the region.

We have observed an increased Russian naval presence in the North Atlantic. New strategic nuclear submarines with Bulava missiles are being put into service, and new submarines

with dual capability missiles are also becoming operational. Highly accurate long-range cruise missiles designed for land, sea, and air platforms have also been introduced. In recent years, flights of long-range bombers from the Kola Peninsula south toward Iceland and the United Kingdom have become more sophisticated and frequent. These strategic capabilities join a broader reform of the military structure involving more forward basing, which increases the potential reach of strategic assets.

Russia's introduction of new high-end maritime capabilities poses a particular strategic challenge to NATO. The development and fielding of such assets combined with advanced training and exercises make Russia increasingly capable of conducting Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) operations in the North Atlantic. Similar developments also pose a threat to NATO members and allies operating in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean.

It is of vital importance that NATO safeguard the sea lines of communication during a crisis or conflict. Its ability to provide mutual support across the Atlantic and in other regions is fundamental to the Alliance's security architecture. Safeguarding NATO's freedom of movement and operation across the North Atlantic is of importance to all of Europe, not only the northern parts of the Alliance. For NATO to take a passive stance in this development is an unacceptable approach.

Stability and Cooperation

At the same time, we strongly believe that it is in the interest of all Arctic states that the North remains a region of stability and predictability through cooperation. Cooperation with Russia based on international law is a precondition for long-term stability in the region. There are

precedents for this. The joint management of fishery resources, for example, has been successful in reducing over-fishing through the implementation of a quota system that serves the long-term interests of the fishing industry in both Russia and Norway. In the spirit of cooperation and peaceful coexistence, we have negotiated a maritime delimitation agreement with Russia that covers the Barents Sea and the

Arctic Ocean. The 2010 agreement solved what had been the single most important unsettled issue between Norway and Russia, and provided us with predictability for our maritime borders. It also provides the legal basis and framework for further Norwegian–Russian cooperation on fisheries, and enables potential cooperation on the development of petroleum resources across the maritime boundary.



Norwegian Maritime Boundaries

As a result of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of eastern Ukraine, Norway suspended bilateral military cooperation with Moscow. At the same time, however, both countries are interested in continuing to safeguard stability in the High North. That is why we continue to work together in areas such as search and rescue, and to uphold the Incidents at Sea agreement. Our sustained collaboration on coastguard and border control maintains Norway's ability to exercise authority, secure sovereign rights, and preserve environmental responsibilities in the North. We maintain a direct line between the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and the Russian Northern Fleet. This is especially important to avoid misunderstandings or unintended escalation, and to ensure the security of the people living in the North.

In order to avoid misunderstandings in relation to military exercises and training, it is important to update existing agreements that contribute to openness, predictability, and confidence building. The Vienna Document,² the Open Skies Treaty,³ and the agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty)⁴ constitute important existing mechanisms to this end. However, Russia unilaterally suspended the CFE treaty in 2007, and NATO stopped sharing information with Russia in 2011.

Cooperation in the Arctic Council has been functioning well despite the increased tensions between Russia and Western countries.⁵ This is an important forum for environmental and indigenous issues, as well as research collaboration. Almost all territorial questions in the Arctic have been solved, but processes regarding the continental shelf are still ongoing. In the Arctic Council's 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, all five Arctic coastal

states agreed that the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would be the basis of all territorial claims in the Arctic.⁶ These states have invested substantial political prestige, resources, and scientific attention to the issue of the continental shelf. UNCLOS provides an integrated and predictable international legal framework for the sea areas, with a firm basis in the UN. It is important that all Arctic littoral states stay committed to UNCLOS. We must work to keep the Arctic Council as a functioning mechanism for the regulation of diverse interests in a region also vested with complex politics.

Norway and the Alliance

As a small state neighboring a nuclear power, the guiding principle for Norway has been balancing deterrence and reassurance toward Russia. Credible deterrence for Norway means standing firm with our allies, exercising our sovereign rights, and making our strategic interests clear. We reassure through a predictable and non-threatening posture. Our defense concept is based on the premise of involving allies early on in a crisis and as seamlessly as possible. The security guarantee embedded in the NATO Charter—along with close and lasting ties with the United States, our most important ally, the United Kingdom, and other key allies—remains the cornerstone of Norway's security strategy.

The United States has prepositioned military equipment in Norway that is available for rapid preparation and debarkation in support of overseas deployments, enabling a strong and credible reinforcement of Europe. The U.S. Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway is firm evidence of the American commitment to Norwegian and European security. Norwegian units of all services regularly train

and exercise together with American forces and with other allies. Exercising together maintains interoperability, which keeps collective defense guarantees credible. Joint exercises are also important to show political commitment to collective defense. Moreover, the United States has signaled that it may resume airborne maritime patrol operations from Iceland. The United Kingdom has announced plans to invest in new maritime patrol aircraft to be based in Scotland, while France has also shown greater attention to surveillance, exercises, and training in the High North.

Substantial, yet balanced military peacetime activity in the North Atlantic with multinational participation has been and will remain an important part of a credible, transparent, and accountable policy. Therefore, we would like to see a more frequent presence of Allied forces in the North, training and taking part in exercises. We believe this is important, both as a signal of Allied cohesion and solidarity, and as a way of enhancing the knowledge of operating in the Alliance's own area of responsibility.

Since the Cold War, Norway has kept a watchful eye on military strategic developments in the Barents Sea on behalf of the Alliance. In our efforts to ensure a stable, predictable, and cooperative strategic environment, we maintain armed forces that contribute to deterring and defending against pressure, assault, and attack on Norwegian territory and adjacent areas. The Norwegian armed forces maintains its presence in the High North. The Norwegian joint headquarters is located just north of the Arctic Circle. Several coastguard vessels patrol the vast sea areas in which Norway has jurisdiction. F-16s are continuously on high-readiness as part of NATO's integrated air defense system. The majority of

our land forces are located in our most northern counties. We have invested in Aegis frigates, coast guard vessels, and maritime helicopters. Our acquisition of a new fighter aircraft, the F-35, is also a part of this overall investment. More than simply a replacement for the F-16, the new F-35 adds a wide range of new capabilities to our armed forces. Its long-range, precision-guided joint strike missile ensures that we will be able to strike even well-defended targets at extended distances, which strengthens our ability to deter any potential opponent. A predictable Norwegian presence prohibits the development of a dangerous power vacuum in the region and demonstrates our intent to defend our sovereignty.

The development of Russian strategic capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, combined with exercises and training in the North has increased Russia's ability to deter and defend in the maritime domain. The need for a 360-degree approach to deterrence and collective defense is more important than ever. We must view the potential threat to the northern and Baltic regions as interlinked, emphasize anti-submarine operations, and secure sea lines of communication across the Atlantic. Consequently, we must address the developments on NATO's maritime flanks in the form of increased Allied presence, situational awareness, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.

There is great continuity in the High North. Yet, the grave new developments in international relations in recent years, particularly the increased tensions between Russia and Western countries after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, demand robust and reliable situational awareness, including in the North. Russia's decision to set aside international law has displayed its willingness and ability to use

military means to back up its spheres-of-interest rhetoric. Together with our allies, we have been very clear that putting “might over right” is unacceptable. We must never forget the price our forefathers paid for peace and stability on our continent. During the more than seven decades that have passed since the end of World War II, international law has been our first line of defense, and so it must remain. “A Europe whole and free and at peace,” based on the values of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law was, is, and will always be our goal.⁷

Collective Response: Looking to the NATO Summit in Warsaw and Beyond

It should be clear that challenges in the northernmost part of the Allied area of responsibility concern us all. We need a coherent, consistent, and comprehensive response to the changing strategic environment in the North Atlantic. Together with the United Kingdom, France, and Iceland, Norway has actively promoted an initiative to strengthen NATO’s maritime flank in the North Atlantic. I would like to offer the essence of our joint initiative for the NATO summit in Warsaw, Poland, in July 2016. The ultimate aim is to adapt NATO to an ever-changing security environment. We wish to include the maritime domain of collective defense as part of the agenda for NATO’s development for Warsaw and beyond.

- **Strengthen NATO’s Maritime Capabilities.** First, NATO needs to pay more attention to the maritime domain and its impact on Alliance security. This requires true high-end Allied maritime capabilities. NATO’s maritime flanks are of overall strategic importance, and this needs to be fully recognized. Developments in the High North, and proper analyses of the

implications of Russia’s maritime doctrine, must be taken into consideration. We need to make sure that relevant capability requirements are fed into the NATO Defense Planning Process. Our forces must have relevant readiness and responsiveness.

- **Improve Command and Control Structure.** Second, we must take a close look at NATO’s command structure (NCS) and the command elements of the NATO force structure (NFS) to have the ability to plan, lead, and execute joint and combined operations. In particular, we need a better command arrangement with competence in full-spectrum maritime high-end blue-water operations. This requires close links among national headquarters, regional experts, and the NCS. Norway has for some time been an advocate of a stronger regional orientation to our command structure to better utilize situational awareness and operational insights. The importance of relevant and timely command and control arrangements cannot be overstated.

- **Increase Training, Exercises, and Presence.** Third, we need to think comprehensively about training and exercises in NATO. In addition to boosting interoperability and providing familiarity and understanding of the area of responsibility, training and exercises signal Allied cohesion and solidarity. This should have a deterring effect. Naval ships are warfighting systems that require highly trained and specialized personnel. We must facilitate conditions for relevant high-end training and exercises, including in the most demanding scenarios. It is important that NATO’s integrated military structure runs a comprehensive exercise and training program and is able to draw the necessary lessons from this activity. Norway

is looking forward to hosting NATO's high visibility exercise Trident Juncture in 2018, one of the alliance's largest exercises. We envisage a training scenario where the focus is on demonstrating deterrence and defense of the northernmost area of the alliance. Trident Juncture 2018 will consist of both a live exercise in October 2018 and a command post exercise in November 2018.

The abovementioned trinity—to strengthen capabilities, improve command and control, and increase training, exercises, and presence—will contribute to our goal of a NATO that remains politically and militarily credible. In Warsaw, we will chart the course for the Alliance's long-term adaptation to the new security environment, so that NATO stands ready to defend all allies against any threat from any direction. Given the new security challenges, we need to be able to operate

in the air, on land, and at sea. The way forward is doctrinal and technological interoperability among systems, domains, and countries.

Prospects: A Call for Maritime Power and Presence in the High North

The bedrock of Allied deterrence and collective defense is a strong and united transatlantic link. NATO currently faces challenges that require it to pay careful attention to its eastern and southern flanks, but we must not lose sight of the strategic changes in the North. Because of the need to remain vigilant and alert in this region, Norway is committed to drawing the attention of allies towards the north. This is part of our contribution to burden sharing and collective security, and is also part of NATO's 360-degree approach.

It is high time to review NATO's maritime posture. Strategic stability in Europe depends



Norwegian Armed Forces

Dutch infantry deployed by a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter during exercise Cold Response 2016.

on the credibility of NATO's collective defense capability, which in turn depends on open sea lines between the United States and Europe. As we prepare for the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, we must assess the new security environment as it is, not as we wish it to be. We must think strategically at the same time as each country takes regional responsibility. And we must strengthen the transatlantic link in both political and maritime terms. In short, NATO needs a coherent and robust long-term strategy to deal with the new security environment. A key element of that strategy must be maritime power and presence in the North.

PRISM

Notes

¹ NATO, "Statement by NATO Defence Ministers," June 25, 2015, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_121133.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

² Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures," November 30, 2011, <<http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597?download=true>>.

³ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Treaty on Open Skies," March 24, 1992, <<http://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true>>.

⁴ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," November 19, 1990, <<http://www.osce.org/library/14087?download=true>>.

⁵ "The Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic." Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States are the members of the Arctic Council. In addition, "six organizations representing Arctic Indigenous peoples have status as Permanent Participants." Arctic Council, "The Arctic Council: A backgrounder," May 20, 2015. <<http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us>>.

⁶ The Arctic Council, "The Ilulissat Declaration," May 28, 2008, <http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf>.

⁷ Phrase used by President George H. W. Bush. See: Ambassador Robert Hunter, "Perspectives: 'Europe Whole and Free:' Ukraine Should Impel a Return to First Principles," *The European Institute* (May 2014), <<http://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/ei-blog/196-european-affairs/ea-may-2014/1903-perspectives-europe-whole-and-free-ukraine-should-impel-a-return-to-first-principles>>.

Kenan O'Connor



During Obangame Express 2015, Nigerian forces conducted bilateral visit, board, search, and seizure training aboard the USS *Spearhead*. The *Spearhead* was deployed to the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations to support the international collaborative capacity-building program Africa Partnership Station.

Implementing the *Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority* in Europe and Africa

BY JAMES G. FOGGO III AND ERIC THOMPSON

America's security interests have always extended beyond its own shores—and the U.S. Navy has always defended that security at home and abroad. From the earliest days of the Republic, the waters of Europe and Africa have been critical to U.S. security. In 1775, John Paul Jones sailed into harm's way with one of our first frigates—USS *Bonhomme Richard*—to defeat the British warship HMS *Serapis*. That pitched battle ended with the sinking of the *Bonhomme Richard* but also with the capture of the *Serapis* as an American prize. Later, in the early 1800s, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur fought numerous naval battles off North Africa against the Barbary pirates, most notably in Tripoli, Libya. Throughout the next century, the U.S. Navy played a key role in the defeat of Germany in World War I and World War II. During the Cold War, the Navy was on the front lines, meeting the challenges of the Soviet Union, and thus playing a key role in its ultimate defeat and dissolution.

The waters of Europe and Africa are still critical to U.S. national security. The illegal annexation of Crimea, Ukraine, in 2014 is one of the most obvious changes in the security environment, but that is only one of many. The vicious border war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 caused significant setbacks to the Georgian economy, military, and infrastructure. When Russia illegally took Crimea and occupied the main Ukrainian port of Sevastopol, it confiscated over 50 percent of Ukraine's navy. In addition to its actions in the Black Sea, the reinigorated Russian Federation is actively destabilizing the Arctic and Baltic seas. Russian aggression in the Caucasus, Georgia, and Crimea illustrates how Russia is adopting hybrid warfare to destabilize the current world order.¹ A resurgent Russian navy is a key element of this aggression. For example, Russian submarine patrols have increased 50 percent since 2013², and Russian surface vessels very publicly strike

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targets in Syria to demonstrate Russia's newfound naval strength.³ Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has noted with alarm that Russia is now the greatest global threat to the United States and the only nation that is a potential existential threat to our way of life.⁴

Russia continues to invest in its submarine force, especially the new *Kilo* class, which is quieter and more capable than its other submarines. This investment includes the alarming plans to homeport six new Russian *Kilo*-class submarines in the Black Sea (two of which have already arrived), which could destabilize the region. Russian submarines are also operating farther from their homeport of Severomorsk into the North Atlantic and expanding operations into the Arctic. Growing access to natural resources has led to increased competition and tensions. New oil and gas deposits discovered in the eastern Mediterranean have also increased the number of exploration, drilling, and oil rig support platforms in that region.

At the same time, a growing ring of instability is slowly encircling Europe and Africa. Recent terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, Ankara, and elsewhere have grabbed the world's attention. Not only has the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant directly attacked North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member nations, it has also established a foothold on the doorstep of Europe with its territorial gains in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Shabaab in eastern Africa, and Boko Haram in western Africa have thrown formerly peaceful areas into turmoil. Terrorists and violent extremists who exploit and perpetuate political instability are responsible for the worst migrant crisis Europe has faced since World War II.

While maritime actions alone will not prevent this grave human tragedy, in February 2016, NATO started a maritime migration mission in the Aegean Sea. Saving lives is the obvious goal, but the follow-on actions are complicated and depend upon the nationality of the refugees, where the refugees were rescued, the flag of the ship that saved them, and the patchwork of bilateral agreements in place.

The United States is committed to working with our partners and allies to combat the root cause of the issue—terrorism in the Middle East and Africa—but it is not a simple task. The multiple factions in Syria are difficult to understand, making it challenging to influence them effectively. And by definition, an international crisis is not contained to specific geographic borders; actions in one place may cause unintended consequences in a completely different geographical area.

On the African continent, geography and the tyranny of distance are also obstacles to regional security. Criminals engaged in piracy, illegal fishing, and illicit trafficking operate in vast spaces that are difficult to monitor. Criminals are adept at slipping through the cracks in communication and information sharing, even when countries are willing to work together to enforce the rule of law.

A common military saying is that "the enemy gets a vote," but we must remember that our partners and allies also get a vote. The 28 NATO nations are bound by Article 5 to defend each other, but each nation has its own economic, political, and military priorities. Only a few NATO nations currently contribute 2 percent of their gross domestic product to their respective militaries, and even those that heavily invest in their militaries make choices based on their own national interests. Partners

IMPLEMENTING THE DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE AND AFRICA

and allies then decide together how they employ those forces in any given situation.

The U.S. Navy faces these historic challenges, as well as new and diverse ones, as we defend the nation not only in the maritime domain, but across all domains. Today, we can be attacked from the sea or under the sea, and from the air, space, and cyberspace. The threats in each of these domains are exceedingly dangerous, and we must remain vigilant. Similarly, the growing complexity and pervasiveness of, and accessibility to, the global information system now empower more people, businesses, communities, families, machines, governments, nongovernmental organizations—and, yes, criminals, terrorists, and other malign actors—than ever before. Rapid technological changes release the creative energy of and bring new opportunities to a large population, but they also usher in new threats and challenges.

With all of these challenges, how does the United States plan to protect the American people? In 2015, the United States laid out its plan for employing naval power in the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, and Ready (CS21R)*.⁵ Simply put, CS21R is the core policy the leaders of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have endorsed. It established the essential functions for the U.S. Navy: to defend the homeland, deter conflict, respond to crises, defeat aggression, protect the maritime commons, strengthen partnerships, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response, when needed. As an overarching strategy document for the three sea services, CS21R provided general guidance and let each Service decide how it will go about fulfilling its functions and accomplishing its missions.

In early 2016, Admiral John Richardson, the U.S. Navy's 31st Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), did exactly that with the publication



Joshua Davies

Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet VADM James Foggo inspects Ghanaian sailors in Tema as part of the Obangame Express multinational maritime exercise, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command.

of the *Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority*.⁶ A “design” is broader and more open-ended than a traditional “campaign plan.” Its focus is on long-term outcomes rather than on accomplishing a sequence of specific military objectives. The *Design* offers a method for framing strategic problems in a way that can help Navy leaders recognize important trends, accommodate complexity, and acknowledge and address uncertainty. With this understanding, Navy leaders can use the *Design* to formulate a purposeful and integrated way ahead to meet the challenges of the future. It encourages leaders at all levels to evaluate and assess their actions within the context of the environment in which they operate, while providing guideposts for behaviors, actions, and investments.

The *Design* also encourages the Navy to look beyond traditional notions of the threat. Naval officers often focus on specific adversaries and near-term threats, but the *Design* encourages them to think about *macro* trends. The *Design* recognizes that the character of the competitive environment is influenced by three interrelated, powerful global trends: increasing exploitation of the maritime domain, the rise of the global information system, and the increasing rate of technological creation and adoption. By promoting deliberate decisionmaking, the Navy plans to use these three trends better and more effectively than our adversaries. In so doing, the United States will maintain its edge and its maritime superiority.

Today, the CNO’s *Design* is the touchstone that guides how the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. 6th Fleet (CNE-CNA/C6F) meets the rapidly emerging challenges in the region. We are applying the four main lines of effort that lie at the heart of the *Design*:

strengthen naval power at and from the sea, achieve high-velocity learning at every level, strengthen our Navy team for the future, and expand and strengthen our network of partners. We will examine each of these in turn.

Strengthen Naval Power At and From the Sea

*Maintain a fleet that is trained and ready to operate and fight decisively—from the deep ocean to the littorals, from the sea floor to space, and in the information domain. Align our organization to best support generating operational excellence.*⁷

There are several paths to strengthening naval power. Among these are increasing capacity (force structure), getting more out of current capabilities, seeking force multipliers at sea and ashore, and leveraging the full battlespace from the sea floor to space. U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR/NAVAF)/U.S. 6th Fleet has recently grown significantly in capacity in order to address emerging challenges in the European and African theaters. For example, in the last two years, the number of ships permanently assigned to NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet has increased 400 percent. In early 2014, the one permanently assigned U.S. Navy ship in theater was USS *Mount Whitney*, U.S. 6th Fleet’s command ship. The remaining naval presence was provided by vessels deploying from the east coast of the United States on six month deployments or vessels transiting to and from the Arabian Gulf through the Suez Canal. Now, there are four permanently stationed forward deployed guided missile destroyers (DDGs) in U.S. 6th Fleet.⁸

These vessels were forward deployed to Rota, Spain, as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). EPAA is the U.S.

contribution to the NATO ballistic missile defense (BMD) mission and defends Europe against Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Even in light of the recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement, Iran still continues to build a lethal arsenal of long-range missiles that can reach the capitals of Europe. Thus, EPAA provides Europeans with a hedging strategy against Iran in the event of abrogation using capabilities ashore and at sea. Ashore, the U.S. Navy recently completed installation of an Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS) in Deveselu, Romania. A sister site is scheduled to be built in Redzikowo, Poland, which will further expand the EPAA system. Together with the four DDGs, which are mobile BMD platforms, the AAMDS help protect our NATO allies.

In addition to being BMD capable, DDGs are capable of conducting multiple missions, including air and missile defense; strike, surface, and anti-submarine warfare; maritime interdiction; counterpiracy; presence operations; and search and rescue. This means they provide a tremendous return on our investment by being forward deployed. These ships constantly support real-world operations, participate in multinational exercises, and conduct a variety of other training with allies and partners, spending almost half of their time underway.

Forward deploying the DDGs to Rota provides NAVFAC/NAVFAC/US 6th Fleet with two key advantages over transiting ships. The ships do not need to cross the Atlantic Ocean, so they can respond more quickly when operations or emergencies arise, and are able to participate in more training events with our partners and allies. These routine interactions—operating, training, and

engaging—help forge relationships that should not be underestimated.

On any given day, NAVFAC/NAVFAC/US 6th Fleet may have a submarine in the Arctic, the command ship USS *Mount Whitney* participating in a Baltic exercise, an oiler refueling an allied vessel in the Aegean Sea, a destroyer conducting a port visit in the Black Sea, Seabees working on construction sites in three African countries, Aegis Ashore facilities in Romania exercising their ability to intercept Iranian missiles, and an expeditionary fast transport ship conducting multi-national law enforcement operations off the western coast of Africa. NAVFAC/NAVFAC/US 6th Fleet is an extremely capable force dedicated to peace and stability in Europe and Africa.

Achieve High-Velocity Learning at Every Level

Apply the best concepts, techniques, and technologies to accelerate learning as individuals, teams, and organizations. Clearly know the objective and the theoretical limits of performance—set aspirational goals. Begin problem definition by studying history—do not relearn old lessons. Start by seeing what you can accomplish without additional resources. During execution, conduct routine and rigorous self-assessment. Adapt processes to be inherently receptive to innovation and creativity.⁹

One of the most powerful components of the *Design* is the line of effort that focuses on high-velocity learning. This process is not just about doing things “faster,” nor is it limited to classroom learning. Instead, it seeks to improve an organization through questioning that drives innovation and improvements. Having a “learning engine” where ideas and concepts

are iteratively posited, tested, assessed, refined, re-positied, re-tested, and so on, means the organization can rapidly adapt the lessons learned.

In the past, the U.S. military dominated the three domains of warfare: maritime, land, and air. Today, warfare has become increasingly complex and added two new contested domains: space and cyberspace. We must now leverage the Navy's intellectual enterprise to think and develop new ways of warfare in all five domains. Because traditional or historical approaches are no longer valid, it is critical that we make use of new technologies, new concepts, and new processes, such as online gaming and simulation, to develop the Navy of the 21st century.

NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet is doing just that with its approach to naval operations in Europe and Africa and our dedication to training as we fight. Asymmetric warfare, the proliferation of smart mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and high-end diesel electric submarines, as well as anti-access/area denial strategies in places such as the Arctic, Baltic, and Black seas all present mounting challenges in our area of operations. To overcome these problems, we are developing new concepts and tactics, which we include in every exercise that we organize in this theater.

We have also formed an innovation team that mirrors the *CNO Rapid Innovation Cell* and the Secretary of the Navy's *Task Force Innovation*. With no shortage of volunteers, many of whom are junior officers with big ideas and a keen understanding of new technologies, we are at the forefront of the changing nature of naval warfare. For example, one innovation that we are implementing this year will put aerostats and parasails on the decks of our ships to extend the reach of our

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). This will greatly complement our unmanned aerial vehicle ISR at a reduced cost. Furthermore, because it went from idea to implementation in under a year, it may provide the model for future rapid innovation programs.

We have begun using consortiums with our partners and allies whose defense budgets are stagnant or in decline. These allow us and our allies to develop combined assets at a fraction of the cost to each nation. Some recent examples include the C-17 Globemaster aircraft consortium in Papa, Hungary, and the NATO airborne warning and control system consortiums in Geilenkirchen, the Netherlands, and Trapani, Sicily. One of the most impressive examples of a successful consortium was our participation in the Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum's At Sea Demonstration 2015 (ASD-15). During a complex BMD scenario, a U.S. BMD-capable DDG engaged a BMD threat in space while allied and partner ships simultaneously defended against incoming anti-ship cruise missiles. Meanwhile, several destroyers and frigates from the nine participating nations passed cueing and targeting data amongst themselves, to the "shooter," and to shore sites—an important first for those nations. This was also the first live demonstration of the Standard Missile-3 in the European theater. It was a highly successful shoot-down event—all four targets (one ballistic missile and three anti-ship cruise missiles) were destroyed. ASD-15's success verified the concept that pooling resources and investment in high-end BMD capabilities is both possible and prudent.

These consortium efforts demonstrate not only what we can accomplish when we work together toward shared and innovative goals,

but also a road ahead. Perhaps consortiums for developing and fielding marine patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, missiles, and/or Aegis radar technology are just around the corner.

Strengthen Our Navy Team for the Future

*We are one Navy Team comprised of a diverse mix of active duty and reserve Sailors, Navy Civilians, and our families—with a history of service, sacrifice, and success. We will build on this history to create a climate of operational excellence that will keep us ready to prevail in all future challenges.*¹⁰

This aspect of the *Design* is intended to develop a different kind of software—our people. This is, frankly, the greatest advantage we have over our adversaries. If you work at NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet, whether you are Active or Reserve Component or a civilian, you are our “Shipmate.” Ships and plans are useless without a team to operate and direct them. Across the dual theaters of Europe and Africa, NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet Shipmates stand ready to conduct decisive combat operations if called upon.

Approximately 20 percent of our headquarters staff are civilians, and they bring a different perspective than those of us who serve in uniform. We nurture this dynamic through a variety of processes and forums. Within the last year, we created the Civilian Advisory Board to give civilian staff members a consolidated voice, wherein approximately 20 GS-14/15 level leaders meet monthly to discuss issues and best practices. We have also formulated a Civilian Command Sponsored Fitness Program, a more robust meritorious awards program, and a reinvigorated on-site

training program that brings subject matter experts from the United States to Europe to train large numbers of our workforce at a fraction of the cost of sending everyone to training in the United States. This last effort is intended to “train the trainer” and to allow us to form our own cadre of subject matter experts for future generations of shipmates.

In addition, we held the first three day Senior Civilian Leadership Seminar sponsored by Fleet Forces Command to improve knowledge about civilian development programs within the Department of the Navy (DON). Finally, we are exploring options within the current hiring system to maximize leadership’s flexibility in retaining—and attracting—critical talent. By creating exchange opportunities with our stateside partners, NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet benefits from their skills in theater and they gain an overseas perspective, thus transforming the way DON “thinks” about its strategic partners. This critical insight, honed and sharpened in an overseas environment, provides an invaluable advantage to our forces moving forward. These deliberate efforts help ensure NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet is a place where motivated and innovative people will take ownership, assume appropriate risk, and seize opportunities to make our naval forces more efficient and effective.

Expand and Strengthen Our Network of Partners

*Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies, and partners who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.*¹¹

The ability to build and maintain meaningful, mutually advantageous, and enduring partnerships distinguishes us from our adversaries.



Sgt. Austin Long

Partnerships are critical to maintaining the peace, and—if it comes down to it—assuring our warfighting edge. By placing partnerships at the center of our thinking, planning, training, and operating, we actively seek to benefit from the academic and intellectual potential that industry, interagency, and naval partners around the world can provide. Every aspect of the NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet mission, including operations, exercises, intelligence sharing, and training, is conducted with our ever-expanding network of allies and partners in mind.

By living and working with our host nations, the 10,000 to 11,000 Sailors in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations strengthen our relationships. The NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet headquarters is in Naples, Italy, with the command ship about an hour away in Gaeta, Italy. In 2015, *Mount Whitney* and her crew spent several months in a Croatian shipyard to extend her service life through 2039. Spain warmly welcomed four DDGs to Rota, which added 2,500 Sailors and family members to the area. In October 2014, the U.S. Navy established its first new base since 1987 when Naval Support Facility Deveselu was dedicated in Romania. Another base establishment ceremony is scheduled for the fall of 2016 in Poland to support the second Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System. Simply sharing food,

space, and cultural experiences enhances our mutual understanding.

Conducting exercises with our partners also increases our professional relationships. One of the largest maritime exercises in Europe, Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2015, involved 49 ships, 60 aircraft, and 5,000 air, ground, and maritime forces from 17 participating nations. Each year, BALTOPS has grown in size and complexity, demonstrating our commitment to operate together. For example, in BALTOPS 2015, we spent many hours solving difficult interoperability and communications problems. Practicing now ensures we build the skills required to be proficient in a real-world environment. But the key aspect of BALTOPS 2015 was that, for the first time in its 43-year history, it was led by NATO, specifically the Commander of Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO). By leveraging the dual-hatted nature of U.S. 6th Fleet and STRIKFORNATO, we executed the largest BALTOPS ever and, more importantly, showed clearly the solidarity of the NATO alliance.

BALTOPS also demonstrated the importance of exercising together, especially as diverse national forces evolve and acquire new technology. Only with practice will we be able to incorporate all new capabilities effectively. In that vein, BALTOPS offered an opportunity for partners such as Sweden and Finland to



As part of the NATO-led combined amphibious assault exercise, Trident Juncture, a U.S. Marine from the USS *Arlington* holds security with a Portuguese Marine at Praia da Raposa beach in Portugal.

lead an amphibious assault alongside NATO forces. In 2016, STRIKEFORNATO will again command BALTOPS, and we will execute more complex amphibious landings, work across larger distances, and challenge ourselves at every level.

Exercise Joint Warrior, held in the spring and fall, is another opportunity to focus on interoperability. The coastline at the United Kingdom training range, with its lochs and islands, provides a training environment that challenges sailors in all warfare areas. Joint Warrior is designed to ensure U.S. ships can operate with our NATO allies and international partners using NATO tactics and procedures.

Training and relationship building are also U.S. goals in the Black Sea region. The United States has maintained its support for Ukraine, especially in the maritime domain, since Russia illegally annexed Crimea. NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet is currently in the detailed planning phase for the next multinational Sea Breeze exercise, hosted by Ukraine and involving other NATO and Black Sea nations in 2016.

To support our efforts in the Black Sea region, NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet recently hosted five of the six Black Sea nations in Naples, Italy, for the first-ever Black Sea Forum. This event was focused on maritime security in the Black Sea, especially the growing threats

from terrorism, massive migration flows, and asymmetric threats from the Russian military build-up. The willingness of our allies and partners to engage in meaningful discussions at the Black Sea Forum speaks volumes about their desire for increased security cooperation in this rapidly changing environment.

NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet is also building upon our relationships throughout Africa. We conduct three “Express” series exercises annually: Obangame/Saharan Express in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea; Phoenix Express in the Mediterranean Sea; and Cutlass Express in East Africa. These exercises help build the capabilities of African maritime forces and provide opportunities for the American, European, and African partners to operate together. No one nation can combat piracy, counter illegal fishing, or stop illicit trafficking alone. Regional information sharing has also helped nations effectively police their own waters, which is essential for regional security.

A recent success in Africa, the rescue of the pirated fuel vessel *M/T Maximus*, shows the practical benefits of the Express exercises. In February 2016, Ghanaians and Americans were patrolling together in Ghanaian waters aboard USNS *Spearhead* as part of an Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership Operation when they received a real-world tasking to locate a suspected pirated vessel. The

Ghanaian-American team found the hijacked ship *M/T Maximus* and relayed the location to the maritime operations center in Ghana. Over the next two weeks, eight nations helped track the suspect vessel as it transited southwest through the Gulf of Guinea. When the hijacked ship entered the waters of Sao Tome/ Principe, they coordinated with the Nigerian navy, which conducted the first ever opposed boarding by a West African navy. The Nigerian navy recaptured the vessel and rescued the hostages, killing one pirate and taking the remaining ones into custody. A simple joint exercise morphed into a successful multinational, real-world counterpiracy mission.

These are just a few of the ways that working together across cultural lines and defending the sea lanes lead to overall maritime security. NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet will continue to take every opportunity to work with our partners and allies.

Preparing for the Future

As we prepare for the future at NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet, we will rely on the *Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority* as our bellwether. The *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* is an effective strategy for aligning ends, ways, and means and defining the core functions of the naval services, but it is the *Design* that allows us to envision how to successfully implement our strategy and adapt to the future. The *Design* provides us with a way ahead to inculcate a culture of adaptation, assessment, and learning, and such a culture is critical to help us understand and meet the challenges of the world today and tomorrow.

NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet protects the peace and provides stability through strength at sea. It builds relationships among our NATO allies and partners. But it is not only

these goals that define us. It is how we approach those goals and how we shift our actions and behavior to meet obstacles and challenges that are our key advantage. The *Design* enables us to do this by showing us the importance of constantly learning and adapting.

By inculcating high-velocity learning into our day-to-day thinking about naval warfare, we are constantly involved in assessing our environment, identifying the threats that exist and that may exist in the future, and developing appropriate solutions. But the solutions of today may not be the most appropriate solutions for tomorrow. The NAVEUR-NAVAF/U.S. 6th Fleet staff understands the importance of assessing, innovating, problem solving, and then reassessing. In this way we are constantly learning, relearning, and meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow. Only a few years ago, Russia was considered a partner and the Mediterranean was at peace. Today, Russia confronts us across Europe, and the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean has steadily grown. We are meeting these challenges and will continue to do so. But we are also assessing and identifying what may come in the future. This is the essence of the *Design*, and the real goal of the U.S. Navy in Europe and Africa. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Steve Covington, "The Meaning of Russia's Campaign in Syria," Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, December 2015, <<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia%20in%20Syria%20-%20web.pdf>>.

² According to the Sputnik International news service, as cited by Sam Lagrone, "Russian Navy Chief: Submarine Patrols Up 50 Percent Over Last Year," *U.S. Naval Institute News*, March 19, 2015, <<http://news.usni.org/2015/03/19/russian-navy-chief-submarine-patrols-up-50-percent-over-last-year>>.

³ Nicholas de Larrinaga, "Russian Submarine Fires Cruise Missiles into Syria," *HIS Jane's Defense Weekly*, December 9, 2015, <www.janes.com/article/56544/russian-submarine-fires-cruise-missiles-into-syria>.

⁴ Press briefing with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, August 20, 2015, <www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/614330/departments-of-defense-press-briefing-with-secretary-carter-in-the-pentagon-press>.

⁵ Chief of Naval Operations, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready," March 2015, <www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf>.

⁶ Chief of Naval Operations, "A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority," Version 1.0, January 2016, <www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Unlike during the Cold War era, there are no permanently assigned carrier strike groups or amphibious readiness groups in the Mediterranean—only those temporarily assigned during "transit presence."

⁹ Chief of Naval Operations, "A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority."

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

Photos

Page 58. Photo by Kenan O'Connor. 2015. 150320-N-JP249-034 GULF OF GUINEA (March 20, 2015). From <<https://www.flickr.com/photos/cne-cna-c6f/16258432374/in/album-72157663673877641/>>. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 2.0 License <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/>>. Photo unaltered.

Photo 61. Photo by Joshua Davies. 2015. 150325-N-RB579-248 TEMA, Ghana (March 27, 2015). From <<https://www.flickr.com/photos/cne-cna-c6f/16328256703/in/album-72157647476827593/>>. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 2.0 License <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/>>. Photo unaltered.



Syrian and Iraqi immigrants getting off a boat from Turkey on the Greek island of Lesbos.

The Disintegration of European Security

Lessons from the Refugee Crisis¹

BY FABRIZIO TASSINARI

Even before the current crisis, migration management had always been among the most complex, politicized, and least integrated policies in Europe. Together with common foreign and defense policies—another item on the European agenda that is becoming increasingly enmeshed with the refugee crisis—migration is the epitome of a highly sensitive issue that is threaded carefully at the domestic level by each European Union (EU) member state before it gets negotiated in the EU, almost always resulting in watered-down compromises. The rather straightforward reason for this is that the assorted range of consequences that are associated, rightly or wrongly, with migration policy in the European public debate—from the dissolution of the welfare state to the rise of Islamic terrorism—are items that can decree victory or defeat in any European election. Because of this politicization, the ballooning migrant and refugee crisis has gradually moved the signposts and changed the standards of what is acceptable to say or do in Europe today to address it. Policies and words that were taboo only a few years ago (for example, border control) are now a constituent part of the lexicon and policy repertoire.

This article argues that the ongoing migrant and refugee crisis has effectively marked a gradual—but inescapable—renationalization of European policymaking, particularly in the field of security policy. I will analyze national responses by focusing on two country cases, Italy and Germany, which are extreme and representative enough to showcase typologies of reactions to the refugee crisis. The article will then review how national positions affected EU policy responses. I will then move on to discuss what this state of affairs means for the future of Europe's security, and conclude by observing the consequences of the migrant crisis for the ongoing renationalization of EU policymaking, as well as options, available or imaginable, to overcome it.

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The Sources of Security in Europe

As is often the case, *The Economist* said it best. After the EU's expansion toward Eastern Europe, the British magazine ran an editorial entitled, "How terrorism trumped federalism."² Although the article dealt primarily with the debate on Turkish accession to the EU, the title of the piece crystallizes the extent to which Europe's paramount quest for security (of which terrorism is but one facet) thwarts its equally vital process of integration (as incarnated to the utmost degree by the notion of federalism).

The correlation between security and integration has been at the heart of the post-World War II European project. Rendering war between European countries impossible (arguably Europe's greatest achievement) has been attained through the relentless quest for ever closer integration. The balance of power that dominated European geopolitics for centuries never succeeded in bringing lasting peace to Europe. This was accomplished through gradual integration, the pooling of resources, and the voluntary sharing of sovereignty, from the Marshall Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s, to the adoption of a single currency, the eastward expansion of the EU, and, indeed, the free movement of people in Europe that have occurred during the last three decades.

Integration has also represented the European response to every major shift in the European power constellation. Rather than protecting themselves by closing their borders and erecting barriers, European nations have sought stability by opening up to one another. The end of dictatorships in Greece, Spain, and Portugal and the collapse of the Soviet Union each led to "enlargements" of the European

Union to include the countries of Southern and Central Europe. Each widening has in turn corresponded to a "deepening," in the form of a series of arrangements and treaties aimed at creating a more integrated Europe. The correlation of security and integration in Europe has thus defined a peculiar system of international governance based upon shared rules and sophisticated institutional instruments. It has broadened the meaning of what is domestic and what is foreign. For over a decade, the EU passport and the euro have been domestic issues, while the EU has acquired a growing presence in foreign policy alongside that of its member states.

Europe's neighbors have presented a challenge to this set up. One of the most outstanding accomplishments of the EU has been to replicate the nexus of security and integration in new regions and countries of Europe. As top European diplomat Robert Cooper has argued, the EU has proven able and willing to "enlarge the context" in which policies are made.³ However, in today's neighborhood—the area stretching from Russia and the former Soviet space in the east to Turkey, the Middle East, and North Africa in the south—Europe appears to have stretched this context beyond repair. Indeed, the European instincts are today going in the direction of actually decoupling the pursuit of security from that of integration. Peace and stability are not pursued through the gradual inclusion of peripheral countries. Rather, they are sought by keeping those countries and the challenges accompanying them at arm's length from Europe. The migrant crisis has possibly presented the most glaring example and systematic representation of this state of affairs.

Rolling in the Italian Waves

There are several EU states that could serve as case studies worth highlighting to describe the magnitude of Europe's ongoing refugee crisis. In Hungary, for instance, migration management has constituted a key instrument to generating and maintaining political consensus. In June 2015, facing arrivals that at that time already numbered twice that of the previous year, the Hungarian government built a 4-meter-high (13-foot) and 175-kilometer-long (110-mile) fence along its border with Serbia. This and other measures, as well as the discursive correlation of the refugee crisis with issues such as unemployment and terrorism, have become one instrument of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's illiberal project. In stark contrast to Hungary, daily arrivals into Greece as of March 2016 have averaged an astounding 1,980 per day.⁴ Notwithstanding the country's severe logistical shortcomings in confronting such large numbers of arrivals⁵ as well as a predictable popular uneasiness with such large numbers of arrivals and Athens' ongoing economic predicament as a result of the sovereign-debt maelstrom⁶, the crisis has brought forward a sympathetic attitude that seems far removed from the unpredictability experienced just one year ago in connection with the Euro crisis. Yet for the purpose of highlighting the idiosyncrasies of Europe's response, as well as the range of options at the disposal of European policymakers, no case is more representative than that of Italy. In the span of only a couple of years, Rome has effectively encompassed policy positions both as extreme and as different as those of Hungary and Greece.

Going back to the start of what was then known as the "Arab Spring," the case of Italy,

and particularly of Italian-Libyan relations, is symptomatic and representative of two unrelated tendencies: first, an overall strategic disorientation regarding the most effective course of action for migration control, and second, a disingenuous expectation on the part of national capitals about the role and capabilities of the EU.

Italian-Libyan relations have always been central to EU migration management, as they concern one of the two most trafficked entry routes via sea into Europe (the other being the so-called "Balkan route" involving Greece). The status quo in this regard was based on the "Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya" that was signed by the two countries in 2008. The pact allowed Italy's coast guard to deport incoming immigrants back to Libyan shores, skipping procedures for filing potential asylum claims. In the process, Italy agreed to pay Libya \$5 billion USD, formally for colonial reparation, but in practice as a price tag for the repatriations.⁷ The so-called "forced" repatriation became the most concrete outcome of this pact and led to international uproar. Several observers, including Human Rights Watch, considered Italy to be in breach of the Geneva Convention, insofar as it stipulates that contracting states cannot expel or return refugees or asylum seekers to states where their lives or freedom might be threatened. More than that, however, the pact was turned into something of a blackmail for Europe as a whole, with Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi repeatedly threatening to turn the continent "black" unless EU countries paid the amounts requested.⁸ Notwithstanding its ethical and legal acceptability, the deal paid large political dividends. Then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi declared in the immediate aftermath of the signing that the pact was

about “less immigrants and more oil.”⁹ In that respect, he delivered. According to Eurostat, entries into Europe via Italy in 2010, the year before the start of the Arab Spring, totaled a mere 7,300 people.¹⁰

After the fall of Qadhafi in late 2011, 30,000 people reached the shores of Lampedusa, Italy’s southernmost island, just 290 miles from the shores of Libya. At the time, although Italian officials noted privately that these numbers were manageable, the political backlash had already begun. Critics on the Italian right warned of an impending “human tsunami.” French authorities unilaterally closed their borders with Italy in an attempt to prevent migrants from traveling onward to France. Even traditionally open nations such as Denmark reintroduced border controls.

Then, in October 2013, Italy performed an abrupt about-turn. A boat carrying some 500 migrants sank off the coast of Lampedusa.¹¹ The Italian coast guard was able to save only about 150 passengers. In response to the tragedy, the Italian government launched *Mare Nostrum*, a vast search-and-rescue operation stretching into international waters. Through *Mare Nostrum*, Italy saved more than 130,000 lives in 2014, at a monthly cost some of EUR 10 million.¹² Laura Boldrini, a former spokeswoman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the current speaker of the Lower House of the Italian parliament, put the price at roughly EUR 600 per saved life.¹³ That was apparently too much—citing its high costs, the Italian government shut down the project after just one year. Italy had expected that *Mare Nostrum*’s costs and responsibility would be



Irish Defence Forces

Irish Naval personnel from the *LE Eithne* rescue migrants as part of Operation *Triton*.

shared by other states and institutions in the European Union, as the high influx of migrants was a continent-wide problem. This transference never quite materialized, however. A replacement EU mission, Operation *Triton*, was granted just one-third of *Mare Nostrum's* budget and had both fewer assets and a more restricted mandate. (While *Mare Nostrum* operated in international waters, *Triton* is active only up to 30 miles off the Italian coast.)¹⁴

Mare Nostrum represented a complete reversal from the Libya-Italy deal. To picture it, one needs only to imagine the Italian coast guard sailing in two diametrically opposite directions: under the Berlusconi-Qadhafi deal, they would go back to Libya with boatloads of migrants, including potential asylees; with *Mare Nostrum*, the migrant boats would be intercepted and escorted to Italy. However, the operation proved politically untenable. As a further testament to the political toxicity of migration management, it might be worth pointing out that during the time of *Mare Nostrum*, Italy was not ruled by an elected government, but one caretaker, technocratic executive because of the Euro crisis. In other words, even though the government did not have to face elections, the operation was shut down after only one year.

A Pragmatic Germany

The case of Germany is representative at several levels. First, as the largest European country and the de facto hegemon of post-Euro-crisis Europe, Germany has served as the default leader of the European pack. The more significant reason for its representativeness is that Germany has struggled with realistic and pragmatic policy positions, far removed from the populist extremes of the countries mentioned and reviewed above.

Even before the current crisis, Germany received more asylum applications than any other country in Europe—including 202,000 in 2014 alone.¹⁵ Backed by these numbers, Berlin had typically been dismissive of pleas for support coming from Southern Europe. “I’d like to remind you that we have quite a large number of asylum seekers that we have accepted [in Germany] by European comparisons,” Chancellor Angela Merkel said in late 2013.¹⁶ “We need to add some short[-]term measures on Lampedusa [but] we have today not undertaken any qualitative change to our refugee policy.”¹⁷

In 2015, the situation shifted dramatically. The worsening conditions of the Syrian civil war as well as the rise of the Islamic State pushed the issue of the millions of refugees to the top of the German political debate. A particularly awkward episode involving Merkel occurred during a televised meeting in July 2015 when a young Palestinian girl asked about the prospect of family reunifications. The typically pragmatic answer delivered by the Chancellor, about the limits of European states in welcoming migrants, backfired and was perceived as needlessly cruel.¹⁸ In August, Berlin decided to waive EU rules for Syrian refugees. By most accounts, this was a momentous move—one unmatched in other EU states—but reality quickly set in. By September, Germany had reinstated temporary border checks.¹⁹ Conservative estimates put the number of arrivals at 800,000 (later corrected to 1.2 million), which immediately raised the question of the enormous response that managing this influx would require.²⁰

In mid-October, Merkel undertook a historic visit to Ankara, only two weeks ahead of controversial snap general elections in Turkey, to seal a migration deal endorsed by the entire

EU. This deal was intended to address the entries coming through the Balkan route to Europe from Syria, Iraq, and Central Asia via Greece. The lynchpin of the accord consists of a readmission agreement: anyone unlikely to gain asylum—approximately half of the daily arrivals in Greece, according to the UNHCR—will be returned to Turkey. Already coping with some 2.6 million refugees on its own, Turkey would receive aid, quantified as EUR 3 billion, to manage the additional influx. While we are light years away from Italy's "forced repatriations," the Turkey-EU deal also may look like a Faustian pact, measured against Europe's own criticism of the deteriorating state of the rule of law in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey has been offered the possibility of a visa-free agreement with the EU. Movement of Turkish people to the EU had long been one of the sticking points in the EU's checkered relations with Ankara, with EU countries panicking over the prospect of being flooded by Turkish job seekers. Any proposal relaxing visa requirements would be an absolute game changer in EU-Turkish relations, which have long been tarnished by a lack of trust and by Europe's perceived double standards.

In March 2016, the EU-Turkey agreement was sealed with a surprising and controversial addition, negotiated separately by Chancellor Merkel and the Turkish government. The addition stipulates that the individuals subject to readmission to Turkey include the totality of arrivals in Greece—including refugees. In return, the EU will add an additional EUR 3 billion to what had already been agreed, and take into the EU one of the refugees already hosted by Turkey for every one migrant sent back from Greece.²¹ This one-for-one refugee swap has been severely criticized by rights groups, and it is questionable whether Turkey

will indeed deliver on its promise. Moreover, the deal sparked a domino effect of parallel proposals. The latest of these is a migration "compact" that the Italian government proposed in early April, in advance of a foreseen surge of immigrant arrivals by sea after the closure of the Balkan route. The proposal plans to reallocate already earmarked funds and to issue joint "Euro-bonds" to fund infrastructure projects in countries of migrant origins, mostly in Africa. More controversially, the plan proposes to replicate the EU-Turkey deal, with war-torn Libya problematically cast in Ankara's role.²²

It is doubtful whether this compact will see the light of day; the proposed issuance of Euro-bonds for Africa has already been flatly rejected by Germany. At the same time, Merkel has expressly excluded a "Plan B" to solve the crisis. She seems determined to stay the course, repeatedly telling Germans, "Wir schaffen das" ("We can do this"). However, critics are growing both at home and abroad, and Merkel's own popularity rating is dwindling at a rapid pace from the sky-high levels she has enjoyed throughout the past decade.²³ This raises serious questions about the political viability of the German response. If anything, however, the range of different measures laid out so far shows that Berlin is not driven by a simple-minded idealistic vision that lacks alternatives, as critics would have it. Merkel is refining tools—some more questionable than others, as the agreement with Turkey shows—in order to realize a long-term vision about the resolution of this crisis, which for Germany is ultimately a European vision. It is here, in the common and coordinated European policy, where the major deficiencies of the European response seem to coalesce.

European Response: Behind the Curve

The governments of Italy and Germany have in recent months joined forces by sending common letters pressing for a European solution to the crisis. Such a solution would include a revision of the now outdated Dublin Declaration stipulating that refugee applications should be filed in the country of first arrival in Europe, a provision that would bring countries like Greece to collapse. But the two case studies examined here also underline the broader and more fundamental challenge facing the EU in the refugee crisis: member states change the facts on the ground, decisions are taken nationally, and EU institutions are presented with a *fait accompli*. National capitals have produced a reality made of unilateral actions that leave little room for consultation, let alone coordination, and create what the

popular media has dubbed a “domino effect” of national reactions. In this vein, Italy launched *Mare Nostrum* before coordinating with its European partners, then shut it down the following year once it realized that the expected support was not forthcoming. Similarly, Berlin’s welcoming of Syrian refugees had a knock-on effect on Germany’s neighbors, almost all of which have reimposed border controls as a result.

Despite the countless emergency EU summits at the highest levels throughout the last year, a widening gap has emerged between European deeds and European actions. The most striking example is precisely the scheme meant to redistribute refugees across EU member states. In May 2015, with arrivals already in the hundreds of thousands, the EU agreed to relocate 40,000 Syrian and Eritrean refugees over a period of 2 years.²⁴ By September 2015,



Mstyslaw Chernov

Refugees stranded at Budapest’s Keleti railway station

at a time when Germany alone had welcomed some 800,000 refugees, EU member states agreed, after painful negotiations, to redistribute 160,000 refugees.²⁵ As of early January 2016, EU countries had made little over 4,000 places available for relocation, and a mere 272 people had actually been relocated.²⁶ “At this rate,” European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker quipped, the program “will take until 2101.”²⁷

Perhaps the most paradoxical example of Europe’s inconsistencies concerns the protection of EU external borders. In recent months, this has become of one of the political mantras preferred by EU governments. In January 2016, for example, the European Commission summoned the governments of Sweden, Denmark, and Germany to explain their almost simultaneous, and yet uncoordinated, decisions to reinstate border checks. All three governments, despite visible grudges about each other’s decision, convened and repeated in unison that the only way to protect the Schengen system of free movement of people inside the EU, increasingly challenged by border checks, was a better protection of the EU external borders. As in several other instances both before and since, the European Commission ultimately resigned to rubberstamp the decision of the three governments as corresponding to the kind of extraordinary situation that justifies the re-imposition of border checks.²⁸

While no one in Europe disagrees that the protection of the external borders is vital to the survival of Schengen, the EU is in disarray as to how to do it. Some governments play up the role of so-called “hot spots,” initial reception facilities aimed at streamlining identification and fingerprinting. Another recent proposal, by the European Commission, suggested turning FRONTEX, the hapless EU border agency,

into a full-fledged European border and coast guard.²⁹ In line with the resistance to coordinating border control as described above, some European capitals have been reluctant to give up sovereignty on such a key national prerogative.

Entirely missing in this discussion is that the hype surrounding the protection of EU external borders runs counter to much of what the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has stood for. For more than a decade, the ENP toward countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Europe has been about extending the benefit of EU integration by means of lowering trade barriers and, crucially, opening borders. Visa facilitation and eventual liberalization measures to this day remain the top prize for a large pool of countries that have little or no hope of ever gaining membership in the EU. The fact that in the midst of its controversial debate regarding Turkey’s ascension, the EU has offered Ankara the prospect of visa liberalization for Turkish citizens testifies to the myriad contradictions in EU policy circles.

Present and Future of European Security

In June 2016, the EU will adopt a European Global Strategy, its first strategic document produced since 2003. Whether or not such a paper will in fact amount to a strategy, it offers a useful point of departure to discuss how Europe’s self-perception and security are evolving, not least in light of the refugee crisis.

In 2003, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq found Europe unprepared and painfully divided; several European countries were supportive, while others, primarily France and Germany, were against it. Partly as reparation to that situation, the EU adopted a European Security Strategy,³⁰ a rather short document modeled on the U.S. National Security

Strategy. The EU's strategy, however, was a negotiated paper, listing all of the items that member governments agreed upon; it made no effort, however, to identify the things they did not agree upon, including contentious issues such as the use of force. Despite the considerable academic posturing surrounding this document, it is doubtful that it can be called a strategy, let alone a "doctrine."

On the contrary, the fact that the original strategy survived for so long is a sign of Europe's strategic silence. The 2003 document began with the sentence, "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free."³¹ This was just after the introduction of the euro and before the enlargement toward Eastern Europe, arguably the most optimistic phase in modern European history. Soon after the release of the European Security Strategy, the proposed "European Constitution" failed in popular referenda in France and the Netherlands. In the ensuing decade, the financial crisis set in, the Arab Spring launched a winter of discontent and stagnation, Russia invaded Ukraine, and Europe was confronted with a refugee crisis that continues virtually unabated.

The new strategy document will reflect the fact that Europe now operates in a fundamentally different reality, one that is more somber, but also more pragmatic, about its security. Such a reality should account for three sets of considerations. The first concerns unity and coordination of foreign and security policy. Since 2009, when the EU's Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the EU has endowed itself a quasi-Foreign Minister position in the form of a High Representative (currently Italian politician Federica Mogherini) and an embryonic joint diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service. These innovations

have arguably improved Europe's standing and coordination. However, some of the more notable foreign and security policy dossiers in recent years, such as the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 and ongoing Russian aggression toward Ukraine, have come about in an episodic and circumstantial way, more often than not thanks to the German lead, not unlike the refugee crisis.

Europe's recent history may point in the direction of a pragmatic approach to foreign and security policy coordination. A new European security strategy will be genuinely effective when it taps into the political will and momentum of key member states. A shared European security doctrine that trickles down in the self-perception of each individual European nation is unlikely to emerge any time soon. But a coalition-building exercise based on shared European values and driven by variable geometries of member states may succeed in delivering something amounting to a European strategic outlook. The refugee crisis, reflecting the scarce degree of integration and solidarity, may already be pointing the way, thanks to a coalition of European states, and even of EU states and neighboring countries working on specific policy packages.

The second consideration concerns the reach of European security. It is interesting that the forthcoming document will replace the word "security" with "global" ("European *Global Strategy*," vice "European *Security Strategy*"). This has both a geographic and a thematic connotation. In geographic terms, the use of the term "global" indicates that Europe has aspirations of reaching out to all of the world's regions, despite notable setbacks in its own backyard. The thematic significance understands "global" in the French sense of the word, "globale," meaning that the EU

operates across the whole palette of policy and thematic areas. This may sound somewhat ambitious, but it is also rather accurate. Visible and high-profile foreign and security policy achievements such as the Iran nuclear deal are few and far between. Much more often, the EU's global reach hides in technical details. It delivers most effectively in very specific fields, such as influencing the way product standards are defined globally or through visa facilitation and liberalization programs for third countries, which reverberate into larger and unrelated consequences about the spread and value of Europe's project.

The third consideration concerns the strategic purpose of European security. Even if "strategy" is a term that denotes a focus on defense and "harder" notions of security, the EU's power remains overwhelmingly soft and civilian. It is perfectly legitimate to call initiatives such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership part of a strategy—in this case, negotiating a regional trade agreement as a result of the failure to negotiate a global one, as witnessed in the ill-fated Doha Round. Even so, it does not make up for Europe's longstanding deficiency in the military sphere. This is an age-old problem that the ongoing refugee crisis has put in an even worse light, if one considers the deployment of NATO to intercept smugglers on the eastern Mediterranean flank. U.S. President Barack Obama similarly reiterated in his parting foreign policy interview to *The Atlantic* in April 2016 the long-standing American criticism of Europeans "free riding" on defense spending.³² Whether or not Europeans will embrace their new security strategy, this remains the sticking point of Europe's international presence.

Conclusions: The making of an Existential Crisis—and a Way Out

The conceptual spectrum on which we can place the responses described in this article is very clear. On the one hand, there is a vision regarding the security of European citizens as best attained by opening borders, lowering trade barriers, and joining a single currency. The other vision believes that security is better attained by protecting borders, keeping sovereignty in national hands, and reversing supranational integration. Schengen is possibly the most symbolic example of the first vision. Whether or not the scheme is, in fact, unraveling, Europeans need to ask themselves whether the Europe that produced Schengen, the euro, and even the enlargement toward Eastern Europe—the three main achievements of post-Cold War European integration—is still the Europe we have and can have today.

Evidence from the refugee crisis, as well as unrelated developments such as the Euro crisis and the travailed process of Britain's renegotiation of its membership with the EU, points to a negative answer to the question. More specifically, it points in the direction of the vision that regards the renationalization of European politics as the best way forward for the EU. It used to be that Eurosceptic voices needed to explain their argument to a cozy centrist consensus that was overwhelmingly in favor of ever closer European integration. Now the tables have turned. Eurosceptic positions firmly occupy the center of the debate in many European countries, and increasingly timid pro-EU forces have to present and defend their arguments.

Despite this, the renationalization of European politics need not necessarily entail a securitization of the state and a militarization

of borders. It must also mean reclaiming the role of the state as a motor of EU integration and above all as a catalyst of a nation's civic resources and a community of purpose. This is what makes the German experience in the refugee crisis so consequential. The hard-headedness with which Angela Merkel is pursuing a European solution to the crisis is not driven by idealism, but by the same principled pragmatism that has provided the moral compass of her decade-long tenure in government. In the same way that Merkel used to repeat obsessively that if the euro fails the EU fails, she is now saying that if the EU fails refugees, the existential *raison d'être* of European integration fails. As a result, the current crisis has ignited an unprecedented level of mobilization in the German government and in civil society, and has awakened the volunteer spirit of the population at large. Merkel's "We can do it" does not refer only to the government, but to Germany's citizens. As Deputy Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel put it, "It's about all of society."³³ Critics have grown louder, even in the Chancellor's own camp. The disturbing incidents on New Year's Eve involving apparent asylum seekers harassing women in Cologne and other cities may well spell the end of Germany's new *Willkommenskultur* ["welcome culture"]. But at a time when EU institutions appear in disarray, the German approach represents the most genuine attempt at rekindling the forces of Europe's liberal ideal from the bottom up. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ An earlier version of this article appeared in the *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2016*, Barcelona: IEMed, 2016. The author gratefully acknowledges the European Institute of the Mediterranean for permission to reproduce it.

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Photos

Page 70. Photo by Ben White/CAFOD. 2015. Refugee crisis in Europe. From <<https://www.flickr.com/photos/cafodphotolibrary/22092745854/in/photostream/>>. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Generic license. <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/>>. Photo unaltered.

Photo 74. Photo by Irish Defence Forces. 2015. Irish Naval personnel from the *LE Eithne* rescuing migrants as part of Operation *Triton*. From <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:LE_Eithne_Operation_Triton.jpg>. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license. <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/>>. Photo unaltered.

Photo 77. Photo by Mstyslav Chernov. 2015. Syrian refugees having rest at the floor of Keleti railway station. Refugee Crisis. Budapest, Hungary, Central Europe, 5 September 2015. Found at <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Syrian_refugees_having_rest_at_the_floor_of_Keleti_railway_station._Refugee_crisis._Budapest,_Hungary,_Central_Europe,_5_September_2015.jpg>. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license. <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/>>. Photo unaltered.



Police in Vienna separate “Fight Against the Right” and PEGIDA (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident”) activists during a February 2015 demonstration.

Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe

Current Developments and Issues for the Future

BY DANIEL KOEHLER

Europe has experienced a revival of militant right-wing extremist groups, networks, and incidents in recent years, with a surge of anti-immigration and Islamophobic violence, as well as anti-government attacks and assaults on political opponents, ethnic minorities, and homosexuals. Although not as significant as in Europe, the United States has also seen an upsurge in political violence considered to be “right-wing extremist” in nature (for example, white supremacist, neo-Nazi, racist, or anti-government sovereign citizen). For the international audience, only a few of these incidents gained broad media attention; right-wing extremist attacks are seen mostly as isolated events when compared with other attacks, such as those by Islamist extremist terrorists. In Germany, a right-wing terrorist group calling itself the National Socialist Underground was discovered in 2011. Despite having assassinated at least 10 people and committed 2 bombings over the course of almost 14 years, it had gone undetected. That same year, Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people in a bomb attack in Oslo and a mass shooting in Utøya, Norway. In the United States, white supremacist Michael Page shot and killed six people and wounded four others in an attack against a Wisconsin Sikh temple in August 2012. Only one day after Charles Kurzman had argued in the *New York Times* that right-wing terrorism might be the most severe security threat in the United States, Dylann Roof killed nine people in his shooting rampage at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, on June 17, 2015.¹ Similar events have been recorded in many Western European countries, as well as in Russia and Eastern Europe. However, the public debate has not ascribed the same level of

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importance to the threat from the extreme right as it has regularly with Islamist extremism.

Nevertheless, statistics clearly show the significant risk posed by violent right-wing extremists in Western countries. In the United States, for example, the Combating Terrorism Center's Arie Perliger counted 4,420 violent incidents perpetrated by right-wing extremists between 1990 and 2012, causing 670 fatalities and 3,053 injured persons.² After three peaks in 2001, 2004, and 2008, with each wave surpassing the previous one, the general trend is again upwards.³ Professor Christopher Hewitt's valuable studies about terrorism in the United States also show that "white racist/rightist" terrorism accounts for 31.2 percent of the incidents and 51.6 percent of terrorism-related fatalities between 1954 and 2000, making it the number one threat ahead of "revolutionary left-wing" or "black militant" terrorism.⁴ In both the United States and Canada, a widespread lack of coherent analysis about the threat posed by extreme right-wing militants stands in stark contrast to the level of concern about such individuals expressed by police officials and other law enforcement agencies.⁵ As a means of comparison, Islamist and right-wing extremists have caused 45 and 48 casualties in the United States, respectively, since the September 11, 2001 attacks.⁶

In Europe, academic and official statistics—including the University of Bergen's Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) and Europol's annual European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)—show a number of right-wing attacks since World War II.⁷ TWEED registered 648 right-wing terrorist attacks between 1950 and 2004 (approximately 6 percent of a total of 10,239 attacks), while TE-SAT registered

nine such attacks between 2006 and 2013, though only two were in Western Europe. TWEED also reveals three main waves of attacks: France in the early 1960s, Italy in the 1970s, and Germany in the early 1990s. These three nations also dominate the aggregate country share of casualties.⁸

Regarding the TE-SAT statistics, it is important to note that the national definitions and selection criteria vary significantly and that the vast majority of violent crimes committed by individuals or groups motivated by an extreme right-wing agenda are not categorized as terrorism by Europol, based on the national legal frameworks. Although all available national and international statistics in Europe and North America show increasing trends in extreme right-wing violence/terrorism, the basic phenomenon is by no means new: both Europe and the United States have experienced significant extreme right-wing attacks and waves of violence during the past several decades.

Despite this, only a very small number of academic studies have thus far focused on this form of political violence⁹, which has created a dangerous level of ignorance and a worrying lack of expertise regarding the threat assessment of the far-right.¹⁰ This article will provide an introduction to the current situation regarding right-wing violence in Western Europe, with a focus on its tactical and strategic aspects, and review related implications for security in Europe and the United States. This article argues that this specific form of political violence bears a number of unique characteristics that make it harder for security agencies to detect and appropriately react to, especially because the comparison with Islamist extremism has created political and tactical biases that hinder the adaptations needed to address

this threat. An in-depth case study of Germany is provided to illustrate what that threat could look like and to reveal the potentially devastating consequences for a nation's security that may result. It is necessary, however, to see this form of organized violence in the context of the wider far-right movement in Europe, and the West, as right-wing groups typically are very well connected across borders, display significant collective learning, and to some extent see each other as inspiration for their own tactics and modes of operation.¹¹ As only a brief overview is within the scope of this article, another goal is to raise awareness about the lack of knowledge and understanding regarding extreme right-wing violence, which poses a severe threat to internal security in many Western countries.

The Far-Right: Interplay of International and National Affairs

Throughout the last decade, Europe has seen a major surge of electoral successes for nationalist and far-right parties.¹² Currently, 39 European countries have nationalist and extreme right-wing parties represented in their parliaments (excluding Turkey and Russia). While in many cases these parties have gained only minor influence or nominal representation, they have seen major—and unexpected—successes in a number of other countries, including France (National Front), Sweden (Sweden Democrats), Greece (Golden Dawn), Poland (Law and Justice), the Netherlands (Party for Freedom), and Denmark (Danish People's Party). It is especially noteworthy that far-right parties seem to have gained strong support as a result of the ongoing refugee crisis as well as Islamist-motivated terrorist attacks. These external events directed against a specific country have been shown to increase electoral

support for extreme right-wing parties and may be linked to peaks of right-wing terrorism and violence.¹³ Bold and rhetorically violent anti-immigration and Euro-skeptic platforms of right-wing parties arguably might also increase support for more violent actions by small clandestine groups. After the Paris terror attacks of January 7 and November 13, 2015, the extreme right-wing party the National Front scored the highest results in local French elections, winning approximately 30 percent of the national vote in December 2015 (compared with 11 percent in the 2010 election).¹⁴ Although it was ultimately defeated in the final round of voting, this defeat did not denote a decrease in voter support. Rather, it was merely a result of the tactics employed by the opposition parties, which utilized special characteristics of the French electoral system. After the 9/11 attacks, anti-Muslim hate crimes and right-wing terrorism (it should be noted the relationship between the two is heavily debated) jumped 1,600 percent in the United States.¹⁵ Following the London bombings in July 2005, police reported a six-fold increase in the rate of right-wing violence against Muslims. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, similar incidents rose by 281 percent in France.¹⁶

As such, possible links and supportive collaboration, if not outright institutionalized cooperation, between clandestine or extra-parliamentary groups and established political parties from the right-wing spectrum must be taken into account when considering right-wing terrorism and political violence. Though a highly under-researched topic, a few studies have looked at this intersection and found mixed results. For example, while Paul Wilkinson, the former director of the University of St. Andrews' Centre for the Study

of Terrorism and Political Violence, found no clear correlation between electoral results of extreme right-wing political parties and violence from small right-wing groups, he did affirm that the ambivalent standpoint of far-right parties toward violence, as well as their racist and xenophobic propaganda, were conducive to right-wing terrorism.¹⁷ In other words, right-wing parties and movements do have an influence on levels of everyday and general xenophobia and racism that are, in turn, intensified and made explicit in smaller, more extremist groups.¹⁸ In addition, more nuanced studies showed a significant rise in right-wing-motivated arson attacks following verbal shifts in the mainstream political debate toward more xenophobic language.¹⁹ While not the focus of this article, it is reasonable to deduce from the existing research that right-wing terrorism and violence cannot be completely separated from far-right parties and mass movements, although the specific relationships between the two remain unclear.

Decades of Right-Wing Extremism in the West

Right-wing extremism has motivated some of the deadliest acts of domestic terrorism in a number of Western countries. The following examples represent only a very small selection of more widely known attacks committed by far-right extremists in recent decades. In August 1980, two members of a splinter cell of the Italian right-wing terrorist group New Order bombed the Bologna train station, killing 85 and wounding more than 200.²⁰ That same year, the deadliest terrorist attack in post-World War II Germany—the bombing of the Munich Oktoberfest by at least one neo-Nazi—left 13 people dead and another 2,011 wounded.²¹ Another devastating attack was

carried out on April 19, 1995 by Timothy McVeigh and two accomplices, who used a car bomb to attack the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Planned by McVeigh, who was inspired by the right-wing extremist novel *The Turner Diaries*, the bombing killed 168 and wounded more than 600.²² It is one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in the history of the United States.

In 2009, Ian Davison, a British neo-Nazi and white supremacist, and his son were arrested for planning chemical weapons attacks using homemade ricin as part of the right-wing terrorist organization Aryan Strike Force.²³ Authorities uncovered the plot, and Davison was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He is currently the only British citizen arrested for and convicted of manufacturing a chemical weapon. Two years later, on July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, a right-wing extremist, detonated a car bomb in Oslo city center, killing 8, and then drove to the island of Utøya to continue his attack, killing a further 69 people, many of them children, in a mass shooting.²⁴ Seventy-seven people in total were killed during the rampage. Prior to carrying out the attack, Breivik had published a manifesto that laid out his ideology, which was based on Christian fundamentalism and cultural racism.

These examples demonstrate that the West has a long history of violent acts perpetrated by extreme right-wing actors. Since 2012, the refugee crisis across Europe has contributed to an upsurge in support for right-wing parties and violent networks. Xenophobic and anti-immigration crimes and social movements have increased in almost all European countries. Thus a major question for researchers, policymakers, and law enforcement personnel in Europe and North America is whether extreme right-wing terrorism and violence

display unique tactical or strategic characteristics that make it harder to detect and counter.

The Nature of Right-Wing Violence and Terrorism

Defining the Threat

One problematic issue connected to identifying and adequately classifying right-wing terrorism is the lack of clarity among the different concepts used to describe this form of political violence. In fact, many incidents of right-wing terrorism have been analyzed under the concept of “hate crime,”²⁵ which does share a number of similar characteristics with terrorism.²⁶ A hate crime—defined as “a criminal act that is motivated by a bias toward the victim or victims real or perceived identity group”²⁷—can include, for example, the desire to “terrorize a broader group”²⁸ or to create a specific intimidation, including through hate speech, which has been described as simply another manifestation of terrorism.²⁹ The similarities between hate crimes and terrorism have led some scholars to call the former a “close cousin” of terrorism because “the target of an offense is selected because of his or her group identity, not because of his or her individual behaviour, and because the effect of both is to wreak terror on a greater number of people than those directly affected by violence.”³⁰ Other scholars have disagreed, however, and argued that the two are in fact distinct forms of violence more akin to “distant relatives” than close cousins based on key differences such as the lack of planning and the spontaneous character of hate crimes, the downward nature of hate crimes (minority group as target), and the lack of publicity.³¹ Reviewing the similarities and differences between hate crimes and terrorism, Mills et al. maintain that

“hate crimes attack society at large by attacking its norms, targeting dearly held values of equality, liberty, and basic human rights.”³² Such a conception of hate crimes aligns them with the “upward” nature of terrorism, refuting claims that hate crimes are only a “downward crime.” Not attempting to solve this conceptual debate here, it is still reasonable to assume that there is a relationship between “hate crimes” and “terrorism,” both in their effects (that is, creating fear) and in the way their perpetrators operate. It is also reasonable to assume that the step from committing hate crimes to committing terrorism is much smaller and easier to take than that from “ordinary crime” (or no criminal activity) to terrorism. Hate crimes seem to provide a bridge and an ideological testing phase for catalyzing potential motivations for violent action (for example, hate, fear, aggression, power) with the ideological call to act.

Case Studies

In order to assess the tactical and strategic dimensions of right-wing political violence and terrorism, it is critical to find a suitable empirical database. Those countries with the largest and most violent right-wing movements, in addition to having adequate statistics and a minimum of good quality research, are the United States, Germany, and Russia. Without the need to recapitulate the history and structure of the violent extreme right-wing movements in these countries, this section focuses on some key strategic lessons learned for policymakers and law enforcement personnel regarding the character of right-wing terrorist violence.³³

United States

Numerous high-quality assessments have been possible in recent years as a result of detailed databases on domestic extremism and terrorism compiled from a variety of projects. These include the Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) database at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism (START); the Global Terrorism Database (GTD); the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB); the American Terrorism Study (ATS); and the Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States (PPT-US) database.

One of the core findings regarding the characteristics of right-wing violence based on the U.S. sample is that the extreme right has not just developed strategic concepts based on small-unit or lone-actor tactics (for example, “leaderless resistance”), but has also shown a strong use of these tactics in practice. Whether or not this is due to a lack of organizational skills,³⁴ many studies have shown that lone-actor terrorism is the most prominent tactic for the American extreme right. Perliger’s dataset, for example, shows that 54 percent of 4,420 incidents between 1990 and 2012 were committed by single perpetrators and 20 percent by 2-person groups.³⁵ The Southern Poverty Law Center, examining 63 incidents between April 2009 and February 2015, found that 74 percent of the attacks were carried out by lone-actors.³⁶ In analyzing 198 lone-actor attacks, sociologist Ramón Spaaij found that right-wing actors constituted the second-largest category (17 percent), following only attacks in which the perpetrator’s ideological conviction remains unknown.³⁷ A similar study of 119 lone-actors found that 34 percent had an extreme right-wing background; a subsequent, more detailed analysis of 111 European and

American lone-actor terrorists showed that right-wing attackers represented the largest group (39 percent), ahead of even al Qaeda-inspired perpetrators (34 percent).³⁸

It thus appears that, although far from exclusively right-wing, lone-actor terrorism is a highly preferred tactic of right-wing violence. A number of studies have looked at the special characteristics of far-right lone-actor attacks and homicides, both in relation to non-right-wing homicides³⁹ and to organized right-wing extremist groups.⁴⁰ In the first case, the major findings reveal that far-right lone-actor attacks have significantly decreased since the early 2000s (with a total of 96 homicides between 1990 and 2008), have been perpetrated by individuals much more likely to display mental health issues (40 percent), and targeted mostly strangers.⁴¹ Lone-actors also seem to target government and military installations more frequently and are older on average than other domestic extremists who are part of an organized group.⁴² Compared with other lone-actor terrorists (Islamist extremist or single issue), right-wing terrorists are significantly more likely to have previous military experience, work in construction, and interact face to face with a wider network, and are less likely to receive help or be part of any command and control structure.⁴³

These studies of lone-actors have revealed profiles of right-wing extremists that are seemingly detached (but not uninfluenced) by right-wing groups, perhaps because of mental health issues and a tendency to focus on government-related targets, both of which would increase the risks of detection and interference by government authorities for organized right-wing groups.⁴⁴ This picture, however, does not fit into a conscious strategy of “leaderless resistance” by the far-right; rather, it is more likely

a concept designed to fit a certain type of activist who would act alone anyway and to label the occurring violence as part of a “master plan.”

Russia

One key lesson learned from the Russian case is how the government’s weak response to the rise of more militant right-wing groups in the early 2000s provided political opportunities for formal organizations to interact and join forces with violent skinhead groups and local community-based movements.⁴⁵ As in other countries, the Russian far-right is not homogeneous, and consists of many different groups and styles. According to Martin Laryš and Mirslav Mareš, the most important of these are unorganized individuals, short-term local mass movements evolving around ethnic conflicts, violent youth gangs, and uniformed paramilitary structures (including terrorist groups).⁴⁶ These groups appear to be united by their common use of Russian nationalism and imperialism. One particularly worrying trend is the potential for large numbers of Russian military veterans with combat experience in Chechnya, Ukraine, or Georgia to be incorporated into highly militant right-wing underground cells.

Research on the Russian extreme right has provided valuable insights into different types of right-wing crimes and group structures, such as ad hoc hate crimes, large-scale mass pogroms organized by right-wing organizations around individual conflicts, and organized violence (including paramilitary branches of existing extremist organizations, violent street gangs, terrorist groups).⁴⁷ Terrorist incidents—such as the bomb attack on the Cherkizovsky Market in Moscow in 2006, the attempted bombing of a McDonald’s

restaurant in 2005, attacks on police stations and railways, or the live broadcast of executions—show the escalation of violence and the radicalization process of the Russian far-right, which can be compared with the situation in Germany since 2011.⁴⁸ It is worth noting that strategic concepts behind these acts of violence have been framed as “counter-state terror” with the goal “to destabilise the state system and to induce panic in society, which according to theorists of counter-state terror, will lead to a neo-Nazi revolution.”⁴⁹ This approach is similar to what has been called a “strategy of tension” used by Italian, Belgian, and German right-wing terrorists.⁵⁰

Germany

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [BfV]), the German domestic intelligence service, estimated that there were 21,000 far-right extremist activists in 2014, including approximately 7,200 from the subcultural milieu (for example, “skinheads”), 5,600 neo-Nazis, and an estimated 6,850 members of far-right parties.⁵¹ Of these 21,000 extremists, German authorities regard a full 50 percent (10,500) as “violence oriented,” meaning they are prepared to use violence to advance their political goals.⁵² Although the number of activists has decreased slightly over the last few years—from an estimated 22,150 in 2012—the number of right wing-motivated crimes certainly has not. In 2014, German authorities counted 1,029 violent hate crimes (“right-wing politically motivated”), including more than 900 cases of criminal assault, an increase of 22.9 percent and 23.3 percent, respectively, from the previous year.⁵³ This surge occurred even before 2015, when the largest numbers of refugees arrived in

Germany. In 2014, 26 violent attacks on mosques were perpetrated by right-wing extremists—a number dwarfed by the explosive increase in violent right-wing attacks against refugee homes in recent years.⁵⁴ While authorities counted 58 of these incidents in 2013⁵⁵, right-wing extremists attacked refugee homes 175 times in 2014. In 2015, the Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt [BKA]) counted 901 violent acts against refugee shelters by individuals with a right-wing background, out of 1,005 total attacks.⁵⁶ Ninety-four of these attacks were arson, compared with just six arson attacks in 2014. This increase reflects a strong radicalization within the German far-right, especially in regard to the open use of violence, resembling the wave of arson attacks against refugee homes in the early 1990s following German reunification.

Although the German far-right movement historically has been extremely violent—officially, 69 right-wing attacks between 1990 and 2015 caused 75 casualties, though civil society watchdogs counted up to 184 deaths—this widespread use of non-clandestine political violence can be seen as extraordinary.⁵⁷ Currently, there are no extensive and detailed statistics regarding the level of right-wing extremist violence and terrorism directed against Muslim persons or institutions, but the rise of the new European “Counter-Jihad” Movement (ECJM) is indicative of the growing importance of Islamophobic violence perpetrated by the extreme right.⁵⁸ Based on cultural nationalism, ECJM has identified Islam and Muslim immigration as major threats to Europe.⁵⁹ In recent years, a number of right-wing terrorist cells that had planned to attack mosques, Salafist preachers, and refugee shelters have been detected in Germany.


A recent project to build a database on right-wing terrorism and strategic political violence has produced a number of important insights about the characteristics of German far-right terrorists since 1963.⁶⁰ Analysis of qualitative and quantitative data reveals that, since 1971, 91 right-wing terrorist actors (groups and individuals that could be identified) have carried out 123 attacks (including both successful and unsuccessful attempts) using explosives; 2,173 arson attacks; 229 murders; 12 kidnappings; 56 cases of extortion; and 174 armed robberies. This database allows for additional strategic analysis, largely supporting the findings from other countries. Of the 91 identifiable German right-wing terrorist actors, approximately 70 percent are either small cells with 2-3 members, small groups of 4-9 members, or lone-actors.

These actors utilize mainly small-unit tactics (for example, explosives, targeted assassinations, arson, and, on occasion, hostage-taking and kidnapping) against government representatives, Jews, leftists, and “foreigners.” Throughout the last 50 years, bombings have been the main tactic of choice, especially since 1990. In earlier decades, assassinations were also used widely, but the last 20 years have seen a significant decrease in the employment of this tactic. Prior to 2000, government representatives (for example, police officers, politicians, and military personnel) made up approximately half of the intended targets. Since then, however, the groups and individuals targeted by right-wing extremists have varied more widely. The vast majority of German right-wing terrorist actors (approximately 72 percent) are active for no longer than a year before they are either killed, detected and arrested by the authorities, or disbanded. If an actor survives for more than a year, however,

the chances of long-term activity rapidly increase, with approximately 14 percent remaining active for between 1 and 5 years and 13 percent for more than 5 years. These long-term clandestine cells are also much more likely to conduct attacks without being detected and to develop highly professional tactics to avoid arrest.

Another common characteristic of right-wing terrorism in general, as well as in Germany, is the lack of public communication regarding attacks (for example, claiming

responsibility through letters, statements, and communiqués). In Germany, only about 24 percent of perpetrators actually send out any form of claim or note. One possible reason for this may be their desire to employ a “strategy of tension” in connection with their attacks, that is, to produce chaos and insecurity among the population in order to increase electoral support for (right-wing) “law and order” parties.⁶¹ This strategy could also be used to demonstrate the weakness and powerlessness of the targeted government. Another theory



The ongoing conflict in Syria has spurred the largest wave of refugees seeking shelter in Europe since World War II.

brought forward more recently argues that the use of terrorism by right-wing extremists is a natural consequence of extreme-right ideologies and therefore does not require any communicated explanation.⁶² Many right-wing attacks might be self-explanatory (e.g., a bomb attack against a synagogue or a mosque motivated by anti-Semitism or Islamophobia) and can achieve the result of terrorizing the targeted victim group even without any communication. A third approach to explaining this lack of strategic communication draws on right-wing extremist tactical concepts such as leaderless resistance, in which public statements are seen as a risk factor for detection.⁶³

Collective Right-Wing Anti-Immigration Violence

In addition to organized right-wing clandestine cells and groups, another highly problematic development became evident in recent years across Europe: anti-immigration mass movements and collective radicalization towards violence.

Between 1991 and 1994, authorities counted 1,499 right wing-motivated arson attacks against refugee shelters in Germany.⁶⁴ Between 1990 and 1995, the 295 individuals convicted in these attacks, which account for about 60 percent of the incidents, displayed a very atypical perpetrator pattern at that time.⁶⁵ Sixty-three percent of the perpetrators had not been previously convicted of any crime and only 21 percent were known to be active in a right-wing party or skinhead group. Approximately 68 percent of the perpetrators were intoxicated during the attack, and in 60 percent of the cases documented by courts there was almost no time invested in planning or preparing the attack.⁶⁶ These characteristics make it extremely challenging for intelligence

and law enforcement officials to detect and counter such attacks. Further, while the organizational characteristics of these attacks certainly did not fit the typical picture of “terrorism” in Germany at that time, the perpetrators’ intent did. In the majority of cases, the relationship between victim and perpetrator was irrelevant; the main motive was to achieve a high media impact to convey a message against the government and a large hated group of immigrants.⁶⁷

Although the quality of the political message and signal was not sophisticated or embedded in a long-term, group-based strategy, the combination of violent protest against immigration and the attempt to force refugees to leave the country through fear shows the terrorist quality of large and spontaneously acting groups based in a joint understanding and unity, guided by right-wing extremist ideology. The violent potential of a large and infuriated crowd has become especially visible in the second wave of right-wing violence against refugee homes that started in 2013. Again, the upsurge in violence appears to have been caused by a widespread negative public debate about immigration, as was the case in the first wave of attacks in the early 1990s.⁶⁸ Since the outbreak of conflicts in Syria, Iraq, North Africa, and the Middle East in the aftermath of 2011’s “Arab Spring,” the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany has steadily risen to an estimated 1.5 million in 2015. The number of violent attacks against housing installations for refugees has mirrored this increase.⁶⁹ This time, however, right-wing extremists have diversified their violent tactics to include arson attacks against designated (but uninhabited) refugee homes, direct threats against politicians, violent clashes with the police tasked to protect the refugees, and

the use of car bombs and explosives. Still, the twofold objective of the attacks was to protest against the government's immigration policies and to either force refugees out of certain areas or threaten them not to come in the first place.

Although no statistical evaluations or scientific studies about this second wave of large-scale violence against refugee homes exist thus far, the initial data suggests that there are at least some similarities to the first wave. For example, in one analysis, out of 148 perpetrators identified by the authorities, only 41 (27.7 percent) had been convicted of previous crimes; the majority were not active in any organized right-wing group.⁷⁰ Different, however, seems to be the role of alcohol. Only 32 perpetrators (21.6 percent) were intoxicated during the attacks, compared to a full 68 percent in the early 1990s. This picture was supported by a subsequent police analysis of 228 perpetrators.⁷¹ Of these, just 14 people had committed two or more of the attacks, and alcohol was only rarely involved.⁷² Although about 50 percent of the perpetrators were known to the police due to previous crimes, only one-third had committed right-wing crimes of any sort before attacking a refugee home.⁷³

Focusing exclusively on the arson attacks, another internal study conducted by the BKA shows a clear radicalization and escalation of the violence used, which shifted from targeting uninhabited to inhabited buildings in 40 of the 61 cases. The majority of the perpetrators in these attacks were not part of an organized right-wing group.⁷⁴ An additional study by the German newspaper *Die Zeit*, which examined only attacks carried out against refugee shelters between January and November 2015 (a total of 222 incidents) that seriously harmed or endangered refugees, found that authorities

were able to identify the perpetrators and gather enough evidence to charge or convict them in only 5 percent of the cases.⁷⁵ The same study also reveals that almost half of the 93 arson attacks against refugee shelters within the same timeframe were directed at inhabited buildings, signifying a continuing escalation of violent tactics.

Parties such as the National Democratic Party of Germany and The Third Way have been involved in organizing protest groups online (typically via Facebook) and stirring up anti-refugee sentiments with falsified statistics of immigrants' crimes or claims of specific events witnessed by friends and colleagues, such as incidents of rape or child abduction by refugees.⁷⁶ Parties like The Third Way have also published guidebooks on how to organize large-scale protests, and have officially registered demonstrations that, in the majority of cases, devolved into violent action or took place shortly before arson attacks.⁷⁷ In this way, right-wing parties, although not proven to be directly involved in the attacks, have contributed to a rise in levels of hostility throughout Germany and provided the opportunity for right wing-motivated violence. In addition, right-wing political parties have tried to gain support from the rather new phenomenon of right-wing populist protest movements such as PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident) and its franchises across Germany.⁷⁸ Though some attacks have been carried out by organized neo-Nazis who took part in anti-immigration rallies, most of these violent acts were seemingly perpetrated by individuals with no ties to the formal extreme right-wing movement, but whose motivations mirrored those deeply embedded in right-wing anti-immigration protest movements. It is known that in some instances

militant right-wing extremists have co-organized or participated in these demonstrations, thereby creating a direct, but completely non-institutional, link between organized, militant, and experienced neo-Nazis and otherwise “normal” citizens (that is, citizens not previously known for right-wing extremist involvement) protesting primarily against immigration and refugee policies. The Bavarian franchise of PEGIDA, for example, was organized by two neo-Nazis who were sentenced to prison on terrorism charges in 2003.⁷⁹ In addition, the organizers and speakers at the PEGIDA franchises in Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and Thuringia are mostly hard-core right-wing extremists.⁸⁰

Although the aspects of spontaneity, large crowds without hierarchy or organization, and intoxication are atypical for the type of

political violence usually associated with terrorism, this right-wing collective violence displays other essential characteristics that place it into that very category. One of the first goals of right-wing collective violence is to directly challenge the government’s monopoly of force. Second, these collective attacks create terror and fear in a wide target group beyond the victims of the attack itself. Third, these acts of violence, especially arson, are carried out with a strong motivation to send a signal or create a public symbol of resistance for a wide audience. Fourth, this type of tactic allows the perpetrator to strategically attack and hide immediately afterward in the large crowd of bystanders or to escape from the location altogether. In this way, collective right-wing violence is akin to core terrorist tactics, although less coordinated and strategic. Right-wing



January 2015 PEGIDA demonstration in Dresden, Germany. One protester (left) holds sign appealing to Russian President Vladimir Putin: “Putin! Help us, save us from the corrupt, enemy-of-the-people BRD [Federal Republic of Germany] regime and from America and Israel!”

organizations, parties, and groups have been careful not to directly coordinate or lead these attacks, but rather to stir up the climate of panic, fear, hate, and urgency to act among the local population.

Similar waves of arson attacks against refugee shelters carried out by members of large protest movements have also occurred in Sweden,⁸¹ Finland,⁸² and other European countries. The formation of violent vigilante groups as part of anti-immigration movements across Europe, with the proclaimed goal of “protecting” European citizens against criminal immigrants is a very recent and completely new development, and poses the risk of collaboration between highly organized and experienced clandestine cells and individuals from mass movements who have no previous criminal records but are ready to commit violence.

A comparable movement in the United States, the sovereign citizen movement, is composed of a highly diverse and loosely connected network of individuals and groups who reject U.S. laws, taxation, currency, and the government’s legitimacy, especially regarding the control of firearms.⁸³ Frequent overlap in the membership of more militant and violent militias and white supremacists has resulted in a number of violent attacks by both individuals and groups, as well as clashes with law enforcement agencies.⁸⁴ For example, Timothy McVeigh’s accomplice in the Oklahoma City bombing, Terry Nichols, was a member of the sovereign citizen movement. There also have been a number of violent standoffs between sovereign citizen members and federal law enforcement agencies (for example, the “Bundy standoffs” in 2014 and 2016), and the murders of a number of police officers have been attributed members of the network.⁸⁵ As a result of increased lethal violence directed

against the U.S. government by sovereign citizen members, including the murders of six police officers and at least three planned terrorist attacks since 2010, the FBI has labeled the network as a “domestic terrorist movement.”⁸⁶

Although European anti-immigration mass movements like PEGIDA are still very different from the highly armed and often extremely violent sovereign citizens, they do share a number of important characteristics, signaling a new strategic and tactical era in the militant extreme right. By diversifying further and moving away from a reliance on lone-actor attacks (although not returning to the large-scale, paramilitary organizations of the 1980s and 1990s), this new type of fluid network, centered around shared opposition to the democratic government and immigration, can mobilize large numbers of activists from mainstream society and create something I would call “hive” terrorism: terrorist acts or violent hate crimes committed by a spontaneously formed crowd that quickly disbands after the incident. Western European law enforcement agencies are currently struggling to understand this new threat and formulate adequate responses. It is comparable to neither an Islamist extremist terror attack in regard to detectable communication, structures, and preparation, nor to the other end of the typology, the neo-Nazi lone-actor.

Conclusion

Right-wing terrorism has operated both traditionally and tactically using very small groups, cells, and lone-actors to target mainly government representatives and minorities with explosives and targeted assassinations. These attacks, which usually do not attempt to inflict indiscriminate mass casualties (a tactic which

nevertheless seems to be gaining increased prominence), have only very rarely been accompanied by some form of public communication (that is, the public claiming of the attack). This indicates that right-wing terrorists do not need or want to communicate their course of action to a potential audience. One reason for this is that right-wing attacks are often self-explanatory (for example, bombing a mosque can successfully generate fear and terror within the target group even without someone claiming the attack). As Professor Mark Hamm points out, right-wing political violence can, in fact, be both hate crime and terrorism.⁸⁷ This also implies that terrorist violence is inherently part of the right-wing extremist ideology and is not perceived by the perpetrators as something in need of explanation. In addition, this raises the danger that the intent and nature of an attack will be misjudged as unplanned, erratic, spontaneous, or as an isolated incident. The findings above, however, suggest otherwise. Right-wing terrorism is a highly dangerous form of political violence and a significant threat because it tactically and strategically aims to blend in with the surrounding societies in order to minimize repression and countermeasures and to maximize the effects regarding the main goal: winning a long-term war against their enemies (that is, democratic governments and foreigners).

Another development caused by the massive influx of refugees that poses potential risks to Western societies is the spread of anti-immigration, right-wing, populist mass movements across Europe, which have displayed a steady process of radicalization toward the use of violence. In addition, the boundaries between large-scale anti-immigration protest movements and organized militant groups have

been increasingly blurred. As the characteristics of the perpetrators of xenophobic arson attacks show, security agencies will be facing a different type of threat: spontaneous and rarely planned, violent and often lethal attacks against refugee homes, mosques, police, or left-wing activists, carried out by individuals or small groups without previous criminal records or even history of involvement in organized far-right groups.

In sum, the key lessons for law enforcement personnel and policymakers are:

1. Right-wing terrorism is a unique form of political violence with fluid boundaries between hate crime and organized terrorism. In general, right-wing terrorism does not aim for individual and concentrated high-effect results, but rather for long-term, low-intensity “warfare” against their enemies. The effects of creating horror and fear in their target group, however, are similar to other forms of terrorism.

2. Lone-actor tactics have declined in recent years, although they still dominate the militant right-wing movement. A distinct type of collective “hive” terrorism has developed in Europe, embedded in and carried out by large-scale, right-wing, anti-immigration and anti-government movements, with the peripheral involvement of organized and more militant right-wing organizations. Having created manuals and guidebooks on how to organize these protest movements and use online social media platforms to stir up hatred, this structure could become a blueprint for the United States as well. The high number of attacks currently being committed in the wake of these movements

in Western Europe could potentially become more dangerous if transferred to the better-armed sovereign citizen movement or other networks in the United States.

3. Law enforcement personnel cannot hope that focusing on the detection of communication and group structures before an event will bring adequate results. Biographical backgrounds may increasingly involve individuals without previous connection to an extremist movement, and small groups could form spontaneously during or shortly after protests and rallies in order to carry out arson attacks, shootings, or other terrorist attacks.

4. While it is not to be expected that the refugee situation will escalate to the level of significance in the United States that it has in Europe, the situation in countries like Germany, France, Sweden, and Denmark have taught neo-Nazis and other organized right-wing extremists how to evade government crackdown and detection before attacks. Even small numbers of refugees could potentially be used to catalyze similar protest movements on platforms already established in the United States.

5. A last potential threat from organized clandestine or open violence can be reciprocal violence between right-wing extremist groups and those opposed to them. Violent clashes between right-wing populists and Salafists in Germany, for example, have led to further radicalization on both sides. Recent clashes in Anaheim, California between Ku Klux Klan members and opponents are another example of this mechanism.⁸⁸

In sum, right-wing terrorism or racist political violence remains one of the most dangerous threats to Western democracies, especially because these extremist groups have developed and used violent tactics designed to be overlooked and misinterpreted by security agencies. White supremacists, sovereign citizen members, neo-Nazis, and other right-wing extremist groups widely deploy a very dynamic and flexible form of collective or “hive” terrorism that does not provide traditional angles for security agencies to identify hierarchies, long-term plots, or group structures. The lethal and terrorizing effect remains intact, however. In addition, the corroding effect against democratic societies and community resilience can be much higher in cases of right-wing terrorism than compared with other forms because the underestimation by the authorities essentially proves right the suspicion of minorities and other at-risk groups that they are without equal protection. **PRISM**

Notes

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⁷ The TWEED dataset is available at <<http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm>>. TE-SAT is available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37>.

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Photos

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Europe at night

EU Energy Policy

Sustained by Fragile Solidarity, Indispensable for Eurasian Security

BY MEMDUH KARAKULLUKÇU

The European Union (EU) is dependent on imports for over half of its energy consumption.¹ At face value, that implies European energy security is an external challenge that demands the prudent, systematic, and dynamic balancing of energy needs across energy sources and suppliers. That prognosis, however, is deceptively simple and incomplete. Under closer scrutiny, the problem proves to be as much one of internal EU market design and governance as it is an external balancing act.

The recent memory of Russian supply disruptions continues to be a strong factor in shaping EU energy policy. In February of this year, EU energy commissioner Miguel Arias Canete told reporters that, “After the gas crises of 2006 and 2009 that left many millions out in the cold, we said ‘never again.’”² These episodes left a permanent mark on the EU’s energy considerations, especially in Eastern European nations that were affected by the disruptions. If the EU fails to manage the anxiety of these countries about their dependence on Russian gas supplies, the issue has the potential to drive a permanent wedge between them and the rest of Europe.

As the major strategic beneficiary of such a rift, Russia’s explicit or implicit actions to widen the rift should be part of the EU’s risk calculations. The dynamic of this fault line evolves along two different paths. On the one hand, some countries, like Poland, expect and demand EU solidarity against the Russian supply risk, and are highly sensitive to initiatives by other member states that may be interpreted as weakening such solidarity. Projects like the Nord Stream II gas pipeline—which will bypass Eastern Europe and directly link Germany and Russia—can lead to a serious erosion of trust due to this heightened sensitivity. On the other hand, some Eastern European countries choose to manage their exposure to Russia by forming closer links with it, which can undermine EU solidarity. Hungary’s deepening relations with Russia is a case in point

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that raises such concerns. Therefore, energy policy for the EU is well beyond a technical discussion. Mismanaging the process can be highly corrosive to the EU's internal cohesion.

With 28 members and diverse national agendas, EU decisionmaking is notoriously complex. Interests are aligned and national differences are reconciled mainly during or after crises and under pressure. A tradition going back to Jean Monnet characterizes Europe as “the sum of solutions adopted for those crises.”³ This crisis-response mode of evolution can be politically expedient to forge a union of disparate states, and can even be effective under some conditions. But there are circumstances where prevention of and preparedness for potential crises, trends, and stalemates is the more effective and more prudent course of action.

The disruptions to Russian natural gas supplies through Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, followed by the swift deterioration of relations with the Russian Federation, rapidly reminded EU policymakers of the virtues of being a “prepared Union” as opposed to a “crisis Union.” Fortunately, neither of these disruptions escalated to a long-lasting energy shutdown.⁴ The EU was spurred into action by these crises and also was given a respite to shape its policy at its own pace. In line with its history, it has once again been granted the opportunity to evolve in response to a crisis. The primary challenge is to leverage this crisis-driven momentum to shape and enforce an EU-wide energy policy that can adequately prepare the EU, as a cohesive structure, for energy-related contingencies and adversities.

Ensuring its own energy security and internal cohesion is only part of Europe's challenge in the energy domain, however. Europe also has a broader geostrategic role as part of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ensuring the openness of global energy trade and preventing locked-in energy dependencies with geostrategic implications are critically important in shaping global relations and alliances. Europe has the political and economic leverage to help shape a more open global trading system for energy, especially in natural gas, where the liquefied natural gas (LNG) and pipeline geometry is still being configured. This is particularly relevant in ensuring that the yet underexploited resources of Turkmenistan and Iran can reach global markets through diverse channels, and that these countries are not locked-in to axes of exclusive interdependence with any single power in Asia. Europe should defend the virtues of globally integrated markets in energy and take the requisite steps in its geographic periphery toward that end.

This broader geostrategic objective of EU energy policy will require strategic planning and action with long-term effects. The “crisis Union” model of policymaking and action is not well suited to fulfill this role. Whether the EU's current internal dynamics will allow for a more proactive policy trajectory is an open question at this point in time. Unfortunately, a failure in this role can have much deeper and long-term adverse implications for global security.

I first turn to the EU's own energy security question in the context of its broader energy policy objectives, and then address its geostrategic role in global, especially Eurasian, energy dynamics.

The European Union's Energy Security: An Internal Governance Challenge?

The EU's energy policy objectives are typically formulated as sustainability, competitiveness,

and security. The relative weighting of these objectives varies across EU members and changes over time. Accordingly, the EU's energy system needs to be dynamic and able to flexibly respond to the changing social preferences over time. This is best achieved through a well-functioning, integrated market where the evolving social choices among the three objectives are affected through price signals. Public policy should ideally work through the market dynamics.⁵

EU energy policy has both an aggregate dimension, where one can think of the EU as a single, united entity, and an internal dimension, where the 28 member states' divergences need to be considered. It helps to separate the problem into these two components to identify the true nature of the EU's energy policy challenges.

Thinking of the EU as a Single Entity

At the EU aggregate level, the sustainability objective was the key driver of the 2008 EU Climate and Energy Package. However, the energy context has changed dramatically since then. The low cost of shale gas drove U.S. energy costs down while the high renewable subsidies and inefficiencies in the EU power market raised electricity prices in Europe. European companies in energy-intensive industries lost competitiveness, and retail customers were unhappy with higher energy costs. As a result, renewables subsidies had to be reconsidered and were pared down in key European countries. Further, the Fukushima disaster in March 2011 caused a strong social reaction against the production of nuclear energy in Europe. Many nuclear plants were closed and overall plans for increased nuclear power as part of the decarbonization effort had to be shelved. Finally, the disruption of

the Russian gas flows in 2009 and the escalation of Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere brought gas supply security to the fore.

Given this fast-changing context, the three energy policy objectives have been recalibrated at the EU level. Climate sustainability remains a priority; under the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy, member states have agreed on specific EU-wide targets for greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy consumption, and energy savings. The sharing of the burden among member states is not specified and the enforcement mechanism is not in place, but the EU has indicated its collective intent to advance climate sustainability goals.⁶ Some progress has been made at the EU level, where the ineffective EU carbon emissions trading scheme is being reformed, including agreement to introduce a market stability reserve in 2019.⁷

The climate sustainability goals target mainly the consumption of the two carbon-intensive fossil fuels, coal and oil. Projections indicate a downward trend in the share of these two fuels in the EU energy mix (Table 1), which would leave nuclear, renewables, and natural gas as the main contenders to meet primary energy needs. Among the three, social and political resistance to nuclear power after Fukushima is limiting the contribution of nuclear energy. Consequently, renewables (including bioenergy) and natural gas are the EU-wide growth areas in power generation and primary energy.

International Energy Agency (IEA) projections for EU energy demand through 2040, laid out in Table 1, reflect these policy choices. In the IEA's two scenarios, the shift to renewables (including bioenergy) and natural gas is clear. The "new policies" scenario, which reflects commitments made at the 2015 Paris

Climate Conference—also referred to as COP21—unsurprisingly indicates a more rapid shift to renewables than the “current policies” scenario. It should also be noted that beyond these relative shifts in the energy mix, the EU also has an ambitious efficiency improvement target, whereby absolute energy consumption is expected to decrease over time.

Renewables

Although renewables costs are on a downward sloping curve, technical and regulatory issues and the low price of fossil fuels still limit their competitiveness. Public subsidies to expedite their deployment, which are then reflected in consumer prices, are counterproductive both economically and politically. High electricity

costs erode the competitiveness of industries in subsidizing countries and harm their national economies. Politically, the link between subsidies and high electricity bills weakens the electoral support for renewables. A faster pace of renewable deployment under such economic and political pressures will demand new policy initiatives and technology advances.

The first factor is the integration of power grids. Because renewables do not generate steady power, they need to be balanced out across a diverse geography through interconnections and supported with traditional gas-, coal-, or nuclear-powered plants, which generate stable and reliable electricity. To the extent that EU member state power grids are

Table 1. EU Energy Demand Composition Projections⁸

Energy Demand-Share (%)

	IEA New Policies Scenario				IEA Current Policies Scenario			
	2013	2020	2030	2040	2013	2020	2030	2040
Coal	18	16	11	7	18	16	13	11
Oil	32	30	26	23	32	30	27	24
Gas	24	24	27	28	24	24	29	31
Nuclear	14	14	14	15	14	14	12	11
Hydro	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2
Bioenergy	9	11	13	15	9	10	12	13
Other Renewables	2	4	7	9	2	4	5	7

interconnected, broader and faster renewables deployment will become technically more feasible and commercially more viable. A second factor is storage technology. If battery technology can make significant advances, the intermittent nature of renewables will be less of an obstacle. Accelerating the decrease in the cost of renewables is a third issue. Solar and wind energy costs are on a downward slope, and if the cost reductions are rapid, deployment will be easier and faster. A fourth factor lies at the intersection of industrial policy and energy policy. To the extent that the EU or member states position renewables technologies as a global export opportunity for European industry, increasing deployment and achieving market scale will be a strategic decision to support EU industrial presence in this domain. EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker characterizes the EU's focus on

renewable energy not only as a climate change policy, but also as “an industrial policy imperative.”⁹ In renewables technologies, the cost improvements with market scale are well recognized.¹⁰ Chinese competitors have a strong advantage in this respect, but some EU economies are still contenders.

Although the overall upward direction of renewables' share in the EU energy mix is almost certain in the coming decades, the exact path and pace of the change will be determined by such policy and technology dynamics, as well as by the evolving social preferences of the public.

Natural Gas

Natural gas is the other energy supply source that is projected to increase its share in EU energy consumption. The carbon content of gas is lower than coal and oil. It is the favored



Jürgen

Europe will have to embrace innovation and technology if renewable energy is to be successful in the future.

fossil fuel for sustainability purposes. However, unlike coal and oil, natural gas is traded in a quasi-integrated global market. The bulk of gas is still traded through pipelines, which fragments global natural gas trade into three separate markets in Asia, Europe, and America. Increasing volumes of LNG that can be traded among these markets is gradually limiting the price divergence among them and expediting their integration. Nevertheless, pipeline delivery still dominates international gas exports. Unlike LNG, pipeline trade creates interdependencies between pipeline-linked suppliers and consumers. Therefore, the bulk of natural gas trade still entails significant supply security concerns and requires a more strategic approach.

The LNG and pipeline channels also differ in terms of cost and pricing structures. Liquefaction, transport, and regasification bloat LNG prices. On the other hand, pipelines are more economical over short distances, but not feasible for longer distances. The EU's gas supply plans and policies involve both LNG and pipeline-delivered resources. The balancing between the two requires a careful consideration of relative security and cost calculations.

At the aggregate EU level, there is ample supply channel redundancy for natural gas. The EU has a total pipeline capacity of 422 billion cubic meters (bcm) from Russia, Norway, Algeria, and Libya, as well as a 184bcm LNG capacity, situated predominantly in Western Europe. The total import capacity of 606bcm, with an additional storage capacity of 91.9bcm, compared to imports of 305bcm in 2014,¹¹ points to significant redundancy at the aggregate EU level (Table 2).

Some of the pipeline suppliers provide high volumes to the EU, however, and these

supply relations are not immune to political and security risks. In particular, the Russian Federation is a major supplier with strong political interests and motives. Algeria and Libya, other important providers, face serious security challenges. A prudent security stance requires the aggregate EU system to be resilient to the possibility of technical or political disruptions from one or two main suppliers. Moreover, natural gas demand is not stable, but fluctuates throughout the year, increasing during the winter. Strict supply security criteria should ensure the resilience of the EU system when faced with major supply disruptions at its peak demand.

Both official and independent studies indicate a reasonable level of EU resilience against major disruptions, with certain caveats.¹² The main problem is that even though the EU can shift to alternate supply channels or tap into stored gas and maintain resilience at the aggregate EU level, the incompleteness of the EU's internal market network—to be discussed in detail in the next section—causes vulnerabilities in Eastern European states. The EU's current gas supply risk is predominantly an internal integration failure, rather than an aggregate vulnerability.

When we extend the time horizon of the EU's aggregate gas supply security, the analysis becomes inevitably less precise because it requires projections in a complex and changing context. The IEA projects that EU gas imports will increase from 298bcm in 2013 to 367bcm in 2025¹³ under the New Policies Scenario. This projected increase in imports will significantly burden and reduce the redundancy and flexibility of the existing infrastructure, especially because of Russia's disproportionately large share in the imports and supply channels. Therefore, when the EU's aggregate

gas supply security is assessed for a longer horizon, it becomes more critical to plan additional capacity for accessing new resources.

With respect to new pipelines, North Africa, the Caucasus, and the Middle East are the possible options. Algeria and Libya already

supply gas to the EU, but the security risks in this region undermine their reliability as backup sources in the near term. Accessing new resources from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq through the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) would diversify the EU's

TABLE 2. EU Gas Infrastructure: Import Pipelines, LNG, and Storage¹⁴

Pipelines (bcm/year)

	Capacity	Imports in 2014	Utilisation Rate
Russia	230	119	51%
Norway	127	101.1	79%
Algeria	54	19.5	36%
Libya	11	6	54%
TOTAL	422	245.6	58%

LNG (bcm/year)

	Capacity	Imports in 2014*	Utilisation Rate
Spain	60.2	17.6	29%
UK	50.7	18.5	36%
France	25.3	10.1	39%
Italy	15.3	7.2	47%
Netherlands	12	0.9	7%
OTHERS	24	5.0	21%
TOTAL	183.5	59.3	32%

*Net of re-exports

Storage (bcm)

	Capacity	Level as of Oct 2015	Utilisation rate as of Oct 2015
TOTAL	91.9	75.8	82%

portfolio. These countries, however, are also rife with myriad legal, political, and security challenges, and the timing of introducing new backup supplies is highly uncertain.

Given the timing uncertainty, it is better to create flexible infrastructures that can attract additional sources from this region if and when they become available. One such project with that vision is the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP). TANAP will carry Azeri gas through Turkey to link with the Trans-Adrian Pipeline (TAP) at the Turkish-Greek border. This pipeline, which is expected to be operational in 2019, will initially carry 6bcm to Turkey and 10bcm to Europe each year.¹⁵ As it currently stands, this volume is helpful but will not qualitatively transform the EU's gas supply security problem or its reliance on Russia. The pipeline's appeal is that it can be scaled up to attract the broader resources of the region if and when other sources become accessible. Of course, alternative pipelines through Turkey or successful LNG hubs in the country may also provide the requisite flexibility and the motivation for these countries to channel their resources to the gas markets.

As this nascent SGC evolves at an uncertain pace, the EU's other alternative is to diversify its gas supplies through the LNG markets. The planning for new pipelines and LNG supplies requires striking a balance between security and cost implications. The EU has already invested in sufficient LNG capacity such that it can replace much of its pipeline-delivered gas through LNG supplies and expand LNG facilities to create further redundancy as its import demand grows. The problem is that LNG supplies have inherent costs reflecting the liquefaction, transport, and regasification stages of the supply. In addition, the EU faces stiff competition from Asian markets for LNG, which

can push the costs to very high levels. Achieving supply security through LNG can be costly. Hence, the final strategy has to balance the security and cost implications of new pipelines and new LNG supplies.

Strategically, having access to both pipeline and LNG supplies will bolster the EU's bargaining position. Even if the EU does not consume high volumes of LNG, simply having the flexibility to shift to LNG will limit the EU's pipeline suppliers' freedom to increase prices.¹⁶ However, to the extent that global LNG prices are high or LNG is difficult to access at short notice, the disciplining quality of LNG supplies on pipeline supplies will be restricted. The evolution of LNG markets and gas price dynamics are critical for the EU as it plans its incremental supply channels.

With the introduction of new U.S. and Australian LNG in the market, LNG supplies are likely to be ample until 2020.¹⁷ Investment decisions for the liquefaction plants currently under construction were made at a time of high LNG prices. Given the less-than-expected demand growth in this decade, LNG prices are likely to be subdued for a few years, reflecting excess capacity. By the same token, the current low LNG prices may undermine new LNG investment plan, and lead to a shortage of LNG supplies and high prices after 2020 as demand recovers.¹⁸

The EU's aggregate resilience to possible pipeline supply disruptions will therefore benefit from a favorable LNG environment until 2020. If the new LNG investments overreact to current price signals, however, the context of abundance may not be sustainable in the longer run. The current LNG context appears to provide a window of time for planning and action to EU policymakers as they prepare for the next decade.

To summarize, at the aggregate level, the EU's dynamic calibration and balancing of security, competitiveness, and sustainability goals are shaping its energy priorities. The current policy of reducing coal and oil consumption, limiting nuclear power, and increasing the share of renewables, bioenergy production, and natural gas in the energy mix is a viable objective. The costs and industrial competitiveness risks of deploying renewables need to be controlled through market integration, new technologies, and effective market functioning. With respect to natural gas, both supply security and cost issues need to be considered. In supply security, the EU has sufficient redundancy in aggregate supply channels in the near-term, but stress tests indicate local vulnerabilities due to lack of energy market integration. In the medium- to longer-term, the EU's projected gas import growth implies the need to access new resources for aggregate resilience. The EU will have to consider both increased LNG supplies and new pipeline access to suppliers, especially in the Caucasus and the Middle East. The former requires a close monitoring of cost dynamics in the global LNG markets, while the latter demands diplomatic skill, patience, and investment in flexible structures.

The immediate challenge for EU energy policy, both in pursuing climate goals through renewables and in ensuring supply security, is primarily an intra-EU politics and market design problem.

Thinking of the EU as a Fragmented Market of 28 Member States

Interconnecting the EU's power and gas networks has been a clear priority of the alliance for advancing climate sustainability, competitiveness, and supply security. Linking power

and gas markets has significant market efficiency benefits. Integrating electricity markets to benefit from diversification gains among intermittent energy sources across borders has become critical, especially with the advent of renewables; expanding renewables in the EU at competitive prices will demand power grid interconnections. The integration of markets is also crucial for gas supply security. Although the EU as a whole has supply redundancy, there are geographic islands in Eastern Europe and the Balkans where countries are still partially vulnerable to Russian gas disruptions. The obvious solution is to integrate these markets regionally and with the rest of Europe through additional pipelines as well as by upgrading existing pipelines, which will allow gas to flow in both directions.

EU policymakers have been aware of these deficiencies for a long time, but individual governments have maintained a strong preference for keeping energy policy within their national purviews. Member states have widely varying regulations and tax regimes in the energy domain, reflecting their divergent energy priorities and policies. The share of taxes in the final price of power can be as high as 57 percent in Denmark and as low as 5 percent in Malta.¹⁹ As a result, the cost of electricity can differ significantly among member states, making cross-border electricity market integration very difficult. The absence of coherent market signals and regulatory practices also complicates and hinders cross-border infrastructure investments.

Similarly, most member states prefer to manage their gas import negotiations at the national level. Recent attempts by the European Commission to mobilize the EU's collective leveraging power in gas-purchase agreements, especially from Russia, have met

strong resistance from member states. Whereas Poland supports the idea as a supply security measure, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are unwilling to antagonize Russia with collective action.²⁰ Strong national instincts in European energy security work to the benefit of Russia, which can conveniently leverage national differences to deepen the rifts in trust among EU member states.

As in other policy domains, however, European energy policy is being forged through crises. Since the 2006 and 2009 gas supply disruptions, the European Commission has taken steps to advance EU-wide energy policies. Progress so far has been slow and integration is still not complete, mainly in parts of Eastern Europe.

The EU's Third Energy Package, enacted in 2009, was an important step. Its main goal was the integration of gas and electricity markets. The EU was given the authority to separate ownership of energy supplies from ownership of transmission networks to prevent energy companies from having excessive market power in gas and electricity. Under this policy package, retail markets were made more transparent, a cooperation mechanism among independent national regulatory authorities was established, and a platform for coordinating cross-border technical standards was launched.

The EU's 2020 Climate & Energy Package was another EU-wide policy enacted in 2009. It set goals for renewables, carbon emissions, and efficiency. Nevertheless, climate policy remained a national concern and member states set their own targets, only to be monitored by the Commission. Again, after the 2009 disruption, gas supply security became an even more pressing issue. The Third Package enabled the EU to block the expanding control of European gas pipelines by Gazprom,

Russia's major gas company. Ownership of both the supplies and the pipelines would have given Russia undue leverage, especially in Eastern Europe. Russia eventually canceled the South Stream project that would have delivered gas to captive states in Eastern Europe. Although the EU Commission does not have the authority to determine collective energy policy, its ability to enforce EU-wide regulatory requirements proved to be an effective tool to counter Russian attempts to control European gas markets.

In 2015, the Commission announced its Energy Union initiative to complete the market integration work. EU countries also agreed on the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework. The legislation for these efforts is not yet enacted so their effectiveness is yet to be seen, though investments in the infrastructure for connecting markets continue, with financial support from the EU's Connecting Europe Facility²¹ and the European fund for Strategic Investment.²²

Although these EU policy initiatives were and are moves in the right direction, a fully integrated energy network and market has not emerged, in short due to the member states' insistence on keeping energy policy decisions under their national purviews. There are still missing infrastructure links in the European gas network, and harmonization of regulatory and tax rules is incomplete.

The EU as a united entity has built significant resilience in energy supplies, but the internal fragmentation and governance challenges continue to bedevil some member states' energy security and hence the EU's strategic unity against Russia.

Revitalizing European Solidarity is the Key to Effective Energy Policy

Overall, the risk of an EU-wide energy supply crisis is reasonably low. The remaining local risks can be managed as long as the core solidarity of the EU project remains intact and member states are willing to share the burdens of a crisis.

The European Commission was asked to systematically test the resilience of the European gas system and produced a report detailing its findings in 2014.²³ The analysis indicates that parts of Eastern Europe would suffer in the event of Russian supply interruptions. However, the existing interconnections would allow a sharing of the sacrifice. Cooperative solutions among neighboring states can spread the shortages across borders and moderate the impact on any single country. The burdens of the imperfect integration problem can be shared by transforming a technical problem into a political solidarity issue.

In line with this diagnosis, the European Commission has recently proposed the revised Regulation on Security of Supply as part of its Energy Union agenda, which advances a mechanism for “mandatory solidarity” among neighboring states.²⁴ Under this scheme, the EU member states will be divided into regional groups within which they will work together for supply security. When a state in a group is faced with a supply disruption, other members in the group will prioritize the selected consumers (households, essential social services, and district heating installations) of the state in need over their own less urgent national customers. The receptiveness of the member states to this proposal will indicate the willingness for a true energy union among the members.

As the European Commission works on such reasonable technical measures, the larger risk facing the EU is the corrosion of mutual trust and commitment among the members, which is the prerequisite for any of these collective proposals. The sharp divergence among key members’ reactions to the Nord Stream II project is an alarming signal about the erosion of that mutual trust. Nord Stream II, with 55bcm capacity, will bypass Eastern Europe and deliver Russian gas directly to Germany. It does not reduce the EU’s Russian supply risk, but it does not increase aggregate vulnerability either. On the margin, it provides redundancy benefits that could be useful in case of technical problems in other Russian pipelines.

The problem is that Nord Stream II allows Germany and Western Europe to unbundle their Russian gas supplies from Eastern Europe. It weakens structural interdependence between Germany and Eastern Europe and, in the absence of solid mutual trust, can undermine solidarity. The intensity of the reaction and resistance to the project from Eastern European countries, led by Poland, indicates a deep fault line in mutual trust.

Normally, European crises lead to new physical infrastructure and institutional/regulatory norms that incrementally shift the baseline from independent nation states to a union of interdependent, entangled members. Nord Stream II can be perceived as a move in the reverse direction where a new infrastructure could serve as a German hedge in a disentanglement scenario. This perception demands particular attention, especially in the context of deepening rifts between Germany and Eastern Europe related to the refugee crisis.

The EU’s energy policy and security framework is an imperfect patchwork that moves erratically, but until now it has moved in the

right direction to advance, albeit slowly, EU efficiency and resilience. Despite its imperfections, Europe still has the wherewithal to adapt in case of a new supply crisis. The bigger challenge is the broader erosion of trust among member states. National energy policies should not be allowed to deepen or facilitate these rifts. Russia would be the clear beneficiary of the erosion of trust between Eastern Europe and the rest of the EU.

Europe has been forged through crises until now. The next energy crisis should not be the catalyst for taking it apart.

A Reluctant Transatlantic Partner: Aligning the EU's Energy Policy and Its Geostrategic Role

For an economy and a landmass as large as the EU, energy policy cannot be considered narrowly and in isolation from the rest of the world. Thinking strategically about the global energy context and its wider geostrategic

implications, and shaping policy actions accordingly should be an integral part of Europe's outlook in the energy domain.

Unlike its internal policy evolution, shaping the global context requires consideration and action prior to crises. It is important to take steps to shape the energy context to forestall potential adverse developments and to facilitate the natural progression of favorable trends. Unfortunately, Europe's political structures and temperament do not at present appear amenable to shaping and executing such a united, forward-looking strategy. However, the EU's capacity for joint strategic action is needed beyond Europe. It is in the interest of the transatlantic community and of an open, integrated global order for Europe to rise to the occasion.

In the climate domain, pursuing ambitious goals is a well-established European objective, and this ambition is very much situated in the global context. Such a policy stance



The recent Russia-Germany pipeline negotiations, Nord Stream II—depicted in the map above—would weaken Eastern European energy security.

gives the EU moral authority and leadership in the discussions around this critical issue. Leading the world away from carbon emissions benefits the EU not only in its climate goals, but also with respect to its cost and security concerns. Decreasing or slow-growing global demand for fossil fuels will structurally increase the bargaining position of importers, including the EU, in the fossil fuel markets, and the upward pressures on prices will be moderated. It is in the EU's interest to use its internal energy policies and global climate agreements as mutually reinforcing factors to advance its larger strategic objective of global transformation away from fossil fuels.

This larger transformation will take decades, however, and until then the EU will have to function in a world dominated by the economics and politics of fossil fuels. As a high-volume importer of fossil fuels, the EU benefits from open, integrated global markets and has a strong interest in preventing price hikes due to supply shortages or supplier manipulations.

Oil markets are globally integrated and relatively well-functioning. The EU's strategic goal in oil should be to ensure the preservation of this market structure. On the price front, the world is currently going through a supply abundance phase and there is downward pressure on oil prices. However, the current price cycle might cause underinvestment in oil extraction, which could underpin the next surge of prices. The EU has a vested interest in closely following these global supply/demand trends and using its global political and economic clout to help maintain steady supplies to meet evolving demand. Predicting and shaping oil prices is notoriously difficult for any actor, but the gradual global shift away from fossil fuels and the increasing availability

of substitutes may allow for a higher level of moderating influence in these markets.

Natural gas markets require a more elaborate strategic calculation. For its own supply security, the EU faces two strategic challenges. The first one is its need for a well-supplied, integrated global LNG market. The LNG markets allow the EU to limit the bargaining power of its pipeline suppliers, both politically and economically. As long as the EU has sufficient redundancy in its LNG facilities, buying Russian or Algerian pipeline gas becomes less of a supply risk. Similarly, as long as the LNG market is well-supplied and the prices are competitive, the pipeline supplies cannot be excessively priced and the economic risk will be limited. Well-functioning global LNG markets are critical for the EU to achieve both supply security and cost minimization.

The second challenge relates to the design of pipeline linkages in Eurasia. As the EU tries to diversify away from Russia, the most promising new suppliers to the east are Iran, Turkmenistan, and Iraq, with 18.2 percent, 9.3 percent, and 1.9 percent of total global proven reserves, respectively.²⁵ The TANAP link will carry Azeri gas to Europe, but Azerbaijan has much smaller reserves, at 0.6 percent of the global total.²⁶ The vast gas resources of Iran are underdeveloped, and Turkey is the predominant export market for Iran's pipeline gas.²⁷ Turkmenistan exports much below its vast potential and has pipeline links to China, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Iran and Turkmenistan's access to global markets can transform the gas market dynamics. As should be expected, growing Asian markets like China and India are eyeing these resources. Russia, on the other hand, would prefer to impede or at least slow down the flow of gas from these suppliers in order to avoid competition.

The significance of the pipelines from these markets goes beyond EU supply security. Pipeline linkages create locked-in relations between countries that can have an impact beyond energy and shape deeper alliances. Therefore, the geometry of pipelines from the Caucasus and the Middle East to Europe and Asia will be important in shaping the evolving geostrategic balance in Eurasia.^{[28][29]}

In this complex context, a simple strategy for the EU would be to aggressively pursue the SGC and build pipeline links to Turkmenistan, Iran, and possibly Iraq. This would be too narrow a strategy in planning for the emerging Eurasian energy architecture, however. The EU’s import demand cannot substitute for growing Asian demand. The economic growth in Asia indicates that the expected increase in import demand from the region will be much larger than the respective increase from the EU (Table 3). Thus, even if the EU secures some pipeline supplies for itself through the SGC, the overall pipeline geometry is likely to be

dominated by the trade between Iran, Turkmenistan, and the big Asian powers.

A possible strategy in planning for emerging Eurasian pipeline relations would be to pursue multiple pipelines and customers as an overarching goal and to ensure that new pipelines will connect the Caucasus and Middle East to the vast Asian landmass, including the Indian subcontinent and China. To the extent that the supplier countries can access more markets in which to sell their gas, the structural dependence relations with single countries will be weakened. Unfortunately, Asian rivalries and alliances are complex, and building multiple pipeline routes to prevent geostrategic dependencies will require vision, persistence, diplomacy, and patience.

The alternative, or parallel, approach to multiple Asian pipelines would be to link the key suppliers in the Middle East and the Caucasus to new LNG hubs where they can access the global gas market, rather than being limited to pipeline customers. In the absence of LNG market access, pipeline sales from the

TABLE 3. Natural Gas Import Projections by Region³⁰

IEA New Policies Scenario - Net Imports (bcm)

	2013	2025	2040	2013-2040 Increase
EU	298	367	387	89
China	52	192	238	186
Japan and Korea	177	153	155	-22
India	18	51	84	66
Other Asia	8	22	88	80

Caucasus and the Middle East to the EU will probably remain small relative to the region's growing exports to Asia. However, having access to LNG hubs would allow these suppliers to also compete for the growing LNG demand from the EU. The combined pipeline and LNG sales to the EU could underpin a more balanced orientation between Asia and Europe. The EU's current strategy vis-à-vis the new suppliers in this region is dominated by the SGC paradigm. However, the pipeline geometry outside this area is a larger strategic challenge, and the EU, together with the United States, has a role to play in ensuring the spread of open, integrated energy markets toward Asia. Diversifying demand from the region with multiple pipelines supplying the EU, India, and China is one possibility, but the low pipeline demand of the EU and the political difficulties in Asia pose serious impediments. Linking these suppliers to the much larger and diverse LNG markets can be a more robust strategy for avoiding geopolitical lock-ins.

In this context, Turkey has a key role to play in both the "multiple pipelines" and the LNG hubs strategies. For the transatlantic alliance, Turkey's role and geographic position have been so far formulated as being useful for diversifying the EU's import channels and serving as an alternative sales channel for the suppliers in the region. This formulation positions Turkey as a pipeline corridor and is consistent with the "multiple pipelines" strategy.

As argued previously, the potential pipeline volumes to the EU are too limited to make a geostrategic impact relative to the allure of the fast-growing Asian demand. One or two high-volume LNG hubs in Turkey would leverage its geographic proximity to all of these suppliers and have the potential to attract

much larger volumes from the region. Functioning LNG hubs would become appealing sales nodes for new suppliers as well as established suppliers who wish to increase their exports. Given the timing uncertainty about when resources from Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan, and even the eastern Mediterranean will become accessible, an LNG hub offers the additional flexibility to scale up if and when new resources become available.

To summarize, the EU is too significant a player to focus exclusively on its own energy objectives. It needs to be a proactive partner in the transatlantic community for shaping long-term energy relations in Eurasia as well as in ensuring the functioning of global markets in oil and LNG. Its sizeable energy market and its gas demand are strategic instruments that can be leveraged to advance an open trading system in natural gas and to prevent locked-in energy trade relations with potentially adverse geostrategic implications.

Conclusion

The EU depends on imports for over half of its energy needs, predominantly in oil and gas. It has to chart a path for its energy policy that balances the competing priorities of security, competitiveness, and sustainability within the bounds of this import-dependent constraint. The EU's current strategy is to shift its energy mix away from oil and coal in favor of renewables and natural gas. This strategy is viable to the extent that power and natural gas markets are seamlessly integrated across the continent. Unfortunately, member states are highly protective of their sovereignty in energy policy, which has hampered and delayed the formation of unified EU energy markets.

The security risk of this fragmentation is not symmetric across the EU. Eastern European

members remain significantly more exposed to gas supply risks from Russia than the rest of the EU, causing a divergence in sensitivities and undermining solidarity. The EU can and should decisively invest in mechanisms to ensure solidarity among its members. The alternative—where eroding solidarity motivates stronger national policy reflexes, undermines the EU’s energy market integration, and thus weakens Eastern European energy independence vis-à-vis Russia—is a vicious cycle that cannot be ruled out. Russia will be the clear beneficiary of such a trajectory. The geo-strategic implications of a lasting divergence between Eastern Europe and the rest of the EU in energy security perceptions are deep and alarming. EU solidarity with regard to energy security has to be preserved as a strategic priority.

Although the EU’s internal energy security challenges are real and complex, it is too significant an actor to focus exclusively on its own energy concerns and remain aloof to evolving Eurasian energy relations. Energy policy decisions have repercussions well beyond the confines of basic energy objectives. They shape and are shaped by the wider geo-strategic context. Captive energy trade links, especially in pipeline-delivered natural gas, can impose structural dependencies that can underpin the emergence of potentially unfriendly security alliances. It is imperative to ensure that the Eurasian energy geometry does not evolve toward such dependent relations, but instead leads to an open trading system.

The EU has a crucial role to play in this process. While it has been skillful and fortunate in shaping its own energy policies through crises, this larger global role demands a “proactive Union” that tries to shape the Eurasian context before the context constrains

its course of action. If the EU does not rise to this occasion, the gradually emerging context may no longer offer the flexibilities that have until now allowed it to adapt at its own pace to the crises it has faced.

To remain the master of its destiny and not become hostage to an adverse energy geometry, the EU’s energy thinking will have to broaden its geographic reach and purpose. The costs and risks of EU complacency are simply too high for itself and its allies. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ The EU was dependent on imports for 53 percent of its consumption in 2013. See: "Energy production and imports," *Eurostat*, May 2015, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports>.

² Christian Oliver, "EU strengthens resilience to Russian gas supply threats," *Financial Times*, February 16, 2016, <<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ff0e7946-d4bc-11e5-8887-98e7feb46f27.html#axzz45gfW5Lu3>>.

³ In his autobiography (*Mémoires*, Paris: Fayard, 1976), Jean Monnet said that "Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises."

⁴ There have been other disputes with Ukraine and disruptions in the supplies to Ukraine after 2009. However, these episodes did not escalate to significantly impact EU countries.

⁵ Georg Zachmann, "Elements of Europe's Energy Union," *Bruegel Policy Brief*, September 2014, 3-4, <<http://bruegel.org/2014/09/elements-of-europes-energy-union/>>.

⁶ European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the Period from 2020 to 2030," *O.J. C*, January 22, 2014,

⁷ "Reform of the EU emissions trading regime: At a glance," *European Union*, Last modified December 2, 2015, <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/reform-eu-ets/>>.

⁸ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2015): 604.

⁹ Jean-Claude Juncker, "A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change." (speech at the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, July 15, 2014), *European Commission Press Release Database*, 7, <<http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/jean-claude-juncker--political-guidelines.pdf>>.

¹⁰ E.g. Swanson's Law is a useful observation supporting the scale effects. Price of solar photovoltaic modules tends to drop 20 percent for every doubling of cumulative shipped volume.

¹¹ Simone Tagliapietra and Georg Zachmann, "Rethinking the Security of the European Union's Gas Supply," *Bruegel Policy Contribution*, (January 2016), 3,

<<http://bruegel.org/2016/01/rethinking-the-security-of-the-european-unions-gas-supply/>>.

¹² European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the short term resilience of the European gas system: Preparedness for a possible disruption of supplies from the East during the fall and winter of 2014/2015," *O.J. C*, October 16, 2014, <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_stresstests_com_en.pdf>.

¹³ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2015), 216.

¹⁴ Simone Tagliapietra and Georg Zachmann, "Rethinking the Security of the European Union's Gas Supply," *Bruegel Policy Contribution* (January 2016), 4, <<http://bruegel.org/2016/01/rethinking-the-security-of-the-european-unions-gas-supply/>>.

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The People's Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China

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The cyber sphere presents new challenges that the EU and NATO must address.

European Union and NATO Global Cybersecurity Challenges A Way Forward

BY LUUKAS K. ILVES, TIMOTHY J. EVANS, FRANK J. CILLUFFO, AND ALEC A. NADEAU

Over the past two decades, European countries have had to meet the same cybersecurity challenges that the United States has faced. However, while the U.S. has benefitted from its sovereign authority (a single foreign policy, a centralized military, and the legal and budgetary power of the federal government), European governments have had to take steps to develop cybersecurity policies at the national level while simultaneously pooling their sovereignty through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) to bolster their defenses.

This article describes the approaches that NATO and the EU currently use to defend their members' interests against such threats. In the last decade, both organizations have recognized that cybersecurity is a key challenge to their core objectives, and they have adopted increasingly ambitious strategies, established new organizations, and (in the EU's case) promulgated legislation to address these threats. Specifically, NATO and the EU have begun to come to terms with the fact that all major security conflicts going forward will have both a cyber and a kinetic component. Cybersecurity failures will increasingly be equivalent to or indicative of broader national security failures. These failures will also lead to the degradation of economic and privacy interests within the member states of NATO and the EU. This reality is forcing all international diplomatic and security-focused organizations, alliances, and associations to retool existing structures or to create new ones through which they can achieve cyber defense and cybersecurity goals.

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Three of the most prominent examples of cyber aggression between nation-states are those on Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and Ukraine (2014, 2015) by Russia and its proxies. In 2007, Russian nationals launched sustained Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against Estonia that disrupted the Web services of the Estonian government and private sector for weeks.¹ The following year, three weeks prior to kinetic hostilities, Russia's conflict with Georgia over South Ossetia began in cyberspace with DDoS attacks and Website defacements that later blended into Russia's overall warfighting strategy.² Finally, in 2014 Russia and Ukraine were engaged in cyber attacks, integrated alongside physical conflict that targeted government and media infrastructure, contributing to the fog of war surrounding Russia's annexation of Crimea.³ Russia squared off against its neighbor again in December 2015 when it attacked Ukraine's electric grid and subsequently launched DDoS attacks, which left 230,000 residents without power for up to 6 hours.⁴ These examples demonstrate not only a growing threat to European security from an increasingly aggressive Russia, but also the trend toward a single concept of conflict that makes cyber and kinetic aggression inseparable. It is important to note that China, Iran, and North Korea, to varying extents, also have the capability and intent to threaten the security of NATO and EU member states through cyber means.⁵

Developments in the cybersecurity operations of both NATO and the EU have paralleled the growth of cybersecurity as a major policy concern to the United States and other national governments. The digital revolution has also changed the basic environment in which governments operate, necessitating increasing levels of cross-border

interdependence and connectivity. European countries have responded to the need to increase coordination and cooperation through new initiatives at the national level and under the auspices of NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, the relationship between national capabilities and sovereignty, and the authority of these two international organizations, remains unsettled. The efforts of NATO and the EU to mainstream cybersecurity into existing activities have thus far proven insufficient to fully address the growing cyber threat landscape.

NATO's Development of Cross-border Cyber Defense Policy and Coordination

NATO forecasted today's cyber threat environment in 2010: "Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly [...]; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability."⁶ NATO faces a cyber threat landscape that abounds with hackers, hacktivists, nation-states, and criminals. NATO itself has been targeted directly by Russian hackers seeking information on its defensive posture against Russia.⁷ Furthermore, the recent attack by Russia on the Ukrainian power grid underscores the fact that Russian cyber attack capabilities are very real.⁸ NATO also faces the same types of cyber breaches that affect businesses in America on a daily basis, ranging from random criminal acts to infiltrate NATO's systems to those of a more sophisticated, targeted nature. Despite preventive measures, cyber criminals around the world continue to gain access to these networks, including those that are classified.⁹ In all, the current threat environment embodies much more significant risks than those first exemplified by the Russian cyber attacks on Estonia in

2007, which initially prompted NATO to address the dangers of cyber warfare.

How did NATO get to its current state in cybersecurity? NATO has always defended its military communication networks; however, during the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO stated that cyber defense was also part of its agenda and that it would strengthen its “capabilities to defend against cyber attacks.”¹⁰ The Prague Summit paved the way for NATO’s creation of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) in 2002. Following the cyber attacks against Estonia in April and May of 2007, NATO issued its first “Policy on Cyber Defence” in January 2008. It later issued its “Strategic Concept” in 2011, as well as a newly enhanced cyber defense policy in 2014¹¹ in which NATO clarified that Article 5 could be invoked for a major digital attack.¹² It also pledged to improve cyber defense education, training, and exercise activities, in addition to its commitment to create a NATO cyber range capability.¹³

While NATO does not have a standing cyber defense force per se, its structures now cover the political, operational, and technical challenges of cyber defense. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), established under Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty, is the key entity within the Alliance that decides whether NATO responds to an attack of any nature. The Cyber Defence Committee (CDC), known as the Defence Policy and Planning Committee until 2014, is a senior advisory body that advises the NAC on cyber issues, as does the Cyber Defense Management Board (CDMB). Cyber is part of the NATO defense planning process that sets force goals for the Alliance as a whole.¹⁴

In 2012, NATO officials created the NATO Communication and Information Agency

(NCIA) through a merger of a number of existing agencies.¹⁵ The NCIA acts as NATO’s principal deliverer of communications, command, and control (C3), which includes IT support to NATO Headquarters, the NATO Command Structure, and NATO Agencies. NCIA is responsible for defense capability planning; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture, exercises, and training; and acquisition and procurement of advanced technology. NCIA also functions as NATO’s first line of cyber defense and houses both the NCIRC team and NATO’s Information Security Operations Centre.¹⁶

Though formally outside of the NATO command structure, the Alliance also relies on work done by the NATO Cyber Defence Center



Nimmak

The 2015 hack of the Ukrainian power grid left over 230,000 residents without power and represented a new era in cyber attacks.

of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn, Estonia. The CCD COE develops doctrinal and legal concepts, conducts training and exercise programs, carries out technical research and experimentation, and contributes to national and NATO capabilities.¹⁷ The CCD COE launched the Tallinn Manual process, which has become the main authority on the applicability of the law of armed conflict to cyberspace. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 will be published in 2016 and will examine international law for cyber operations below the threshold of armed conflict.

NATO, much like the U.S. Government, is intensifying its relationships with private-sector cyber security companies. The NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP) initiative is designed to encourage relationships with industry.¹⁸ NATO is also developing a Cyber Rapid Reaction Team (RRT)¹⁹ to protect its critical infrastructure, much like U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs).²⁰ The protection of critical infrastructure under some circumstances may require offensive cyber capabilities to stop an attack. Unlike U.S. Cyber Command, NATO does not have an inherent offensive capability.

Finally, NATO is actively exercising its cyber forces. Cyber Coalition, a primarily table-top exercise, now includes more than 35 participating countries and has been integrated into NATO's crisis management exercises.²¹

In addition, the NATO CCD COE organizes the world's largest international live-fire cyber defense exercise in Tallinn, which in its 6th iteration in 2016 saw more than 550 people and over 26 nations participate.²² Using a fictional scenario and virtualized networks, the exercise involved defenders, attackers, and bystanders. Twenty blue ("friendly") teams, represented by 19 nations and the NCIRC,

were tasked with maintaining networks and services in a fictional country that was under attack.²³

NATO's trend toward increased cooperation and joint operational exercises in the cyber realm tends to reflect a broader shift toward more robust coordination in the majority of its mission areas. NATO currently does not have any operational cyber capabilities as an organization, relying instead on Allied capabilities. The technical capabilities of NCIRC are used solely to protect the limited footprint of NATO's own command structure. As cyber defense becomes an operational domain in its own right, NATO should consider creating a tactical command similar to those for land, air, and maritime.²⁴ Given that cyber lends itself to economies of scale, NATO could also consider developing certain shared capabilities, similar to its strategic airlift and airborne warning and control systems capabilities.

The Increasing Influence of the EU in Creating a Single European Approach to Cyber Security

NATO's main efforts, however, remain focused on military defense. The organization has recognized the importance of civilian networks and the risks they face, particularly through its work on hybrid threats, but it does not have the legal or policy levers to address many of these questions directly. This is where the European Union comes in. The EU has superseded or supplemented member state policies in many areas, including those related to economic, justice, and home affairs. Accordingly, a large portion of Europe's legal environment consists of or is based upon EU legislation. While national governments guard their sovereignty in the areas of defense and foreign

policy, the EU maintains some limited authority in these areas. In fact, the EU is developing a considerable role in shaping the European cybersecurity landscape, primarily through legislation and expenditures related to economic regulation, individual rights, and internal security. Developments over the last 5 years have broadly paralleled the work of the Obama administration and the U.S. Congress. Much of this progress on both sides of the Atlantic has been related to cybersecurity information and threat indicator sharing. For example, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, President Obama's 2015 Executive Order 13691 on information sharing, and legislation that statutorily codified the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) seek to accomplish many of the same goals as Europe's directive on Network and Information Security (NIS). These regulations focus primarily on increasing the speed, regularity, and centralization of information sharing between the public and private sectors.²⁵ In spite of a modest EU mandate with respect to foreign and defense policy, the EU has begun to play a substantial role in shaping the foreign policies of its member countries and the global cyber environment.

The EU has treated information security as a serious concern for some time, primarily through the lenses of data protection and regulation of the telecommunications sector. The 1999 Directive on Data Protection harmonized EU national rules on data protection, and also prohibited governments from discriminating against companies in other EU states on grounds of data protection. The 2002 regulatory framework on telecommunications²⁶ and directive on e-privacy²⁷ established security requirements for internet service

providers and other telecommunications service providers, including reporting requirements for cyber incidents. One of the major motivations for European rules on security was to prevent different national rules on the matter from obstructing trade in services within the EU.

In 2004, the EU established ENISA, the European Network and Information Security Agency.²⁸ The relatively small agency, located in Greece, initially focused on research and training, but has been moving in a more operational and regulatory direction. ENISA operates Europe's bi-annual table-top cyber training exercise, Cyber Europe, which has nearly 300 public- and private-sector participating organizations.²⁹ Increasingly, ENISA is also taking on a regulatory role in aggregating the security incident reports submitted as part of EU regulation.³⁰ Further, in 2010, the EU decided to set up the European Union Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU), a security team that, like the NATO NCIRC, focuses only on the security of EU institutions³¹, though CERT-EU is quite active in various international cooperation networks. The EU has recently begun to work more intentionally and consistently to tackle cyber crime. While EU law has covered fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash payments since 2001³², its legislation in this decade has focused on combatting child pornography and sexual exploitation online (2011) and harmonizing criminal penalties more broadly for cyber crime (2013).³³ Borne out of the 2010 European Commission's Internal Security Strategy³⁴, Europol launched the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), which focuses on organized cybercrime, payment fraud, high-tech crimes, child sexual exploitation, and

cybercrimes or attacks that target critical infrastructure.³⁵

In spite of a patchwork of pre-existing activity and legislation, the EU did not adopt a cross-cutting strategy until 2013. The EU's cybersecurity strategy, titled "An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace," covers the major aspects of a comprehensive approach to cyber defense and security.³⁶ The European Commission proposed new legislation covering cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, cooperation between national CERTs, and increased support for exercises and security research. It also launched a number of soft initiatives, including the dedication of a European cybersecurity month, making progress on cyber crime cooperation and mutual legal assistance, setting strategic goals for the newly created European Cybercrime Center, and completing the Europe-wide adoption of the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime. The cyber strategy called for an international cyberspace policy based on the EU's core values, particularly those dealing with the promotion of fundamental rights, free expression, and a norms-based international legal order. The EU also addressed the cybersecurity of its military missions, while engaging with academia and industry to develop the European cyber industry and to protect the cyber security of the EU's own institutions. These priorities broadly mirror those announced by the Obama administration in the same year as part of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.³⁷ Overall, the EU strategy has been successful, with action being taken to achieve its objectives. Still, a review of the state of play will reveal that much work remains.

Legislative accomplishments have had the most significant effects on Europe's

cybersecurity policy landscape. Two new pieces of legislation will shape the basic legal framework for European cybersecurity once policy-makers formalize them this summer after years of negotiation. First, the directive on Network and Information Security will require all governments to implement cybersecurity rules (including mandatory reporting for incidents affecting service availability) for their operators of essential services. This will effectively cover critical infrastructure in the fields of energy, transportation, telecommunications, medicine, and finance. This directive, however, will not create a central European inventory of critical infrastructure or require common standards. Cloud services, e-commerce marketplaces, and search engines will be subject to more specific and consistent European rules. National governments are required to cooperate and share some information, but the directive falls short of the mandatory Europe-wide cooperation and information-sharing mechanisms originally envisioned.

Difficulties in agreeing to rules governing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure reflect the different national arrangements within member states of the EU. Some governments, including Germany and the Netherlands, treat cybersecurity as a question of homeland security, while others, such as Latvia and Denmark, consider it a question of defense. Still other countries, including Finland and Italy, see cybersecurity as a matter of commerce and communications. While many governments see the value of a strong pan-European approach, others view any central regulation of cybersecurity to be encroaching on their sovereignty. Nevertheless, these rules represent a sea change: EU law previously contained almost no clauses that sought to harmonize regulations on the protection of

critical infrastructure, which policymakers previously considered to be a purely national question. However, the use of such stark dividing lines is no longer feasible when infrastructures themselves span national borders.

The second major piece of new legislation is a new set of EU rules on data protection, the General Data Protection Regulation and law-enforcement specific rules in the Data Protection Directive.³⁸ The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly names the right to the protection of personal data alongside rights to human dignity, life, liberty, and privacy. There has been some form of EU data protection law in place since 1999.³⁹ The new regulation creates a consistent, single set of rules for all companies operating in the EU that handle the personal data of EU citizens, though these rules will also be complex and,

in some cases, costly to implement. EU law protects individual rights that U.S. law does not explicitly consider, including the right to access information on how businesses are processing one's data, the right to transfer this data to other service providers, and the "right to be forgotten," which requires businesses to delete certain personal data on individuals upon their request. EU citizens will also benefit from data breach notification standards that are generally similar to those implemented in the United States. Fines for businesses that fail to comply with the Data Protection Regulation can rise to four percent of that company's global revenue.⁴⁰ Thus, while this data protection regulation is not explicitly about cybersecurity, it will create strong incentives for companies to implement good data governance practices and shore up



Security & Defense Agency

Members of the Security and Defense Agency, a major contributor to EU and NATO policy, meet in 2012 to discuss the intersection between public and private partnerships in the cybersecurity sphere.

measures that protect data integrity and confidentiality.

The headlines on European data protection have come not from the legislature, but from the courts: the European Court of Justice (the EU's supreme court) has taken an active role in striking down legislation it considers to be in violation of data protection rules. The court invalidated an EU directive on data retention that had required telecommunications companies to retain user data and share this with law enforcement if legally requested.⁴¹ Furthermore, the court annulled the EU's data safe harbor scheme, which allowed private companies to transfer the personal data of European citizens that they possessed to servers located in the United States. This forced the United States and the EU to develop a new arrangement, called Privacy Shield, which acts as an "umbrella agreement" with the U.S. government. The renegotiation of safe harbor was aided by America's passage of the Judicial Redress Act, which gives EU citizens legal standing to sue the U.S. government for misuse of their personal data.⁴² Furthermore, the "right to be forgotten," which is now enshrined in the recent data protection legislation, was initially created by a court decision in 2014.⁴³

Operational cooperation among European governments has improved, with EU structures playing a growing role. The EU's best performance has been in the area of cyber crime, where cooperation among national cyber crime units and prosecutors has become frequent and close. The legal framework for cooperation on cyber crime is comparatively robust. The 2013 Directive on attacks against information systems includes a requirement for member states to respond to urgent requests within 8 hours. In 2013, EU member

states also agreed to use an existing mutual evaluation mechanism to conduct thorough peer reviews of national cyber crime units.⁴⁴ Europol, Eurojust (the EU's agency for cooperation on prosecutions), and ENISA all have roles in cooperation with national authorities.

Europol's cyber crime center, the EC3, has become a hub for coordinating international and cross-sector support for joint law enforcement operations related to cyberspace. The EC3 is able to assist member states, as well as international law enforcement, in fighting cybercrime by leveraging Europol's infrastructure and network to share intelligence and align international priorities.

Europol, through the EC3, has facilitated and participated in numerous operations with U.S. law enforcement to disrupt cybercrime.⁴⁵ It has cooperated with the FBI and U.S. private sector partners like Microsoft and Symantec to take down some of the highest-profile botnets in recent years.⁴⁶ Such counter-botnet operations have involved up to 30 members, and often rely on the facilities and coordinating capabilities of Europol.⁴⁷ Pilot initiatives hosted by the EC3 (such as the Joint Cybercrime Action Task Force, which includes the FBI) are leading to multinational investigations and operations conducted jointly along every step, from identification of priorities to execution.⁴⁸

Yet room for improvement remains. There is no single European contact for reporting cyber crime, and cross-border access to data necessary for cyber crime investigations has become more difficult following recent court judgments.⁴⁹ Europol reports that the invalidation of EU data retention rules has actively hampered investigations in areas such as computer intrusion, hacking, and child abuse⁵⁰,

and the decision has created legal uncertainty⁵¹ around law enforcement access to cloud data.⁵²

CERT cooperation has not developed as well as cybercrime cooperation. It has remained focused on bilateral and broader multilateral groupings, as well as narrower European groupings that include only some EU countries, such as the European gov-CERT group.⁵³ Notably, the CERTs that belong to this group do not have any membership from the countries that have joined the EU since 2004. The NIS directive now creates a format for cooperation among national CERTs, but this lacks the robustness of EU mechanisms for cyber crime cooperation. Information sharing and cooperation on incidents remain voluntary, so it will be up to member countries to make a push for closer cooperation.

The EU continues to face challenges in living up to its potential as the facilitator of a single market, which has stymied the growth of the European private sector's much-needed contribution to cybersecurity. Cybersecurity has not become the kind of big business in Europe that it currently is in the United States. While estimates vary, Europe constitutes at most one-quarter of the global cybersecurity market, and its cyber exports fall short of those of the United States and Israel. The U.S. federal government's cyber spending dwarfs that of national markets in Europe⁵⁴, and Europe's cyber insurance market is still nascent relative to that of the United States.⁵⁵ More fundamentally, European businesses have been reluctant to move toward using cloud services of all types, including those related to security.⁵⁶ In 2016, the EU plans to launch major initiatives to promote industrial policy and standardization in cybersecurity, including a 500 million euro public-private partnership to focus EU spending on research and development.⁵⁷ Part

of the current challenge is market fragmentation. Not only does Europe lack a single purchaser like the U.S. federal government, but it also suffers from different private sector expectations and standards in individual countries. For example, a cybersecurity firm must apply for government contracts with 28 separate EU countries, each of which will have its own priorities and objectives for such contracts on top of their differing regulatory regimes. This situation increases transaction costs and complicates service provision to the extent that it is relatively growth prohibitive with respect to European cybersecurity firms that rely on government contracts.

The EU is also expanding its activity in specific sectors by applying its existing sectoral regulatory power and influence. Recently announced initiatives include further rules and information-sharing platforms and guidelines for the electricity, transportation, and finance sectors to set up several sector-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and CERTs.⁵⁸

In the global arena, the EU has used its modest authority to coordinate foreign policy to great effect in creating coherent "cyber diplomacy." In early 2015, EU governments formally endorsed a common position on major cyber foreign policy questions⁵⁹, but this approach has long been visible in bilateral cyber dialogue with numerous partners, including China, India, South Korea, and Japan.⁶⁰ Dialogue with the United States has helped the two entities coordinate a common approach to cybersecurity policy in most key areas.⁶¹ Furthermore, the EU has prepared common policy positions for the diplomatic services of national governments to use when negotiating on a bilateral level.⁶² The EU has

also allocated significant funding for cyber capacity building in third-party countries.

Since applying sanctions against Russia for its annexation of Crimea in early 2014, the EU has increasingly looked for ways to use its economic clout as a tool of diplomatic deterrence. The current president of the EU Council of Ministers has proposed that the EU apply naming and shaming, diplomatic and economic sanctions, as well as aggressive law-enforcement activity in the case of state-sponsored coercive cyber operations.⁶³ These measures would still be tame in comparison to U.S. activity, but constitute a significant step forward from otherwise loosely coordinated EU action in this area.

In the core defense area, the EU's ambitions have been more modest than NATO's, but it has put in place a policy framework for cyber defense with a roadmap that policymakers review every 6 months. This framework includes measures that support the development of national cyber defense capabilities, protect command and control and communications networks, improve training and exercises, and ensure coherence between EU and NATO efforts.⁶⁴

The Future of EU-NATO and EU-U.S. Cooperation

EU-NATO cooperation has always presented a challenge due to the differences in the makeup of each organization's membership. There are signs that the relationship could be warming up: the EU and NATO signed a technical arrangement in February 2016 to increase information sharing between the NCIRC and CERT-EU.⁶⁵ The agreement authorizes technical information sharing to improve incident prevention, detection, and response, and is similar to U.S. information-sharing

requirements between government agencies. While information sharing within the American federal government has been ongoing since 2004⁶⁶, it is now becoming more effective than ever due to improvements in information-sharing software, hardware, and procedures, and the adoption of standard technical specifications. Furthermore, two non-NATO EU countries are members of the CCD COE, and the EU and non-NATO members participate in or observe various NATO-related cyber exercises.

Ultimately, the United States and Europe would benefit from an EU-NATO-U.S. triangle, where the Allies could work together within NATO to further develop joint cyber defense capabilities and approaches. The EU and the United States could simultaneously work bilaterally to achieve shared objectives on other cybersecurity matters. A joint policy agenda between these two powers could include convergence between EU and U.S. security standards for cyber products and services, including joint procurements in less sensitive areas; collaborative exercises; more structured information sharing; continued development and elevation of international cyber crime law enforcement regimes; and consistent and practical data protection regulations.

The United States has much to contribute to the cyber operations of NATO and the EU, and can serve as a force to bring these two organizations closer together. American law enforcement and the deep cybersecurity talent reserves of its private sector have already proven to be invaluable partners in Europol's cyber crime investigations. The trend toward globalized impacts from cyber threats makes it likely that partnerships on matters of law enforcement and cybersecurity in general will continue to grow. A few areas in which the

United States, NATO, and the EU could further cooperate on cybersecurity policy include combined cyber forensics training to improve attribution, more widespread support for resilience and remediation practices, and greater coordination between the U.S. and EU judicial regimes when it comes to bringing cybercriminals to justice.

Although the cybersecurity threat has been growing for the past two decades, the preference of national governments for sovereignty in the realms of foreign and defense policy has traditionally limited the cybersecurity ambitions and organizational capacity of both NATO and the EU. It was not until approximately 6 years ago that European policymakers began to recognize that the threat from cyber attacks and cyber crime is inherently a cross-border problem that requires cross-border

solutions. With increasing support from the European states that belong to NATO and the EU, these international entities have been able to build out their organizational and operational structures and capacities.

The EU and NATO have respectively made tremendous progress in building their capacity to coordinate cybersecurity and defense activities among their members. The increasing willingness on the part of these organizations to work more closely with one another and international partners is also a promising, if recent, development. Europol's multilateral law enforcement operations against cybercriminal groups and forums represent one of the best emerging models for international resource pooling and operational coordination. In fact, the crucial role that international law enforcement must play in combatting the global cyber



National Security Agency

Cooperation with U.S. organizations like the National Security Agency (headquarters pictured above) and the well-developed American private sector have already improved NATO and EU cyber operations, but further integration must occur to address effectively the cyber challenge.

threat qualifies entities such as Europol for a more elevated role in international diplomacy. However, cyber crime is only one piece of the larger puzzle of cybersecurity and cyber defense. The recent successes of coordinated law enforcement operations will reach their full potential for positive impact only if NATO and the EU apply lessons learned from that realm to broader cyber policy issues.

Overall, the cyber threat landscape is pushing national governments and international organizations toward greater transatlantic security cooperation. With a growing cyber threat from nation-state actors, including a resurgent Russia, and a new norm of conflict that ensures kinetic operations will be paired with cyber aggression for the foreseeable future, security cooperation in Europe and around the world is increasingly necessary. The strides that NATO and the EU have made thus far to address cyber threats are promising but ultimately only foundational. These organizations must build on this foundation by continuing to make progress toward cross-border integration of information, capabilities, and defensive strategies if the advantage in cybersecurity is ever to be wrested from the attacker.

PRISM

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Photos

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U.S. Army



Standoffs at Checkpoint Charlie in 1961, between the United States and East Germany, were precursors to Operation *Long Thrust*, which played a role in deterring the USSR advancement within Germany.

Russia's Contradictory Relationship with the West

BY PETER ZWACK

Prelude: Recalling Operation Long Thrust

On August 20, 1961, an American armored battle group of the 18th Infantry Regiment stationed in West Germany crossed the heavily militarized border at Helmstedt and rolled its way approximately 100 miles along the autobahn across Soviet-controlled East Germany into West Berlin. Too small to be an offensive threat, but formidable enough to be serious, Operation *Long Thrust* skirted the fine line between resolute deterrence and go-to-war provocation, and allowed the United States to avoid becoming militarily embroiled with strident adversaries in East Germany and the Soviet Union.^{[1][2]}

That bold demonstration was part of a difficult, and potentially incendiary, period that nearly all experts and observers thought had expired with the end of the Cold War in 1991. As the post-Cold War period unfolded, many thought that a new Russia would, with fits and starts, join the Western community of nations, while the Central and Eastern European lands traditionally caught between Russia and the West would finally find security and maintain peaceful relations with their neighbors.

More than half a century after Operation *Long Thrust*, a modern-day version of this forgotten Cold War deterrence operation reprised itself in Eastern Europe as the United States instituted Operation *Atlantic Resolve*. Russia's illegal invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014, as well as the continued beleaguering of eastern Ukraine by Russian-supported proxies, have caused troubling clouds to loom over Eastern Europe, including over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, three key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Baltic allies. In response to Russia's actions, the U.S. military in April 2014 sent three modest paratrooper companies from the storied 173rd Airborne Brigade into these geographically vulnerable countries to show allied solidarity and support, as well as to convey an unambiguous message to Russia not to consider any offensive or subversive action against them.³ In February 2015, Operation *Dragoon Ride*, in

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another determined show of assurance and deterrence, elements of the U.S. Army's 2nd Cavalry Regiment and British forces rolled through the three Baltic states all the way to Narva, an Estonian city dominated by ethnic Russians that lies just 90 miles from St. Petersburg.⁴ There they celebrated Estonia's Independence Day. While Russian officials fulminated and state-controlled press decried the maneuvers⁵, informed Russian leaders and planners fully understood their intent: while not an offensive threat, they had been served notice that the Baltic States, Poland, and other Eastern European countries were fully under NATO's security umbrella, with all of the protections of collective defense outlined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.^{[6][7]}

Another round of multinational exercises by NATO Allied and Partner countries have been underway. In late spring and early summer 2016, U.S. Army Europe orchestrated exercises Swift Response and Saber Strike; during this same period, the annual Anakonda exercises, led by Poland, maneuvered defensively oriented forces across much of Eastern Europe. Other shows of assurance and deterrence, including the brief fly-through of two F-22 Raptor fighter jets into Romania, and exercise Noble Partner in Georgia, an unprecedented deployment in which a small number of U.S. M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles were sent via ship across the Black Sea from Bulgaria, demonstrate multinational resolve to assure Allies and Partners that external threats will not be tolerated. Among their multiple objectives is to emphasize to Russia the sacrosanct nature of NATO collective defense for all of its allies, especially those nations with Russian minorities that lie in close proximity to Russia's border.⁸

History and Geography: Why Russia's Continued Rejection of the West?

While the threat from Russia never completely disappeared, it was certainly overshadowed by somewhat improved relations during the post-Cold War period between 1989 and 2014. Recognizing the upswing in relations, how did we come almost full circle to a state of greater tensions and brewing brinkmanship? What is driving Russia to these seemingly aggressive, offensive actions? Or are they actually reactive and defensively preemptive? With very serious demographic, economic, and geographical challenges looming in the next generation throughout its 11-hour time zone expanse, why does Russia persist in its increasingly hard-edged confrontation with the West? One would think that to survive with any real sense of peace, stability, and normalcy, Russia must find a way to positively coexist with the West in the generations ahead. It is my premise that if it cannot, the entire Russian state and society will fail, followed by a dark, unpredictable future for Russia, and, by extension, much of the West.

While in Russia as the U.S. Defense Attaché between the pivotal years of 2012 and 2014, I, along with many other Western diplomats, repeatedly tried to wean our skeptical Russian counterparts from the notion that the West—with NATO and the European Union (EU) as twin cornerstones—was threatening to Russia. We would point out the size of our militaries and the fact that they had been steadily downsizing. We would also emphasize that the U.S. military in Europe had been reduced dramatically since the Cold War and that unless provoked or our Allies were threatened, it posed no military threat to the Russian Federation. Our attention was focused

elsewhere: on the Middle East, Afghanistan, and, increasingly, the Pacific region, which should be of concern to the Russians as well. We also noted that a bordering European Union would be positive, overall, for Russia's economy and standard of living. Finally, we reminded them that other than the Greek and Turkish imbroglio over Cyprus in 1974⁹, all of the countries within NATO have lived in peace, if not always in harmony, throughout the past six decades and that we wished the same for Russia as well.

On occasion, I would ask an informed Russian if Russia would be safe in a world without NATO. Invariably, the individual would lurch forward and answer with an absolute "yes." The more thoughtful individuals would then stop and become pensive, likely wondering what pacts, blocs, and alliances would emerge after NATO and whether they would necessarily have Russia's better interests in mind. Meanwhile, Russia continues to cogitate, and agitate, almost exclusively with a Western primary threat orientation that includes the Black Sea and the Caucasus region. Militant Islam also absorbs them, but it is the Western threat that takes primacy. They rail ceaselessly against NATO's expansion and the perceived U.S. role, along with the EU, as agents of "color revolution" (such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which was partially blamed on "agents" of the U.S. and the EU) and regime change.

Much of this is psychological and visceral, and it is hard to understand from a purely analytical calculus. To attempt to understand Russia—and no one fully can who does not live in their skin—one must pull out a map and re-examine it from a Russian perspective, with an emphasis on its history and geography. If ever there was a large nation driven by

these fundamental factors, it is Russia. History and geography are the key factors that continue to drive Russia's blinkered worldview of multiple existential threats—both real and perceived. It is a worldview that is impressed upon both its domestic populations in nearly every venue since kindergarten, as well as ethnic Russian populations in neighboring countries. It is this world that I shall attempt to delve into and that may unlock a piece of the riddle of why Russia remains seemingly so self-destructive and Western-phobic.

History, Geography—and Psychology

Russia's geography is primarily terrestrial, without significant warm water access to large bodies of water or strategic waterways. This factor drove some of its earliest Czarist-era and Soviet expansionist behaviors. The melting Arctic ice, with the gradual opening of the Northern Sea Route, was not part of this earlier calculus. Ever since the Mongols erupted out of Asia in the 1200s and overran much of the west, including slaughtering and enslaving medieval Rus, the site of present-day Kyiv, the Russians have been in an existential, land-centric wedge beset by threats from every quarter. This was brought about, in part, by its own expansion that, by the late 1500s, had tenuously connected Moscow to the site of present-day Vladivostok, some 5,000 miles away, and that by the mid-1800s had absorbed, by conquest and annexation, much of the Far East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.¹⁰ Other fronts included constant struggles with Western states, including Sweden, Poland, France, and Livonia (a historic region on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea), culminating in Napoleon's disastrous march on Russia in 1812. This was followed by confrontations with the British, French, Ottomans, and others in the Crimean

War (1853-1856); the Allied intervention in 1919 during the Russian Civil War (which included the United States); and the ferocious invasion by Nazi Germany in 1941.

As the “Great Patriotic War,” as World War II was called by the Soviets, fades into history for much of the Western world, in Russia it is still a recent memory. Major celebrations and commemorations are held annually on Victory in Europe (VE) Day, May 9, and extensive efforts are made to keep this defining struggle and sacrifice alive in schools and in the collective memory of the general public. The enduring impact of the war was impressed upon me near Smolensk in early 2014 when, while trying to explain why the West and NATO were no threat to Russia, an elderly woman tugged at my sleeve, exclaiming (paraphrasing), “But, General, remember that in my lifetime and that of my parents and grandparents, the Nazis came from the West and stood with their

jackboots on the throats of our villages and towns in western Russia and millions of us died.” Completely disarmed, all I could do was sincerely tell the skeptical *babushka* that today’s West was different and desired a peaceful relationship with Russia. Upon reflection, however, her point was telling, visceral, and evocative. During World War II, a staggering 20–26 million Soviets, many of them civilians, died fighting a brutal war against an unmerciful foe from the West that, if victorious, would have enslaved those who survived the carnage of the invasion.¹¹ Absorbing the Nazi onslaught, surviving, and then overcoming this frightening existential foe was the single greatest achievement of the USSR; it is still a critical—and painful—part of the living memory of Russia today. While the USSR’s allies—the United States, Great Britain, China, France, Canada, Poland, and other nations—paid a bloody butcher’s bill against Germany and Japan, it



May 2015: Russians gather in Moscow to celebrate Victory Day, the end of World War II.

was the Soviets who endured Nazi Germany's main effort: a massive invasion by a Western power executing a war of annihilation.

Before looking at post-Cold War drivers in order to malign Russian impulses and behaviors regarding the West, we must also recall the deep scars on the Russian soul, many of them self-inflicted, throughout its long history. Between 1914 and 1954, a mere 40 years, approximately 35-40 million Russians (the exact number will never be known) died as the result of two catastrophic world wars, a monarchy-collapsing national revolution, a brutal civil war, a man-made famine, grisly repression, show-trial purges, and a gulag system that turned the nation inside out. What goes on in the psyche of a nation's people after enduring such unimaginable hardship and loss? With the Russian Orthodox Church extinguished, what faith or belief system did Russians turn to during those officially soulless years when churches and cathedrals, temples and mosques, if not destroyed, became stables and were labeled houses of atheism? How does this period of wrenching personal and national violence and loss color the worldview of a people so affected by the loss of loved ones to war, famine, or repression within the last century? No wonder that the Russians are suspicious, defensive, reactive, xenophobic, and often paranoid. All of this makes up part of the tough root structure that characterizes both the durability and the hardness of the Russian persona. It also helps to explain an innate willingness to endure both external and, up to an extraordinary point, internal travail; however, when that willingness snaps, as it did during the bloody revolution in 1917 and as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in the late 1980s, it can become viciously brittle.

The West should be Russia's Life Raft, So Why Its Continued Rejection?

Despite the rocky relationship that currently exists, it would seem that the one grand region with which the Russians would—and could—attain a stable concordat would be the West. On the surface, at least, the West should be the most “like-minded” with Russia in cultural terms. Today, despite its at times petulant “rejection” of the West for some vague philosophy of “Eurasianess,” Russia is overwhelming Western and Christian, albeit of a distinctly Russian flavor. Roughly 80 percent of Russia's approximately 145 million citizens live between Ekaterinaburg in the Urals, the geographical dividing line between west and east, and St. Petersburg on the Baltic Sea. Russian culture, whether it be the distinct, but Christian, Russian Orthodox Church, its Slavic language, its Cyrillic alphabet, or its fine arts (including extraordinary classical music and world-renowned authors and artists) is of a distinctly Western flavor. Even in the vulnerably under-populated Far East and Siberia, “great Russian” culture, including architecture, although influenced by Asia and Central Asia, is more Western than anything else. This cultural aspect of Russia—truly the world's Eurasian nation—is important to reflect upon while trying to parse out its recidivist and seemingly self-destructive behaviors toward the West. It is also a strong indicator that Russia's fate and identity are inextricably tied to Europe, the U.S., and the West overall. This becomes especially salient when we collectively look to a future that very likely will include competition for and conflict over Russia's abundant natural resources, which go beyond simply oil and natural gas.

Russia's intransigence and reactive intimidation have helped set in motion within the West the very influences and potential threats it purports to rail against, including a complete Western review of its security posture and perspective in regard to Russia. Russia's undermining of core European institutions that stress regional economic and security cohesion and stability, including the EU and NATO, is short-sighted and potentially dangerous, not only for Europe, but for Russia itself. Russian provocations since the Maidan protests in February 2014, which are redefining the post-Cold War legal and social order, have fueled already noxious radical-right sentiments inside Europe. This could not only be divisive for Europe in the short-term, but, as history has repeatedly proven, could turn very dangerous for Russia in the long-term.¹² A failed EU and NATO would ultimately be catastrophic for Russia, a nation that is hemmed in between a vassal-like, transactional relationship in the Far East and an increasingly seething southern flank that includes Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and a vulnerable Central Asia and Caucasus that is susceptible to major Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, as well as Sunni extremist violence. With its own actions, Russia is stabbing at the proverbial life raft it will need in the next generation: namely a stable, non-reactionary, and democratic Europe.

Tangled Legacies of the Early post-Cold War Period

The historical residue and baggage of the Cold War, and the struggle of two competing belief systems represented by the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact, still greatly influence today's attitudes and behaviors. During the Cold War, NATO was seen by the Soviets as threat incarnate, a view stoked by state media

that persists among many Russians to this day. The entire population of the Soviet Union, comprised of 15 culturally diverse republics, was psychologically and materially immersed in a state of constant confrontation with the West while at the same time balancing a different, but longstanding, threat in the Far East. While this essay focuses on Russia's relationship with the West, it is important to note that the Soviet Union and China did have major ideological differences that culminated in border clashes in 1969 over islands within the Ussuri River—a dispute that was not resolved until 2005.¹³ Still, despite their announced "strategic partnership,"¹⁴ much of the far eastern portion of the 2,700-mile Russia-China border will always be considered an area of deep concern for the Russians, who are fully aware—as are the Chinese—that they forcefully annexed these under-populated and resource-rich lands from the weak Qing Dynasty in the mid-1850s.¹⁵

Following the fracturing of the Soviet Union in 1991, the West collectively lost the moment and the opportunity to bring a reborn, initially hopeful, and mostly receptive Russia into the more law-abiding mainstream global order. The failures of the 1990s are well-documented, with plenty of blame all around. Russia increasingly charted its own independent path as a liberal democracy, and market principles floundered in unregulated, oligarchic lawlessness. American and Western triumphalism about "winning" the Cold War—with monikers such as "Upper Volta with Nuclear Weapons" affixed to the struggling Russian state—did not help. This offended the already wounded nation immensely.¹⁶ Imagine a proud Russian waking up the day after Christmas in 1991 to find the country truncated, with approximately half of its

population and close to one-third of its landmass split into 15 separate republics. Furthermore, approximately 25 million ethnic Russians suddenly found themselves living in numerous different countries, such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Estonia, and Latvia, thereby seeding the ground for future irredentism and strife.^{[17][18]} Throughout this restless, but initially very hopeful period, the Russians increasingly struggled with the furies that emoted after the Soviet Union's fall. These include the psychological and social fallout from its financial collapse, and its failure to secure a victory in the gruesome 1994-1996 Chechen War, which was followed by its bloody pacification in 2000. These presaged and fed a growing militant anti-Russian Sunni extremism that will likely increasingly plague Russia as its demographics change. Additionally, murderous transnational groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant have targeted Russia for its intervention in Syria, while the Caucasus Emirate continues its slow-boil insurgency in Dagestan.^{[19][20]}

Why Russia's Obsession with NATO?

I have always supported NATO, both as a defensive military alliance and as a mechanism to reassure its current and potential future members that there is a safer world within which to coexist than the geostrategic "law of the jungle" that for centuries so marked Europe. It would have been catastrophic for Europe, and ultimately for Russia as well, if NATO had been annulled after the breakup of the Warsaw Pact as the Russians had wished. Untethered nations anxious about security or desirous of settling old irredentist claims could have broken into new pacts and groupings, ultimately presenting grave threats to both European stability and the new Russia. Such

developments would likely have encouraged an earlier emergence of both European and Russian revanchism that could have ended badly for all.


It was right for the newly freed Eastern European nations, including those abutting Russia, to aspire to and gain NATO membership once the required democratic preconditions and reforms were met. Having served for three years in a Joint Staff NATO policy position in the late 1990s, I also definitively know that major efforts were made to keep Russia informed about the momentum toward its enlargement. I watched closely as inclusive mechanisms such as the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the resultant NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council—a precursor to the 2002 NATO-Russia Council—were formed.^{[21][22]}

It would be shortsighted, however, not to look closely at Russian perceptions of NATO, the EU, and the West in general. If one considers Russia's penchant both for seeing the world along Westphalian lines and for believing that it is perpetually surrounded by existential threats—whether real or perceived—it is not *visually* difficult to understand their perspective. Untempered by context, between 1990 and 2004 NATO's blue lines advanced inexorably in three successive tranches, over the lands of former Warsaw Pact members, deep into Eastern Europe and the three Baltic States up to Russia's borders. To frame this territorially, in 1989, with its Warsaw Pact buffer zone extended to the East-West German border, the USSR's second city, Leningrad, stood over 800 miles away by land from NATO territory, excepting Norway and Turkey. In 2004, when Estonia entered NATO, the alliance's eastern European land boundary at Narva now stood only 90 miles from renamed St. Petersburg. As seen on the map below, the moving of NATO

boundaries east, the exercising of military forces within them, and construction of rogue nation missile defense centers play to both perceived and contrived Russian fears of NATO encirclement.

It will take firm, measured, and patiently explained actions to ultimately convince the Russians that NATO, unless provoked, is not a threat and that it does not want confrontation with Russia. This, however, will be very challenging. First, there will be senior members in Putin’s regime who will reflexively reject any peaceful description of NATO for their own contrived and craven reasons. This could be seen in their overreaction to the likely prospect

of NATO membership for tiny Montenegro, which shares no border with Russia, and in their recent attempts to intimidate peaceful, neutral Sweden and Finland concerning their internal political discussions about the possibility of NATO membership. No matter what was or was not actually said in the Reagan-Gorbachev, Bush-Gorbachev, and Baker-Primakov negotiations concerning Germany’s reunification, the Warsaw Pact, and NATO enlargement, most Russians fervently believe that the West reneged on an unwritten agreement that NATO would not include a reunified Germany and that it would not expand eastward.^{[23][24]} Most of the population, fed by



Map depicting NATO’s eastern expansion over time (1949-2009).

continual state-controlled media disinformation amplifying such notions, ardently believes this and feels the West, with NATO at its forefront, broke faith and expanded eastward, despite protestations by a still-weak Russia.^[25]^[26] This point is regularly and pointedly used as a bludgeon-like talking point by Russian negotiators and interlocutors, and continues to taint our relationship today, no matter how hard we try to explain and reassure. Putin himself summarized this view, stating:

*NATO was built to counteract the Soviet Union in its day and time. At this point there is no threat coming from the Soviet Union, because there is no Soviet Union anymore. And where there was the Soviet Union once, there is now a number of countries, among them the new and democratic Russia.*²⁷

Added to the mainstream Russian sense of grievance was NATO's decision in late 1998, outside of the veto-constrained United Nations Security Council, to take military action against Serbia and to intervene militarily in Kosovo in order to avert the ethnic cleansing and genocide being perpetrated against the Albanian majority there. While a righteous action, I cannot overemphasize how incensed the Russians were by this as it involved attacks against Slavs, also members of the Orthodox Church and with whom they had always had a patron's relationship. This ended a period of cooperation with Russia that had reached its zenith in Bosnia in 1995 when Russian airborne troops served within U.S.-NATO formations.²⁸ While Russian forces did join NATO's Kosovo Force from 1999-2003, the relationship was already ebbing quickly. It was also during this period that Vladimir Putin, then the chief of the KGB, was

stretching his wings, beginning his first round as Russia's president in 2000 and executing a brutal campaign to crush Chechnya's resistance shortly thereafter.²⁹

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there was a brief flicker of potential understanding between the United States and Russia as Russia experienced its own terrorist-inflicted national tragedies, first with the siege of the Nordost Theater in Moscow in October 2002³⁰, and then the Beslan school massacre in September 2004.³¹ Despite this, however, the U.S.-European and Russian relationship inexorably trended downward. Especially threatening to Russia's power elite were the so-called "color revolutions," epitomized by Georgia's Rose Revolution in 2003 and Ukraine's first Orange Revolution in 2004, that apparently were more existential to core Russian regime interests than may have appeared. Most contemporary Russians, once again inflamed by the press and by the pronouncements of their leaders, believe the U.S. and the West were behind these popular demonstrations. In 2008, Georgia, perhaps not fully understanding Russia's antipathy, overreached while responding to provocations, resulting in the Russian invasion and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The incursion certainly signaled increased Russian assertiveness in areas of the former Soviet Union—Russia's declared "privileged sphere"—in which sizeable Russian minority populations reside.

Erosion of Strategic Stability³²

The world was very lucky to survive the Cold War nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Traditionally, nations that build lethal weapons of strategic scope eventually use them. While the surreal

days of “duck and cover” gave way later in the Cold War to a sustained effort to limit nuclear arms and reduce the threat implicit in the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, we have now entered a period of growing nuclear tension with Russia. It seems clear that for the current generation of Kremlin leaders, nuclear weapons have broad political and military utility; they are a potent means to intimidate and coerce in peacetime and crisis, and play an important role in Russia’s approach to contemporary conflict. The manifestations are plain:

- persistent pattern of nuclear saber rattling and open or thinly veiled nuclear threats that seek to induce fear, caution and, ultimately, paralysis among governments that would have to contemplate whether and how to counter Russian aggression;
- military doctrine that envisions the possibility of initiating the use of nuclear weapons in order to “de-escalate” a regional conventional war;³³
- violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and a more general refusal to engage on the question of additional nuclear arms control (that is, beyond the New START agreement) and threat reduction (that is, beyond the Nunn-Lugar program);
- continued investment in modernized nuclear forces of all ranges and types.

The risks to strategic stability are equally evident. Adding to concern is the atrophying state of the arms-control regime assiduously built over decades during the heart of the Cold War by legions of hard-working and often disagreeing diplomats, scientists, and bureaucrats. The Conventional Forces-Europe agreement is suspended,^{[34][35]} the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is gone,³⁶ and the

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)³⁷ and New Start treaties—the latter signed only in 2010^{[38][39]}—are on life support.⁴⁰ The severe erosion of these substantive, confidence-building measures, which had involved diplomats, bureaucrats, and scientists in near daily dialogue, is yet another layer of de-pressurizing points of contact gone, and bodes ill for the future.

Risk-taking behavior by Moscow could lead to a nuclear crisis and miscalculation or unintended escalation. Russia’s deliberate escalation to the nuclear level in a regional conflict could also trigger a series of nuclear exchanges well beyond Moscow’s ability to predict or control. The danger is that Putin and his circle may well believe they can avoid or control such risks and operate safely under a “nuclear shadow.” This belief seems central to the way Moscow would seek to achieve a rapid *fait accompli* against a NATO member and then essentially engage in nuclear blackmail to deter a meaningful collective defense response from the Alliance. Should this attempt at blackmail fail, Russia seems prepared to consider the actual use of non-strategic nuclear weapons to achieve its objectives rather than wage war against NATO forces that, when fully mobilized, would bring superior combat power to the fight. Such actions are those of an insecure nation with major regional aspirations that also realizes it is out-gunned and out-numbered conventionally.

The dangers of Russian nuclear coercion are quite real to those European states most exposed to them. Moscow’s aggression has renewed fears that Europe once again could become a battleground in a conflict that carries no small risk of nuclear use. As a result, NATO today finds itself engaged in serious discussions about how to leverage its own

conventional and nuclear forces to deter Russia and deny it the ability to gain advantage from a strategy of nuclear coercion and escalation control. The task of credibly deterring Moscow requires the West not only to shed outdated assumptions and mindsets about Russia that are premised on a vision of partnership that is no longer realistic, but also to reconstitute its ability to understand Russia as a political and military rival—as well as a potential adversary in war.

Ukraine 2014: Post-Cold War Order Unhinged

The year 2014 will go down in history as a turning-point year, similar to 1914 and 1938, because it was during this year that European and global history swerved onto a very dangerous—but avertable—path. The bloody Maidan demonstrations in Kyiv that were followed by the flight of ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich to Russia dramatically upended Europe's post-Cold War journey toward regional inclusiveness and stability. The West, in its laudatory desire to enlarge the seemingly innocuous European Union, misread just how sensitive the Russians were not just to the prospect of military enlargement, but also to the expansion east of Western free-market ideals and philosophies. With the memory of thousands of Muscovites thronging the streets to protest the 2011-12 presidential secession still extant⁴¹, it became clearer what the Putin regime saw as its top existential threat: a mainstream popular movement supported by the West that challenged the false legitimacy of his corrupt pseudo-democratic, autocratic kleptocracy. Chastened by the sight of Yanukovich's fall from power during the Sochi Olympics, and the subsequent revelation of the extreme wealth he and his family had pilfered from the

Ukrainian body-politic, the Russian President and his inner cabal likely saw themselves in the proverbial mirror and moved quickly to counter this most dangerous of perceived existential threats facing them.

Teetering Ukraine played to Russia's most elemental fears—and its opportunism. Their worst nightmare was a heavily populated and resurgent Ukraine ascending first to the EU and then to NATO, putting the alliance on Russia's doorstep. Although the plans for its invasion and illegal annexation of Ukraine's Crimea likely had been sketched for some time, hard-core Russian planning probably began in earnest during the Maidan protests and the Sochi Olympics in 2012. The disinformation machine went into high gear to prepare the domestic population for aggressive Russian action, proclaiming that NATO had designs on the heavily ethnic-Russian Crimea, including Sevastopol, the leased headquarters of its Black Sea Fleet. The messaging campaign was bolstered by a series of heroic documentaries and films about the World War II "hero cities" of Sevastopol and Odessa that were played heavily on Russia's "*Kultura*" channel and multiple other venues during this time.⁴²

After this dramatically successful shadow campaign that reintroduced "non-linear warfare" and "hybrid warfare" into the mainstream military lexicon—and led to Crimea's illegal annexation on March 18, 2014—Russia turned its attention to the already smoldering situation in eastern Ukraine.⁴³ After its initial success, which was followed by forays by Russian-backed proxy separatists to seize key government and population centers, including Kharkiv, Mariopol, and Odessa, eastern Ukraine became an increasingly fierce battleground. Modern-day mainstream Ukrainian patriotism—manifested by the fierce resistance

of its slapped together, hodge-podge military and volunteers—was born in battle, much to Russia’s chagrin.

This drama in Ukraine played out as a subset of a greater European-U.S. struggle of ideals and actions with Russia. While the EU may have misjudged that association with Ukraine would be seen as an actionable threat to Russia, it managed to pull together and levy what has proven to be an effective sanctions regimen, despite the economic hardship it brought to some of its members. Russian membership in the G8 was suspended and NATO—increasingly concerned by Russia’s Western-oriented revanchism, with former Soviet states containing significant numbers of Russian minorities its likely target—was stirred to action.

If the illegal annexation of Crimea had not already coalesced EU unity, the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17, 2014 certainly did. It was at that moment that the general trend of Russian successes that had begun with the Sochi Olympics, the takeover of Crimea, and its support for pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine came to a screeching halt. Rather than take the diplomatic high ground that many hoped it would, Russia instead tried to deceive and obfuscate its way out of the strong likelihood that a Russian-supplied Buk missile shot down the defenseless civilian jetliner, resulting in the deaths of all 298 innocent civilians on board.⁴⁴ This tragedy was a major turning point for European attitudes; more importantly, however, it galvanized European action and led to, among other things, an intensified sanctions regime.⁴⁵



Leaders from Russia and Crimea sign the treaty of accession, completing the annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014.

Breaking from the Norms of Western-Oriented “Civil Society”

Exacerbating Europe’s concerns was Russia’s growing emphasis on the moral and religious aspects of its “Russianness,” harkening back to its more traditional “Slavophile” days.⁴⁶ This included resurrecting the notion of a “New Russia”; justifying its irredentist claims on territory within Eastern Europe containing ethnic Russian populations; tagging certain individuals and groups as treasonous; treating homosexuals and transgender persons as outcasts; and shutting down non-compliant media outlets and Web sites.⁴⁷ “Putinism,” with its emphasis on Russian morals and identity, became a label that attempted to describe the complex and troublingly autocratic and moralistic nature of the Russian regime.⁴⁸

The term “illiberal democracy” resurfaced at around this same time.⁴⁹ A number of prominent European leaders within several EU countries used Putin’s policies as a model and a justification for their own erosion of personal rights within their nations.^{[50][51]} Aided by a major media effort and attractive economic incentives, Moscow sought to erode the will and desire of struggling EU and NATO nations to honor their commitments to their allies and partners—including the EU’s determination to maintain its economic sanctions against Russia. By extension, another more strategic goal was to set the conditions to weaken and fracture the EU and, ultimately, NATO.⁵² As discussed earlier, though such corrosive and destabilizing developments may bring Russia tactical short-term satisfaction, they would be catastrophic for the country in the long-term.

The migrant refugee wave, a crisis that continues to engulf Europe and weaken its

institutions, is a factor that could drive Russian relations with Europe specifically, and the West generally, in the near future. Russia is a spoiler in this and, curiously, can play the situation both ways. Its substantial and dangerously open-ended military intervention within Syria is creating even more refugees, orphans, and homeless individuals. Indeed, Russia has been accused, with considerable justification, of calculatingly “weaponizing” the migration flow to weaken European institutions.⁵³ If, however, a true ceasefire and a tenuous truce are maintained, with the resultant refugee flow staunch, Russia may be seen by Europe as part of a solution that could conceivably lead to a major, albeit extremely difficult, United Nations security and peacekeeping role in Syria in which Russia, a very active player in the UN, could have a major leadership role. Considered and forward-thinking diplomatic steps could net Putin numerous benefits, including a reconsideration of the sanctions regime levied on his country, especially if major steps were concurrently taken to solidify the 2015 Minsk II ceasefire agreement with Ukraine. While likely not part of Russia’s strategic calculus for entering the Syrian hornet’s nest, such a scenario could provide a possible “off ramp” to improved relations with the West (particularly with Europe and the United States), especially if a deal concerning the long-term resolution of the Bashar al Assad question is achieved. It is not in Russia’s long-term strategic interest to remain caught in Syria, choking on an endless combatant noose of its own making, thus working this angle could derive benefits. Further, open-ended involvement in tortured and byzantine conflicts like Syria could ultimately be detrimental for Russia domestically if something akin to the 1983 bombing of the

U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut⁵⁴ or a widely publicized proxy atrocity, such as the massacre at Sabra and Shatila in 1982, were to occur.⁵⁵ In addition, it is likely that there will be more attacks throughout Russia proper by jihadists returning to the Caucasus and Central Asia from fighting in Syria and Iraq.⁵⁶

How the Strategic Environment has Changed for Russia

Less than a year after Crimea's annexation, major aspects of Russia's international relations, economy, and long-term security had already declined, especially in regard to Europe and the United States. These were strategic factors for Russia that did not exist at the height of its successful Sochi Olympic games that ended in February 2014. To briefly summarize:

- A mainstream sense of patriotism and pride across Ukraine that, while not necessarily anti-Russian, became decidedly pro-Ukrainian. In the 6-month period that encompassed the Maidan protests, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and the proxy invasion of eastern Ukraine, Russia awakened a sense of national purpose among more than 35 million primarily ethnic Ukrainians who would likely fight for their nation.
- The European Union, despite major schisms, including the impending Brexit, pulled together and levied major sanctions that have significantly hobbled Russia's economy and its ability to generate added wealth and production without major compromises. This has put significant pressure on Russia's business sector, including military modernization plans, while adding significant stress to the country domestically.⁵⁷
- NATO regained its core focus. Reluctantly, but firmly, Article 5 returned to

its place of primacy. Although there are still members lagging behind on their obligations, those Allies deficient in committing the required two percent of their Gross Domestic Product to NATO's defense budget are reconsidering their individual budgets. NATO reaffirmed its Alliance obligations to its members, especially those in the east who acutely remember what it was like to be adrift in the so-called "Bloodlands" of the late 1930s.⁵⁸ The U.S. ceased its military retrograde from Europe and took significant steps, including a planned \$3.4 billion increase of Europe-related defense spending under the new European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), the use of prepositioned equipment, and the "heel to toe" rotating commitment of a heavy brigade to shore up NATO conventional defenses.⁵⁹

- The Russian economy buckled. This included the unforeseen collapse of oil prices from over \$100 per barrel to approximately \$35 per barrel before the shooting down of the Malaysian passenger jet in July 2014.⁶⁰ Compounding Russia's woes, its ruble has devalued by over half since March 2014.^{[61][62]} These near simultaneous occurrences—part market-driven, but also as a result of its reckless behavior—and the West-imposed sanctions have put enormous pressure on Russia's ability to sustain major operations and a military modernization program while maintaining the improved standard of living attained over the prior decade. Over time, this will jeopardize what the regime values most: a pliant population.

Finally, a more psychological and sociological change occurred. Russia became an international pariah state. Until its dramatic intervention in Syria in late October 2015, Russia, already seen as an outlier with its poorly

veiled military aggression, internal assault on civil society, and massively corrupt business practices, had isolated itself from much of the international community, certainly within the West. China, India, and Brazil, among others, did not censor Russia, however, keeping their trade links open. While Russia was petulantly dismissive of its suspension from the prestigious G8, the move had to have stung.⁶³

The bottom line is that long-term trend lines for Russia are degrading rather than improving and will present considerable dangers in the immediate future. Neither Brexit nor the fallout from Turkey's recent failed coup attempt will change this. Nothing positive will come to pass for Russia in the long-term, however, unless it is able to mitigate its constant tension and confrontation with Europe, the United States, and the West.

Russia and the West—Avoiding Near-term Brinkmanship while Shaping the Future

Despite the much-trumpeted publicity concerning Russia's temporarily successful gambit in Syria, the remaining strategic conditions that face Russia continue to hold it back. While its actions appear offensive, Russia as a nation is on the strategic defensive, focused more on weathering the strained status quo than on any great advances. Its military actions appear more preemptive and reactive than overtly offensive. The lattice of ethnic-Russian-populated enclaves in the former Soviet Union are all designed in part to block or freeze the ability of Western-oriented countries to break free of controlling Russian influences and join Western institutions. (This same pattern also explains the frozen conflicts in places such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Donbass.)⁶⁴ Ukraine, if its economy does not

implode under the weight of its own poor policies and endemic corruption, has broken from its orbit, and both the EU and NATO, while wobbly at times, are still holding consensus in respect to Russian misdeeds. While it has improved slightly, the petroleum-dependent Russian economy—suffering from sanctions, low oil prices and a devalued ruble—continues to struggle and over time will likely put Russians back onto the streets in protests and mass demonstrations. The brain drain continues, with many from the middle class leaving Russia to seek more promising opportunities abroad; even the so-called oligarchs and the financially privileged, although loyal to Russia to the last ruble and dollar, have exit strategies in comfortable arrangements in London, Paris, and New York or the warm Caribbean and Mediterranean islands to the south.⁶⁵

As this essay goes to print, joint U.S., multinational, and NATO-linked Allied and Partner forces are involved in the aforementioned major series of defensively oriented exercises focused on Poland and the Baltic States, and stretching across eastern Europe into Georgia. Harkening back to 1961's Operation *Long Thrust*, these forces are not large enough to threaten offensively but are robust enough to show resolve and purpose to both Russia and to our regional allies and partners. During these critical demonstrations of assurance and deterrence, we must be mindful of real, but not contrived, Russian redlines. This includes the August 2014 actions of Ukrainian forces that were about to wipe out the ethnic Russian separatist enclaves of Donetsk and Lugansk, which resulted in a direct, if unattributed, Russian military incursion,⁶⁶ and the unambiguous and aggressive intervention in Syria in late September 2015 as it appeared the al Assad regime was about to

fall.⁶⁷ The rhetoric and indicators were evident in the runup to both; the West, unfortunately, failed to parse them out amidst the din of incessant media noise at the time.

While moving ahead with exercises in close proximity to Russian borders, we must pay close attention to Russian messaging, as evinced by their recent actions that have included aggressive fly-bys in the Baltic Sea. We must also proactively and repeatedly consult with the Russian military, and even offer to exchange observers in order to mitigate any Russian sense of threat from these real, but relatively modest, shows of force. The exercises must be widely publicized, including within Russia itself, in order to combat the inflammatory disinformation that will inevitably spew forth from Russian media about “threatening and provocative NATO activities.” Whether U.S.-led, multinational, or NATO, these deterrent, regionally assuring exercises will be lumped together in the Russian narrative. Therefore, public information is a key area that must be improved upon; we in the West are not particularly adept at “wielding the truth” in a coordinated and timely manner, while for Russia information operations are a strategic non-linear operational front. Furthermore, the dearth of U.S. and Russian operational-level military-to-military (M2M) contact is dangerously insufficient, and leaves both sides open to major misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to rapid escalation and brinkmanship. With some personal relations established, key leaders could start to whittle down this increasingly dangerous trust deficit even if they disagree on many issues.

Russia’s Existential Challenge

It is my hope that both the current and the upcoming crop of political leaders in the West

and the Putin regime (which could remain entrenched for the next eight years) have the foresight, gravitas, and credibility to understand and to modulate the differences between assurance, deterrence, and provocation, and break Russia from its ongoing schizophrenic relationship with the West. It will not happen overnight, as the Russian regime is more obsessed with its jaundiced perception of liberal Western thoughts, mores, and economy than the NATO conventional threat. Over time, however, the current Russian-Western animus can and must lessen as the colossal pressures emergent in the rest of the world highlight our obvious convergences—terror, demographics, resources, and migration, to name but a few—that are often occluded by the bile and rhetoric of the current stunted and distrustful relationship. Russia will fail, perhaps catastrophically, if it does not knit itself more credibly with the West. The West, in turn, must continue its firm but patient response to Russian transgressions while resolving a host of challenges that include a weakened EU and the migrant crisis. My biggest concern is that something terrible—something that neither side wants but that could result should Russia be pushed to the brink during this tense and petulant intermediary period—will occur. Therefore, it is critical that we work to find mechanisms to focus on the positive, while managing and ameliorating the extremely dangerous negatives during this pivotal period in our challenged relations.

Despite its rhetoric to the contrary, Russia needs the West. Both will need each other to survive and prosper in the next generation. Beset with growing problems along much of its vast periphery, demographically challenged Russia must find, for its salvation as a politically viable nation-state in future generations,

a credible and peaceful *modus vivendi* with the West. If not, it will fail, and the always (but not infinitely) patient Russian population will inevitably turn on the regime's false narrative that blames all of Russia's woes on external factors, especially the United States and the West, more generally. Despite the rhetoric and disinformation, I believe that much of Russia's leadership, its business community, and its better-connected-than-we-think population already sense this despite the mind-bending disinformation. While currently prudent foreign policy for Russia, any long-term, strategic relationship with an increasingly resource-rapacious China will always place it in a subordinate role fraught with potential existential risk and no prospect of major gain. Further, business in Central Asia and the Caucasus will always produce marginal results. Somehow, then, Russia needs to let go of its anti-Western psychosis and corresponding rhetoric and disinformation and focus on the many next-generation threats, challenges, and opportunities that it and the West must face together. The West, in turn, must continue a dual track of pushing back firmly against Russian transgressions while at the same time patiently and firmly working with Russia to better establish critical confidence-building conduits and arenas for mutually beneficial cooperation. We want Russia to rejoin the peaceful mainstream of law-abiding nations rather than lash out militarily or collapse precipitously, situations that would be extremely dangerous for Russia itself, the West, and the entire world. **PRISM**

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
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Photos

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Known as "little green men," Russian soldiers stand watch over Pervalne military base in Crimea. (March 2014)

Assessing and Addressing Russian Revanchism

BY JOHN HERBST

The West has been slow to recognize the dangers posed by Russian President Vladimir Putin's revisionist policies. At the Wales Summit in September of 2014, NATO identified the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a "grave threat" to its members. While expressing great concern about and condemning Russia's aggressive policy in Ukraine—and noting the various steps taken to deal with the challenges of that policy—the Alliance declined to characterize Russia as even a threat. Indeed, although the Summit statement spoke of the need to provide "assurances" to Allies in Eastern Europe, it did not speak of deterring the Kremlin.

This same reluctance was evident nearly a year later, in the summer of 2015, when General Joseph Dunford testified before Congress as President Barack Obama's nominee to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Dunford identified Russia as an existential threat. Later that day, however, Josh Earnest, the Presidential press spokesman, said that Dunford's observation "reflects his own view and doesn't necessarily reflect the view—or the consensus—of the President's national security team."¹ The next day Secretary of State John Kerry also stepped in and made clear that he does not view Russia as an existential threat.²

Clarity of vision and thought is essential for successful policymaking. Safeguarding European security requires a well-grounded understanding of the capabilities, intentions, and activities of the continent's most powerful military actor.

Moscow's Military Capability and Revisionist Objectives

Russia is one of the world's two great nuclear powers, and its military capabilities are well understood. According to Global Firepower, which evaluates military power around the world, Russia's conventional forces are the second most powerful in the world, after those of the United States. Moscow maintains over 750,000 troops, 15,000 tanks, 750 fighter/interceptors, 1,300 fixed wing attack aircraft, and 350 naval ships.³ These figures mean that Moscow has the capacity to pose a

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significant threat to Europe and to American interests. This has been duly noted by military leaders. Admiral Mark Ferguson, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, notes that the “remilitarization of Russian security policy is evident by the construction of an arc of steel from the Arctic to the Mediterranean.”⁴ He continued, “Starting in their new Arctic bases, to Leningrad in the Baltic and Crimea in the Black Sea, Russia has introduced advanced air defense, cruise missile systems and new platforms.”⁵ General Phillip Breedlove, the former Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, observed in October 2015 that “our force structure in Europe now is not adequate to the larger Russian task that we see.”⁶

Its growing military capacity gives the Kremlin the means to act against U.S. and NATO interests in Europe. But what of its intentions, its policy objectives? Are there reasons for the Kremlin to do so? The Kremlin has not been hiding its national security priorities. Putin has stated on numerous occasions his dissatisfaction with the status quo in Europe and Eurasia established at the end of the Cold War. He has insisted that there must be new rules for the international order, or there will be no rules at all.⁷

The post-Cold War order that Putin finds objectionable has the following characteristics:

- Countries that were subservient to Moscow in the Warsaw Pact pursued independent internal and foreign policies;
- The Soviet Union was dissolved and all of the USSR’s constituent republics became independent states. It is important to note that this decision was taken exclusively by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The West played no part in it, and then President George H.W. Bush even advised against it;

- It was understood that disputes in Europe would be resolved only by negotiations and other peaceful means;
- The tensions and geopolitical competition that characterized 20th century Europe and made it history’s bloodiest were a thing of the past;
- To reduce political tensions and to promote prosperity, European integration would continue, including the countries of the former Soviet bloc; and
- Russia and the West were to become partners, with the West seeking closer relations and sponsoring Moscow’s memberships in international organizations such as the G8 and the IMF.

Putin, senior Russian officials, and commentators have made their views of the post-Cold War order clear. In numerous statements they have:

- Called for a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet space;⁸
- Called Georgia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan failed or artificial states;⁹ and
- Asserted Moscow’s right, and even duty, to protect not just ethnic Russians, but Russian speakers wherever they happen to reside;¹⁰ (Russian speakers make up about 25 percent of the populations of Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Latvia. There are also significant Russian populations throughout the countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union).¹¹

Moscow’s Policy Instruments

Were Moscow’s attack on the post-Cold War order purely rhetorical, it would be problematic, but manageable. Unfortunately, this assault has been comprehensive. It involves Russia’s information apparatus, intelligence

services, criminal networks, business community, and military.

The heavily subsidized Russian media has been conducting a virulent anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, campaign for years. Coupled with the increasing control of “independent” elections, Putin’s media have fanned xenophobia and intolerance throughout Russia. This campaign has been part of Putin’s efforts to reduce the chance that the Russian people are attracted to democratic ideas, and to mobilize the Russian people to support his aggression in neighboring countries.

Russian intelligence services and connected criminal networks play an important part in Putin’s efforts to undermine the post-Cold War order. First, we should note that the very organization of Moscow’s intelligence agencies provide a clue about its intentions. After the collapse of the USSR, the Soviet intelligence service (KGB) was split in half. The Federal Security Service (FSB) was given responsibility for domestic security, while the External Intelligence Service (SVR) was to focus on foreign intelligence. The fact that the independent states of the former Soviet Union are the responsibility of the FSB tells us what Moscow thinks of their independence. A main responsibility of the FSB—and of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Russian foreign military intelligence—is to penetrate the security organs of the neighboring states to ensure that they promote Russian interests as defined by the Kremlin. This includes, as we have seen in Ukraine, making sure that its military, police, and intelligence will not mobilize against a Russian-led insurrection or even invasion.

Corruption, a major feature of Putin’s Russia, is also an important tool for the Kremlin in promoting its influence in the Near

Abroad. The Kremlin understands that corrupt foreign officials are more pliant. Cooperation between Russian intelligence services and criminal organizations figure here. For instance, a massive scandal in Russia and Ukraine has been the siphoning off of substantial resources from the gas sector into private hands. Shadow companies such as Eural Trans Gas and RosUkrenergo were created to manage this, and it was Semion Mogilevich, a major Russian crime boss, who first devised this strategy.¹²

As he consolidated his power in Moscow, Putin ensured that Russian companies were subject to Kremlin control to promote objectives abroad. The heart of the Russian economy is its gas and oil production. Putin has used these assets to promote his foreign policy in a number of ways. For example, he has built gas pipelines to Western Europe around Ukraine and even ally Belarus so that he can use natural gas trade as a weapon against these countries while maintaining access to his wealthy customers in the West. He has also hired senior European officials to work as front men for his companies. The most egregious example of this is former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the Chairman of the Board of NordStream, an international consortium of five companies established in 2005 for the planning, construction, and operation of two natural gas pipelines through the Baltic Sea.

Gazprom, Russia’s major gas company, has established business practices regarding the transportation of Central Asian gas through its pipelines. It also regulated the delivery of gas to European customers in a way that violates European Union (EU) energy policy and maximizes Russian leverage in dealing with individual countries. For instance, Gazprom practices have made it harder for

European countries to supply gas to Ukraine when the Kremlin wants to punish Kyiv by cutting off the supply of gas. Lucrative arrangements with select companies in some EU countries have also built constituencies that support Kremlin foreign policies.¹³

The Kremlin has also assiduously courted extremist parties in Europe in order to weaken not only democratic practices and support for the European Union's sanctions policies, but also NATO's shift of military resources to its member states in the east. Russian support includes financing of Marine Le Pen's National Front party in France and the Jobbik—Movement for a Better Hungary—party in Hungary.¹⁴

Additionally, the Kremlin has built up its cyber capacity. There is evidence suggesting that they have deployed it at least twice to demonstrate their unhappiness with the policies of neighbors. In the spring of 2007, after Estonia had taken down a monument which honored the Soviet Union for "liberating" the country from the Nazis, and following demonstrations by local ethnic Russians against the decision, the country faced a massive cyber-attack that many attributed to Moscow.¹⁵ In the winter of 2015-16, a massive cyber-attack shut down the electricity supply in major areas of eastern Ukraine. This followed the shut-down of the electricity supply from mainland Ukraine to Crimea.¹⁶

Finally, and as discussed previously, Putin has modernized and rebuilt the Russian military and has not hesitated to use it in pursuit of his revisionist objectives in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. U.S. policymakers need to take a stand against revisionism, and Ukraine would be a great place to start

The Origins of Kremlin Revisionism and Its Application

The origins of the war in Ukraine began in the minds of Putin and the Russian security elite who find the post-Cold War order unacceptable. While the broad extent of today's crisis is Putin's responsibility, its roots go back to the imperial thinking in Russian security circles since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In the Russian imperial view, all the territories once ruled by Russia or the Soviet Union should remain subject to the rule or at least the special influence of Moscow. While typically associated with the Russian "power ministries"—the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the FSB, the SVR, and the GRU—even Russian liberals are tempted by this thinking. For example, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin objected to Ukraine's 1991 referendum, in which 91 percent of the population—including 54 percent in Crimea—voted for independence from the Soviet Union (and Russia). It is worth noting too that when the results of the Ukrainian referendum became clear, these two relatively liberal Russian politicians began to assert Moscow's right to protect Russians in Ukraine—the same "principle" that Putin has been using to justify his recent aggression.¹⁷

From the very first days of the post-Soviet world, Moscow's security services developed the "frozen conflict" tactic to limit the sovereignty of its neighbors. They supported Armenian separatists in the Azerbaijan region of Nagorno-Karabakh in order to exert pressure on Azeris, South Ossetians, and Ajaris; the Abkhaz in Georgia to pressure Tbilisi; and the Slavs in Transnistria in order to keep Chisinau, the Moldovan capital, in check. For those who mistakenly blame current tensions with Moscow on NATO enlargement, it is

worth noting that Moscow had its frozen conflicts policy in place before talk of the first expansion of NATO.

Russian activity in the Near Abroad in the 1990's was just a prelude to Putin's policies in the area. After the Rose Revolution in Georgia in the fall of 2003, which drove President Eduard Shevardnadze from power, the Kremlin instituted a trade embargo and undertook various military provocations. In late July 2008, Russia's South Ossetian proxies began to shell Georgian positions. A sharp Georgian response gave Moscow the pretext to send in troops in August, which promptly defeated the Georgians.

Led by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Western mediators established a diplomatic process that led to a ceasefire. The United States sent humanitarian assistance to Georgia and, as a caution to Moscow not to send its troops further into Georgia beyond South Ossetia, delivered it via the U.S. military. Moscow did not take the war beyond South Ossetia.

The West imposed no serious penalties on Moscow for its aggression. The White House froze the civilian nuclear act with Russia, and EU members debated as to whether any action should be taken. Finally, the EU decided to suspend talks on a partnership and cooperation agreement.¹⁸ Not long afterwards, President Sarkozy agreed to sell Moscow the Mistral aircraft carrier in part as a reward for its ostensible observance of the ceasefire that he had negotiated. Less than a year after the war, President Obama launched his reset with Moscow. The Georgian war was seen in Moscow as a great victory. Putin had given a bloody nose to Georgia's pro-Western government and suffered only minor and temporary

inconvenience in Russia's relations with the West.

Ukraine was the next target of Kremlin revisionism. It is worth recalling that the "Ukraine crisis" began when Putin decided in 2013 that it would be unacceptable for Ukraine to sign a trade agreement with the EU. This prospect had not disturbed him in the past.¹⁹

Most Ukrainians, including then President Viktor Yanukovich, who was often described as pro-Kremlin (a simplification), wanted the EU deal. Partly due to Kremlin pressure—Moscow had been banning Ukrainian exports—Yanukovich backed away from the trade deal in late November 2013. The next day, there were tens of thousands of demonstrators on the streets of Kyiv protesting this decision. When Yanukovich tried to clear the streets with strong-arm policing, he provoked demonstrations of hundreds of thousands protesting his corrupt and increasingly authoritarian rule. Putin's offers of lower gas prices and a loan of \$15 billion did not satisfy the demonstrators.²⁰ For two months, Yanukovich alternated between police methods and inadequate concessions to persuade the protestors to go home. He failed. Sergei Glaziyev, Putin's principal adviser on Ukraine, publicly urged Yanukovich to use force to deal with the protestors.²¹

Finally, in late February 2014, Yanukovich either permitted or ordered the use of sniper fire to terrorize the protestors into leaving the streets. A hundred people died as a result.²² But the demonstrators did not leave the streets; they were enraged. Yanukovich's political support collapsed, and he fled the country for Russia a few days later.

In response, the Kremlin launched its invasion of Crimea with "little green men," who looked like and were equipped like

Russian soldiers, but without the insignias and flags of the Russian military. The United States and Europe imposed some mild economic sanctions on Russia in response, while also making every effort in private diplomacy and public statements to offer Putin an “off ramp” from the crisis.²³ That the West had such a tender regard for Putin’s dignity was not unnoticed in the Kremlin, and certainly made Putin’s decision to launch his hybrid war in the Donbass easier. The Sarkozy model of responding weakly to Kremlin aggression was still in place.

Since launching his decreasingly covert war in Ukraine’s east, Putin has escalated his intervention several times. It began in April 2015 with Russian leadership, arms, and money. When Ukraine launched its counteroffensive under newly elected President Petro Poroshenko in June 2015, the Kremlin sent in

increasingly sophisticated weapons (such as the missile system that shot down the Malaysian airliner in July 2015), more fighters (including the Vostok Battalion of Chechens), and, finally, the regular Russian army itself in August. Only the use of regular Russian forces stopped the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Throughout this period, the West was slow and weak in confronting the Kremlin. For instance, the G7 leaders had warned Putin in early June that if he did not cease his intervention in Ukraine by the end of the month, Russia would face sectoral sanctions.²⁴ Yet by the end of June, despite the introduction of major Russian weapons systems into Ukraine, there was no more talk of sectoral sanctions. Only the July shooting-down of the Malaysian passenger jet, along with the invasion by Russian troops, persuaded the Europeans to put those sanctions in place.



VO Svoboda

Damaged building in Kurakhove, Ukraine, 10 miles west of the frontlines in Donbass, November 26, 2014

After regular Russian forces defeated the Ukrainian army in early September 2015, Germany and France helped negotiate the Minsk I ceasefire, which Russia repeatedly violated by introducing more equipment and military supplies into Ukraine and taking an additional 500 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory.²⁵ This escalated aggression, however, did not lead to any additional sanctions last year.

Despite the Russian offensive that greeted the 2016 New Year, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini was floating the idea of easing sanctions. As the violence increased, Mogherini dropped the subject. But in February, Germany and France helped negotiate a new ceasefire, Minsk II, with terms far worse for Ukraine.²⁶ Putin certainly enjoyed this process. Again, the Sarkozy pattern was unbroken. For violating Minsk I, Putin received a much more favorable ceasefire, which he promptly violated by seizing the strategic town of Debaltseve. And why not? While Western leaders huff and puff at each new Kremlin aggression, they hope out loud that this is the last one. And occasionally they levy additional sanctions on Russia.

What the West Should Expect Next From the Kremlin

Nowhere has Putin stated clearly what he needs to stop his war against Ukraine. Western leaders have fallen all over themselves offering solutions publicly and privately to assuage the Russian strongman, but to no avail. There is a simple reason for this: Putin's ideal objective in Ukraine is to establish a compliant regime in Kyiv—something that he cannot achieve because a large majority of Ukrainian citizens despise him for his aggression against their country. His minimum objective is to

destabilize Ukraine so that it cannot effectively reform itself and orient its policy toward Europe.

Putin has not stated these formally because they are not objectives that he can admit in polite society. But destabilizing Ukraine means that he cannot sit still in the territories that he has already conquered with his proxies. He has to continually stir the pot by military action and/or terrorism and subversion. A good example of terrorism is the bombs that were set off in Kharkiv, Ukraine's second largest city, that killed demonstrators at the November 2015 rally honoring those killed by snipers on Kyiv's Maidan Square.

Despite not stating them directly, Putin is not hiding his ambitions. While we do not know precisely when or where he may move next, we do know the candidates. The Kremlin has proclaimed its right to a sphere of influence throughout the post-Soviet space, as well as its right to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers wherever they reside. This would include Kazakhstan, where the Russian-speaking Slavic community comprises 25 percent of its population, as well as Estonia and Latvia, with similarly sized Russian-speaking communities. Furthermore, the sphere of influence includes not only the entire post-Soviet space, but also countries that, while not part of the Soviet Union, were members of the Warsaw Pact.

In August 2014, Putin called Kazakhstan an artificial country created by the genius of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Putin noted that Russians in Kazakhstan face no ill treatment under President Nazarbayev, but speculated that problems could arise once he passes from the scene. Kazakhstan's Slavs are located along the border with Russia, in areas that contain a good percentage of the country's oil

resources. Just as the West's weak reaction to Moscow's war against Georgia emboldened Putin to strike in Ukraine, so too will a Western-tolerated Kremlin victory in Ukraine endanger the former states of the Soviet Union. Is that an acceptable outcome for Western statesmen?

The danger goes beyond the grey zone whose states do not enjoy membership in the EU and NATO. While never recognized by the United States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were incorporated into the Soviet Union; two of those states—Estonia and Latvia—have large Slavic communities. A number of serious thinkers and statesmen say that Putin's reach will not extend to the Baltic States because they are members of NATO and thus have Article 5 protection under the NATO Charter. That is, of course, a critical deterrent, but is Putin willing to test this?

Putin has wondered publicly, as have other senior Russian officials, why NATO is still in existence. After all, they opine, it was created to stop the Soviet Union, which dissolved 25 years ago. It is no secret that the Kremlin would like to weaken the alliance (and the EU). And Putin has been playing games in the Baltics designed to do that and to challenge the applicability of Article 5 there. The list is not small. In addition to the 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia, the Kremlin kidnapped an Estonian counter-intelligence official from Estonian territory on September 5, 2014, the day the NATO summit ended and only two days after President Obama's visit to Tallinn. A few weeks later, Russia seized a Lithuanian ship from international waters in the Baltic Sea.

A New Danger to Europe in an Interconnected World

While Europe has been slowly coming to grips with the dangers of Kremlin aggression in the east, it has also faced a serious challenge from the south: instability in the Middle East and North Africa that produces massive migrant flows into Europe. Until the fall of 2015, these two challenges were seen as distinct, and largely unrelated. Putin's September 2015 intervention in Syria has changed that understanding.

Moscow's operation in Syria was designed principally to save the Assad regime, its long-time ally in the Middle East, from falling to various opposition forces, the strongest elements of which were the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other extremist Sunni groups. Only over time did it become clear that this intervention also gave the Kremlin a lever for putting pressure on Europe.

The Kremlin's operation in Syria has been limited largely to air power with some special forces on the ground. While claiming to be focused on the "terrorists"—whom the West identifies with ISIL and the other extremist Sunni groups—the Russians have devoted the vast majority of their attacks to the weaker, moderate opposition forces fighting the regime. Even against this weaker foe, Moscow initially enjoyed only limited success. By the end of 2015, Kremlin airpower in support of Syrian land forces (supplemented by Hezbollah and some Iranian Revolutionary Guards) had barely retaken any territory from any opposition groups. It had, however, stopped the loss of additional territory by the Assad regime.²⁷

Only in January 2016, supporting Syrian forces on the road to Aleppo, Syria's largest

city, did the Kremlin operation begin to produce substantial territorial gains. By bombing the towns leading to Aleppo, and then the ancient city itself, Russian airpower inflicted enormous civilian casualties. This was the strategy that Moscow employed successfully to win the second Chechen War in the late 1990s. In leveling Grozny, Chechnya's capital, and other population centers, Moscow finally achieved victory, but only after killing tens of thousands of civilians and turning 25 percent of Chechnya's population into internally displaced persons (IDPs).²⁸

By inflicting great casualties on fighters and civilians alike, Moscow's bombing campaign has permitted the advance of Assad's forces. At the same time, this bombing produced another massive wave of refugee flows into Turkey, exacerbating the already serious refugee crisis in Europe that is dominating the political landscape there. This crisis is increasing divisions in the EU between countries that have opposed accepting the refugees (for example, Hungary) and those insisting that all member states must do their share (for example, Germany). It is also empowering hard right parties in Europe that are neither committed to the goal of an integrated EU, nor concerned about Kremlin aggression in Eastern Europe. Finally, it calls into question a signature EU achievement—the Schengen Agreement, which led to the creation of Europe's borderless Schengen Area—as the European nations work out different and, even opposing, responses to the crisis.

The Kremlin's surprise announcement in early March that it had achieved its objectives in Syria and would thus gradually reduce its forces was followed by a renewed emphasis on negotiations between the Assad regime and the moderate and significantly weakened

opposition. At the same time, Russian forces remain in the area and continue military operations.

What the United States and the West Must Do

First, Western leaders need to understand the nature of Putin's threat. Buttressed by the world's second most formidable military as well as a large economy, he is intent on upsetting the post-Cold War order. This currently represents the principal threat to global order.

If Western leaders understood that Putin's ambitions extended to the entire post-Soviet space, including perhaps their Baltic NATO allies, they would recognize the West's vital stake in stopping Putin's aggression in Ukraine. They do not want Putin's grasping hand extending to additional countries, particularly Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, which NATO has an Article 5 obligation to defend. It is very much in their interest to make Putin's life so uncomfortable in Ukraine that he thinks twice about additional aggression.

In addition, Putin's war in Syria has opened a new front in Europe. The West must act promptly and decisively to stop the refugee flows before they destabilize Europe. Here responsibility lies primarily with Washington. With Russia in the game, only the United States has the military power to change the Syrian battlefield in ways that would alleviate the refugee crisis. The possibilities of diplomacy are shaped largely by the relative strength of the contending parties on the ground. The Russian intervention has succeeded in enhancing Assad's military position, which in turn has strengthened his position in Geneva peace talks.

Syria

The Kremlin's announcement in early March 2016 that it had accomplished its mission in Syria and was withdrawing some its forces has not changed the situation on the ground substantially. Significant Russian assets remain and the Russian bombing campaign continues, albeit at a lesser rate. Although a ceasefire has been established, it is not stringently observed and it does not include ISIL and other extremist groups.

In March, the West took important new steps to deal with the migration crisis. The EU's negotiations with Turkey appear to have persuaded Ankara to establish, with EU assistance, better facilities for the refugees which should reduce the flow to Europe.

Yet even with additional aid, Turkey might still find it convenient to permit a good number of refugees to leave the country for the EU. With this in mind, the West could consider taking advantage of the decrease in Russian air operations to establish a no-fly zone and civilian safe haven in northern Syria. Such measures would require American air power and tens of thousands of troops. Potential troop contributors might include France, Turkey, and some Arab states. Yet, even with the reduced Russian air activity, the risk of military confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers raised by pursuing such a course would be substantial.

A second possibility would be to use American military power to balance the battlefield. Moscow's principal aim in Syria is to shore up the Assad regime. It has chosen to do this by massive air attacks on moderate opposition forces—allies of the West—and the civilians among whom they live. The United States could offset this advantage by using its military

to destroy Syrian military hardware and to target advancing Syrian, Iranian, and Hezbollah forces, and their supply lines. American forces could use precision missile strikes to achieve most of these objectives, thereby reducing the danger of a direct American-Russian confrontation.

With Russia's veto-power in the UN Security Council, it is doubtful that the United States and Europe could get UN approval for the operation. The EU, however, could give a Europe-wide imprimatur to the operation, while the Arab League could provide a Middle Eastern one. Such an operation would thwart the Russian mission and, crucially, have international legitimacy. It would also give Moscow reason to reconsider its campaign and to agree to a superpower ceasefire in Syria. This would permit the establishment of a civilian safe haven in the country and perhaps open the door to U.S.-Russia-EU cooperation on a diplomatic track to end Syria's civil war. The current diplomatic effort, with Moscow in the lead, flows from Russia's military operation and is aimed at creating a choice between the Assad regime and Islamic extremists. The United States and its European allies have no interest in such a choice.

Ukraine

In Ukraine, the West's short-term objectives should be to prevent further Russian aggression, allowing President Poroshenko to reform and develop in peace the Ukrainian lands under his control. The middle-term goal should be to secure both the withdrawal of all Kremlin forces and equipment from the Donbass and the return of Ukrainian sovereignty to the occupied territories, thereby restoring Kyiv's control over its border. It would be preferable if this were accomplished


through the Minsk diplomatic process, but that process is stalled.

To increase the odds that Putin does not move beyond the current ceasefire line, and to persuade him to end the aggression in the Donbass, the West must address his vulnerabilities. He has at least two. First, his implicit deal with the Russian people is that he delivers prosperity and, in return, they leave him alone to run the country. By any standard, Putin has not kept his part of the bargain. The Russian economy is under serious pressure today because of the sectoral sanctions levied in the summer of 2014 by the United States and the EU, coupled with the sharp fall of hydrocarbon prices since the summer of 2015. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) calculated that Russian GDP fell by 3-3.5 percent in 2015 and wages dropped by 9.5 percent; it predicts that the Russian economy will fall another 1 percent in 2016. In private, senior Russian

economic officials have said that the drop in 2015 was in fact 4 percent of GDP and 10 percent in wages; they expect the same in 2016.²⁹

Sanctions have been renewed several times—on a six month basis—since the summer of 2014. It is essential that they remain in place until Ukraine regains full control of its eastern territories. Russian officials have publicly acknowledged that sanctions have cost the Russian economy 1–1.5 percent of GDP.³⁰ It would also be helpful if the United States and the EU agreed on new sectoral sanctions to impose if the Kremlin seizes additional territory in Ukraine, for instance the besieged city of Mariupol.

It is important to note that the Obama administration has done a good job; it understands that the key to success is to ensure that both the United States and the EU sanction Russia. Though there may be reluctance in corners of the EU, Washington has worked hard,



Russian Presidential Press and Information Office

Russian President Vladimir Putin and some of his top military brass, including Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu (left)

and largely with success, to impose sanctions in tandem with Europe.

Putin's second vulnerability concerns the use of his army in Ukraine. While his media have conducted an extensive smear campaign against Ukraine and its leadership, they have not been able to persuade the Russian people that Russian troops should be used there. Since the summer of 2015, numerous polls by Moscow's Levada Center have shown that a large majority of the Russian people oppose using troops in Ukraine.³¹ Because of this, Putin has denied the presence of Russian troops there, despite strong evidence to the contrary.³² For example, thousands of regular Russian troops were used in August and September of 2014 to stop Ukraine's counter-offensive.³³ In January 2015, Western intelligence estimates reported that there are anywhere between 250 to 1,000 Russian officers in Ukraine,³⁴ while Ukrainian intelligence claimed that there are as many as 9,000 or 10,000 Russian troops.³⁵ Even Putin finally acknowledged in December 2015 that there was "some" Russian military in the Donbass.³⁶

Whatever the number of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, casualties are a vulnerability for Putin. He is burying his dead in secret, increasing casualties make this more difficult to do. All this means that the United States should provide significant military aid to Ukraine: \$1 billion a year for three years. This should include secure communications equipment, drones, armored vehicles, long range counter-battery radar, and anti-armor systems, like Javelins. By doing so, the United States would assist in deterring further Russian aggression and allow for the stabilization of the rest of the country. Further, providing such equipment would also reduce Ukrainian casualties (over

75 percent of which are the result of missile fire) and increase Russian casualties.³⁷

Countering Revisionism Beyond Ukraine

The United States must act in two different geopolitical areas beyond Ukraine to deal with Moscow's revanchist tendencies. Most importantly, the U.S. must act decisively to strengthen NATO and deterrence in the new members of the Alliance, especially the Baltic States. NATO's presence in the Baltics must be sufficient to serve as a tripwire, making clear to the Kremlin that it will defend these countries. During the Cold War, 200,000 U.S. troops served as a trip wire in Germany. Today, NATO needs at least one battalion (400-800 troops) in each Baltic state to serve the same purpose. We also need sufficient military hardware in the Baltic States and forward deployed troops in Poland and elsewhere to reinforce this point.

After a slow start in 2014, the United States and NATO have taken substantial steps toward establishing this deterrence posture. In June 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced during a European tour that the United States would preposition tanks, artillery, and other military equipment in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States.³⁸ Early in 2016, the Pentagon announced that it would quadruple spending on the European Reassurance Initiative to \$3.4 billion.³⁹ These resources should be used to ensure that there are at least two properly equipped battalions in the Baltic States.

Even with these measures, however, NATO must take three additional steps. First, it must finally approve a contingency plan for "hybrid war" in the Baltic States. Secondly, it should cover both national and Alliance responsibilities in case of the appearance of

Kremlin provocateurs among the Slavic population of Estonia or Latvia. This plan should also include contingencies for small provocations, such as the kidnapping of the Estonian intelligence official, as well as a plan for dealing with cyber-attacks such as the one experienced by Estonia in 2007. Finally, NATO should conduct a formal review of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which was premised on the outdated notion of Russia as a partner of the West.

The second area that requires a new policy is the grey zone in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia where Moscow claims a sphere of influence. Do Western policymakers believe that Moscow has a right to order things in this area as it chooses, regardless of preferences of the other states? If not, the United States, NATO, and the EU need to consider measures that will strengthen these countries. Some are relatively simple. Countries interested in a stronger U.S. and/or NATO security connection, for instance, would certainly welcome more American or NATO military visits. For Georgia, that might mean increased port visits by a more active NATO in the Black Sea. In Central Asia, it could mean more CENTCOM visits to Uzbekistan. The United States might also enhance cooperation with all interested Central Asian states to offset the potential destabilizing impact of its withdrawal from Afghanistan. While this may seem counterintuitive, this last initiative need not exclude the Kremlin. Indeed, NATO and the EU can also help strengthen some nations on Russia's periphery by projects that include the Kremlin. This would also demonstrate that NATO and EU policies are designed not just to discourage Kremlin aggression, but also to resuscitate cooperation on matters of mutual interest.

Policy in the grey zone should also focus on state weaknesses that Moscow exploits to ensure its control. As discussed above, the Kremlin uses its intelligence services to recruit agents in the power ministries of the post-Soviet states. It also uses its firms to acquire key sectors of these countries' economies and to buy political influence. With interested countries, the United States and NATO should offer programs to help vet the security services and militaries to make clear that they both are under the full control of the political leaders in these states. At the same time, the United States and the EU should expand programs to uncover corruption in the financial and other sectors of these countries' economies.

Conclusion

Two years after Russia began to tear Ukraine apart, and seven years after it did the same in Georgia, the West is finally waking up to the danger of Kremlin revanchism. The process has been slow, but it is moving in the right direction. It has been slow, partly because the White House has fixated on avoiding imprudent interventions and to this day has dismissed Kremlin aggression as a regional problem. It has also been slow because many in Western Europe are still unwilling to accept the unpleasant reality that there is a major security problem to their east. This is evident among those politicians calling for the EU to lift sanctions on Moscow.

Still, the West is getting close to where it needs to be to deter aggression against members of NATO. It does, however, need a clearer and firmer policy to strengthen the countries of the grey zone to Moscow's west and the EU's east. This is particularly true for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, countries that would

like to develop democratic, open societies closely associated with the West.

Leaving them to the ministrations of the FSB is consistent with neither Western values nor interests. Nor is it consistent with the interests of the Russian people, who have need of a humane and prosperous society, not revisionism and tension with the West. The West can combine strong policies to deter Kremlin aggression with an open hand to further cooperation once Moscow decides that revisionism is a losing proposition. **PRISM**

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²⁴ Carol E. Lee, "G-7 Heads Warn Moscow Before Facing Putin," *Wall Street Journal*, June 5, 2014, <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-iran-nuclear-issues-on-g-7-agenda-1401962803>>.

²⁵ "Militants aided by Russia seized 500 square kilometers of Ukraine since Minsk Agreement," *Euromaidan Press*, January 20, 2015, <<http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/01/20/militants-aided-by-russia-seized-500-square-kilometers-of-ukraine-since-minsk-agreement/#arvlbdata>>; Nathan Francis, "Russia Sending More Troops, Heavy Weapons into Ukraine as Conflict Intensifies," *Inquisitr*, November 2, 2014, <<http://www.inquisitr.com/1580820/>

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²⁶ For example, it would give the local authorities the unique right to control the local police and to create and control a militia.

²⁷ Columb Strack, "Syrian government territorial gains just 0.4% since Russian military intervention," *HIS Jane's 360*, November 19, 2015, <<http://www.janes.com/article/56134/syrian-government-territorial-gains-just-0-4-since-russian-military-intervention>>.

²⁸ Mary Holland, "Chechnya's Internally Displaced and the Role of Russia's Non-Governmental Organizations," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 17, no. 3 (2004), <<https://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/3/334.abstract>>.

²⁹ International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Update," *IMF*, January 2016, <<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/update/01>>; Private Discussions in Europe, February 8-11, 2016.

³⁰ Interfax, "Western sanctions cost Russia 1.5% of GDP—Alexei Kudrin," *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, November 21, 2015, <http://rbth.com/business/2015/11/21/western-sanctions-cost-russia-15-of-gdp-alexei-kudrin_542921>.

³¹ Levada Center, "In case of renewed militarized action, should Russian army be deployed in Ukraine?" *Russia Votes*, November 14-17 2014, <<http://www.russiavotes.org/security/ukraine.php#713>>.

³² Karoun Demirjian, "Putin denies Russian troops are in Ukraine, decrees certain deaths secret," *Washington Post*, May 28, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-denies-russian-troops-are-in-ukraine-decrees-certain-deaths-secret/2015/05/28/9bb15092-0543-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story.html>.

³³ Pavel Felgenhauer, "Autumn Pause Follows Donbas August Fighting," *The Jamestown Foundation*, <http://www.jamestown.org/regions/europe/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44325&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=667&CHash=604db41436221f4a39624f24a3ca9ca9#.Vv7aevkrKU>.

³⁴ Ivo Daalder, Michele Flournoy, John Herbst, Jan Lodal, Steven Pifer, James Stavridis, Strove Talbott, and Charles Wald, *Preserving Ukraine's Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, February 2015).

³⁵ BBC Europe, "Russia has 9,000 troops in Ukraine—President Poroshenko," *BBC News*, January

21, 2015, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30913027>>.

³⁶ "Putin Acknowledges Russian Military Officers in Ukrainian Mainland," *Concorde Capital*, December 18, 2015, <<http://concorde.ua/en/research/daily/putin-acknowledges-russian-military-officers-in-ukrainian-14874/>>.

³⁷ Opponents of this idea argue that this would not deter the Kremlin because the Kremlin has escalation advantage and Ukraine is more important to Russia than the United States. It may be true that Ukraine is more important to Moscow than Washington, but it is not more important to Moscow than to Kyiv. And Kyiv and the Ukrainian people will continue to fight the aggressors. Why do we want to disadvantage the victims of aggression by denying them arms?

Some opponents of providing weapons argue that Kremlin military strength means that it can defeat any weapons system we provide. And if that happens, it would be geopolitical defeat for the United States. This is simply false. We can pursue a policy of weapons supply without taking responsibility for securing Moscow's defeat. We can provide weapons while making clear that we have no intention of using American troops. This was the successful rationale behind the Reagan Doctrine, which challenged Soviet overreach in Third World conflicts around the globe by providing weapons.

The last point is this. If we understand that Putin's aim of revising the post-Cold War order may mean aggression in countries beyond Ukraine, it is very much in our interest to make his experience in Ukraine as painful as possible. That will make him more vulnerable at home and will leave him with fewer resources for mischief elsewhere.

³⁸ Phil Stewart and David Mardiste, "U.S. to pre-position tanks, artillery in Baltics, eastern Europe," *Reuters*, June 23, 2015, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-europe-defense-idUSKBN0P315620150623>>.

³⁹ Phil Stewart and David Mardiste, "U.S. to Pre-Position Tanks, Artillery in Baltics, Eastern Europe," *Reuters*, June 23, 2015, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-europe-defense-idU.S.KBN0P315620150623>>; Andrew Rettman, "U.S. to Quadruple Military Spending in Europe," *EU Observer*, February 2, 2016, <<https://euobserver.com/foreign/132101>>.

Photos

Page 164. Photo by Anton Holoborodko. 2014. Little green men armed with AK-74Ms blockading Perevalne military base 25 kilometres south of Simferopol, 9 March 2014. From <[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_green_men_\(Ukrainian_crisis\)#/media/File:2014-03-09_-_Perevalne_military_base_-_0203.JPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_green_men_(Ukrainian_crisis)#/media/File:2014-03-09_-_Perevalne_military_base_-_0203.JPG)>. Licensed under Creative Commons 3.0 Unported license <<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>>. Photo unaltered.

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Page 175. Photo by Russian Presidential Press and Information Office. 2015. Vladimir Putin at the site Donguzskij (2015-09-19). From <[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_at_the_site_Donguzskij_\(2015-09-19\)_13.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_at_the_site_Donguzskij_(2015-09-19)_13.jpg)> licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en>>. Photo unaltered.

Book Reviews

Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World

By Ian Bremmer
Penguin Publishing Group, 2015
240 pages, \$27.95
ISBN: 978-1591847472

REVIEWED BY TOM FOX

It is common in any discussion of U.S. foreign policy to hear laments about our current lack of a “strategy.” Whether looking back at Iraq and Afghanistan, assessing options to deal with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Syria, or projecting the relationship with a rising China, foreign policy hands of all political bents consistently harp on the refrain that we do not have a national strategy. Ian Bremmer, the founder and president of the Eurasia Group, captures this problem neatly in his new book, *Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World*. He positions himself squarely in the critic's camp, but he does not limit his negative assessment to the current administration. Rather, he sees this lack of coherent American foreign policy strategy as stemming from the end of the Cold War. And he is not out only to criticize. His goal is to push the conversation

Captain Tom Fox, an Army Aviator, recently completed a tour at U.S. Army Pacific and is now a Master in Public Policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School.

forward and begin what he views as an essential debate for determining America's future.

Bremmer leads off with a quiz of sweeping abstract questions that each offer three responses. This exercise sets up his framework for the entire book. He offers three choices: Independent America, Moneyball America, and Indispensable America. The book is set up as an argument for each one in sequence, and wraps up with his final analysis about why choosing one is essential and which choice he recommends. The construct is engaging as he fully commits to making a strong case for all three of the vastly different options. He remains even-handed throughout, and I imagine that many will not know exactly where he will land at the end, as I was myself surprised.

In order to invest the reader in his framework, Bremmer's first two chapters set the stage with his analysis of where the world is now. He states that although America's relative power in foreign policy is shrinking, the capacity and growth potential of the country as a whole are vast and the U.S. remains a superpower. He cites the strength and diversity of the economy, the surge in domestic energy production, and America's favorable demographics as the key factors that give the country a unique competitive advantage in the near and mid-term future. He then assesses recent American foreign policy, reaching back to the end of the Cold War and arguing that we have stumbled significantly with the administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama in sequence. Bremmer deconstructs their failures and dismantles them all rather expediently on the grounds of “incoherence.” He does not give the American electorate a free pass either, as the American people continue to choose leaders more focused on domestic issues.

But again, his interest is not so much in criticism as it is in reinvigorating the debate about making a critical choice in foreign policy: what should America be now and in the future? The book has no qualms about perfectly positioning itself for a presidential election cycle. It is a fantastic starting point for the robust debate needed about the nation's values and priorities in dealing with the rest of the world. The complexity of international relations does not lend itself to sound bites and 30-second spots, but Bremmer argues that the first step is having this conversation and becoming more informed as a people. Only then will we have the foundational understanding we need to make the hard choices to secure America's future.

This brings Mr. Bremmer to his opening argument, that for Independent America. He leads with a quote from President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Chance for Peace" speech, which is not as oft-cited as his farewell address that cautions against the "military-industrial" complex, but is similarly powerful in its advocacy for non-military spending. The Independent America chapter focuses its energy on lambasting American overreach, ranging from our nation-building experiments to domestic surveillance and free trade. He argues that the best path to global leadership is instead to set an example for the world at home by focusing our spending on rebuilding crippled infrastructure, investing in education, and maintaining a right-sized military, while also living up to our commitments to our veterans. Bremmer maintains that this is not "isolationism," since that is an oversimplification of the argument. Rather, Independent America is the belief that we can have more influence abroad if we fix our domestic problems and become a proper showcase for American

values. Success at home will set the stage for other nations to follow suit and buy into American peace and prosperity.

Bremmer then turns to Moneyball America, hoping that there are enough baseball fans out there to appreciate his nod to Billy Beane's approach to maximizing value with advanced analytics. The baseline of this argument is that maximizing America's value, not its values, is the critical linchpin for achieving success in today's complex world. He leads on the security front, advocating for the Powell Doctrine's checklist in deciding whether war is worth it. Bremmer compares the two Iraq wars in this light and shows that the second adventure should have been avoided by applying that high standard. In the Moneyball vein, it is essential to not let emotion cloud cold-blooded rational and analytical assessment. To do this, Bremmer makes cost one of the key elements in dictating what America can and should do. He emphasizes the use of drones and sharing responsibilities with allies to further maximize efficiency in foreign policy. Moneyball America allows for and encourages negotiating with enemies, as flexibility is key in taking advantage of opportunities. Finally, Moneyball America relies heavily on the power of trade to secure America's interests abroad. Whether through the use of sanctions, American energy, or aggressive trade deals, America has an unmatched set of economic tools that we can use to advance our interests. This calculated vision of American foreign policy places economics first and steers clear of the idealistic notions of both isolationism and exceptionalism. Pragmatism instead reigns supreme.

Lastly, Bremmer comes to Indispensable America, the argument that most people will be very familiar with, as it has dominated U.S.

Government rhetoric (if not the actual policy decisions) since the end of the Cold War. *Indispensable America* holds American values as supreme and the inevitable march of freedom and democracy as essential to eventual global peace and prosperity. Only the United States can lead that charge because only it has the resources to remain engaged in every region of the world, pursuing American interests and spreading American values. This comprehensive strategy keeps the United States militarily engaged in securing the commons while also aggressively pursuing economic engagement that promotes free-market values. *Indispensable America* relies on democracy and capitalism as the cornerstones for ensuring the arc of history bends toward peace and freedom. The U.S.-China relationship is critical here, but *Indispensable America* maintains that in the long-term, we must empower the Chinese people to eventually realize control of their own government. Bremmer couches *Indispensable America* in the grandest and most ambitious rhetorical American traditions and argues that only in this way can we live up to our own destiny.

Having laid out these three calls for clarity in foreign policy, Bremmer then moves to argue how essential it is to choose. However attractive it might be to pick and choose elements from each or even to continue to muddle through without a foreign policy, he maintains that a cohesive foreign policy sets a course for stability because it shows the rest of the world what America stands for, regardless of what that is. That alone would produce some order in the increasingly more dangerous and disordered world. Here, Bremmer reminds us about the value of decisiveness with a quote often attributed to Theodore Roosevelt: "In any moment of decision, the best thing you

can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing." In Bremmer's analysis, the time for America to choose is now: we and the rest of the world will be better off with any of the three options presented.

Before he concludes, Bremmer reminds his reader that the book is more about the reader's choice than his own. He also says that the book itself was an exercise for him to figure out where exactly he stood on the question at hand. This construct helps to make the book an enjoyable read because it is inevitable that the reader will feel the tug of each of the arguments. In the end, *Indispensable America* falls short for him because it does not reflect an accurate assessment of American power right now. As he puts it, "America cannot play the same role in 2020 that it played in 1945, 1970, or even 1990." Although one might think that this would put him into the Moneyball camp, he is against that approach mostly because of its lack of vision. Bremmer does not believe that Americans would buy into something that puts "value over values," and he knows how deep exceptionalism runs. For this reason, he believes we should channel that energy into an Independent America policy. Values do matter, but he posits that we can best spread those values through our example. He again renounces isolationism here, as well as adventurism. He emphasizes that we must make this transition slowly in order to afford our allies, particularly Germany and Japan, the time to build up their capacity to defend themselves. He also believes that trade is an essential part of a viable Independent America strategy, in contrast to the anti-free trade view he espoused in his initial argument.

He concludes by once again arguing that choice is essential, and it is the choice of the

reader—and by extension the American electorate—that will set the course for our country. His book succeeds in advancing the conversation and encouraging a comprehensive and strategic approach to foreign policy. Although his framework of only three options is relatively simple, it does a fairly good job of capturing a wide continuum of differing mindsets. One could also criticize the work for offering very little in the way of specifics for any of the three options. Of particular note for a military audience was that all three visions included mention of decreased defense spending, a premise that alone could take an entire book to convince some to even consider.

Nonetheless, the purpose of the book is not to finely detail the policies of each strategy, but instead to outline them and encourage a choice within the framework. In that goal, he succeeds. This work is an excellent starting point for an important debate, particularly in an election season. Although it is probably too optimistic to hope for such a nuanced and serious discussion to happen in the public arena, it is fair to expect our policymakers, their staffs, and our citizens to take a harder look at what matters for America. As we all prepare to go to the polls, we should understand better where our priorities in foreign policy lie. This book provides a strong opening salvo for three different visions and a useful structure for discerning one's own choice for the proper role of America in the world. It is only fitting that Bremmer offers an open-ended conclusion: "May we choose wisely."

PRISM

**Terreur dans l'Hexagone:
Genèse du djihad français
[Terror in the Hexagon: The
Genesis of French Jihad]**

By Gilles Kepel, with Antoine Jardin
Gallimard

ISBN: 978-2070105625

REVIEWED BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

T*error in the Hexagon*¹ is a frightening and authoritative work written for France and, by extension, for the United States. It presents a detailed analysis of the interaction of French society and political Islam over the past decade. This interactional element is of critical importance because, unlike most works on the rise of jihad, this study understands its growth in France as a dynamic between the host population and its leaders and those of the foreign immigrants.

Ten percent of the French population is Muslim. Although France has historically been a melting pot for small groups of minorities, Muslim immigrants have faced—and continue to face—challenges in regard to both French culture and French attitudes toward immigrants, as well as to the very question of what it means to be "French." As important as culture is in France, though, this is not merely a cultural struggle; it is just as deeply an

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economic and a socio-economic struggle on a very personal level for youth who find themselves marginalized and stuck in low-income housing with little hope of finding employment, realizing themselves, or improving their lot. And so it becomes political, a struggle for power—over one's self, one's soul, and one's personal and professional satisfaction in life.

Half a century ago, Algeria was considered by the French to be an integral part of their country; the Algerians, however, were not treated as Frenchmen. When a number of Algerian leaders, including members of the Front de Libération Nationale (the FLN or National Liberation Front), protested that they were not French but Algerian and revolted, France played into their hands by treating all Algerians as rebels and so made its final contribution to nationalist solidarity. "You are not French but Algerian, so act Algerian," they were told by their leaders. Today, many French Muslims feel deep discrimination and so political entrepreneurs tell them, "You are not French but Muslim, so act Muslim," thus conferring a political identity on Islam as a religion. Unlike in Algeria, however, these political entrepreneurs have not succeeded to the same degree in France. In the process, though, the situation has played back into French society and into the political Islam movement as well. This is the message of Kepel's work.

The story begins with the riots of Ramadan in 2005, when youth took to the streets, sometimes violently, to protest the living conditions in the housing agglomerations, dreary and anonymous caserns in the suburbs of Paris that left young people with no place to work, play, or simply hang out, and marked a generational evolution in the political attitudes of the immigrant population. The older generation of North Africans that came after the end

of the Algerian War of Independence in 1962 was mainly interested in integration, both economically and socially, but also sought to retain their religion (without extremism). They sought to exercise their right to vote and in numerous cases were elected to local councils. For the youth, however, more vigorous action burst forth to protest their living conditions. The counter-reaction was swift, beginning with then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy's dismissal of the rioters as "a band of riffraff," but crystalizing into the more serious growth of Jean-Marie LePen's xenophobic National Front. Pressed from the new right, Sarkozy, having become president of France, continued to disparage the immigrant population, to the point that when he sought reelection in 2012, the immigrants voted massively to put François Hollande into office. That vote, however, was not repaid—a *trompe l'oeil* victory, as Kepel calls it—and the Muslim immigrants were ready for a further evolution in their political attitudes.

At the same time, political entrepreneurs stood ready in the Middle East to take advantage of the situation of Muslim populations there. The first phase—although in reality it was already the third phase mirroring the evolution of the immigrant attitudes and a longer reach into the past²—started with the attempts of national fundamentalist movements to cleanse their own governments of corrupt and impious rulers who did not take care of the physical and spiritual welfare of their own populations. Among those included were the mujahideen and then the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria. (Only the mujahideen in Afghanistan were successful.) The second phase was the transnational movement al-Qaeda, which

thought it useless to attack Arab governments because they depended ultimately on support from the far enemy in the West. They thus believed their destructive efforts should instead be focused on long-distance dramatic attacks on the heart of globalization and imperialism in the United States. The result was the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001. When this created only solidarity against their efforts, however, a third strategy was conceived: to operate “not as an organization but as a system (*nizam, la tanzim*)” and to make random attacks against the soft underbelly of the near enemy, Europe. Resident agents in the United Kingdom and in Spain responded to the appeal to “act as Muslims” and carried out attacks against Madrid and London in March 2004 and July 2005, respectively. (The “system” was one of the networks or rhizomes that lived off of social media, which then became so characteristic of youth movements of the Arab Spring).³

This strategy of three phases was the basis of the *Appeal to World Islamic Resistance*, published on the internet in 2005 by Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (known as Abu Musab al-Suri), a Syrian-born, naturalized Spanish engineer hiding in Baluchistan, Pakistan. A significant contribution of Kepel’s book is to bring attention to the work of al-Suri, relatively unknown by commentators among the names of jihad leaders. Al-Suri advocated grassroots terrorist action carried out against civilians in order to sow fear, inspired by but not organized from the top, and characterized by individuals acting in loose networks. (Kepel references a Quranic verse as the oft-cited justification for the use of terrorism, though the term is used in the context of conventional war, not attacks on civilians).⁴ Although it is never clear from the account the extent to

which al-Suri was known to terrorists, his work was widely disseminated. Kepel dates the advent of the third phase with the killing of four Jewish children and a Moroccan policeman by Mohammed Merah in 2012, continuing to the horrific attacks in Paris in November 2015 that left 130 people dead and another 368 injured. These are all terrifying examples of al-Suri’s prescriptions. The June 2016 attack on the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, could likewise be included as part of the third phase, as Kepel describes the particular repugnance with which Islamic extremists view homosexuals, whom a hadith orders to be killed.

The implications of this strategy of terrorism are deeply disturbing. Prevention depends on refined information and security over a swarm of individuals, a hydra without a head, not on breaking an organization or its center (despite the pretentious name of the Islamic State or the Caliphate, which facilitates the funding and networking of individuals to commit violence in its name). Terrorism is effective in creating a massive reaction of fear and xenophobia among French voters and commentators alike, which then helps political entrepreneurs win the hearts and minds of the ordinary Muslim population. Ironically, the religious context, twisted but powerful, is further invigorated by the anti-religious sentiment of present-day, nominally Catholic France, and then exacerbated—as the book highlights—by the political support for same-sex marriage and the prohibition of wearing veils that derive from the particular interpretation of France’s constitutional secularism. Above all, however, the incitation of violent extremism is perfectly adapted to take root in the fertile soil of neglect, unemployment, and

aimlessness that turns deprivation into discrimination and revenge.⁵

The most disturbing of the implications is that once the vicious circle of the security dilemma has been activated, it is hard to unwind. Feelings of tolerance, acceptance, and assimilation are not easily generated, and it is not easy to roll back deep-seated discrimination. The need for identity and realization are not quickly satisfied by new measures. Economic crises and recessions, and the pressures of immigration and social disintegration are current concerns not susceptible to rapid policy remedies, and their absence only exacerbates the feelings of neglect and alienation. The United States is not France, but the latitude is the same.

The message is so compelling that it calls for at least some suggestions for a positive response. The weakest part of the work is the nearly total absence of a prescription. The book ends with a half page proposing the ultimate appeal: public education, notably high school and university! Unfortunately, to counter people who firmly believe in immediate salvation in an unknown "Other World" of their inspired imagination, the response of this world has to be a good deal more developed than that. Kepel's book is informing and terrifying (as the Islamists want), and should likewise be galvanizing. But to what end? It tells us to avoid extreme reactions to extremes, but what is the effective middle? A responsive policy was within reach in Hollande's election, where he could have rewarded his supporters with a targeted program of improvement of living conditions, showing that the government cared. It would have taken courage and decision, something in short supply in the government, and it would have been in keeping with the Socialist Party's ideals, currently also

out of reach. It would also require more assiduous intelligence and police work. The same prescriptions still hold, but it is now even more difficult. It will take more than welfare and security policy—it will take leadership to convince the French public to fold over 10 percent of its population into its melting pot.

PRISM

Notes

¹ "The Hexagon" is a casual synonym for the mainland part of metropolitan France that is derived from the approximate shape of the country.

² I. William Zartman, "Political Dynamics of the Maghrib: The Cultural Dialectic," in *Contemporary North Africa*, ed. Halim Barakat (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

³ Heba Raouf and Ali al-Raggal, "Egypt: Can a Revolution be Negotiated?," in *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat*, ed. I. William Zartman (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015).

⁴ In his writing, Kepel cites verse 40 of Surah 8; the correct verse is 60 of Surah 8.

⁵ Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman, eds., *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed* (Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005).

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